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Abstract 
Darwin's development of his theory of descent with modification by natural selection 
effected a profound transformation of teleological thinking in biology. In what sense, 
and through which means his theoretical discoveries can be said to have overcome 
metaphysical teleology and to have initiated and informed current ideas on what 
scientifically legitimate "teleological" explanation in biology should consist of, is the 
question investigated by this thesis. Two main claims (which are really two sides of the 
same coin) are being defended: 
In the first place, the contention is that Darwin's efforts to elaborate a theory of 
evolution that could comply with the requirements of a certain empiricist (vera causa) 
philosophy of science, enabled him to undermine metaphysical teleological explanation 
in biology. Through having posited natural selection as the empirical causal process 
responsible for all the wonderful features of living phenomena, Darwin dispensed with 
the need for appeals to revealed theology's argument from special creation, as well as 
with appeals to natural theology's argument from design. The collapse of these kinds of 
metaphysical explanation was an important precondition for the emergence of any 
properly scientific account of adaptational phenomena, that is to say, of any 
scientifically legitimate model of "teleological" explanation. 
In the second place, the contention is - and this again by virtue of the kind of empirical 
historical process he envisaged as the cause of adaptations - that Darwin indeed 
initiated such a new scientifically legitimate model of teleological explanation. Darwin 
provided teleological explanation, for the first time, with a proper causal basis (natural 
selection) - a crucial legacy to present-day biology. However, the explication of that 
model had to wait until well into the present century. It now goes under the name of an 
etiological approach to goals and functions, and is the model which, in my view, not 
only offers the closest approximation to Darwin's own conceptualisation of the 
explanation of adaptational phenomena, but which is, moreover, the most fundamental 
model for both explanatory and historical reasons. Finally, given Darwin's initiating of 
the latter model, we can now seriously consider altogether discarding the designation 
"teleological" when speaking of current biological explanation of apparently functional 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
and goal-directed phenomena. 
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Abstrak 
Darwin se ontwikkeling van sy teorie van evolusie deur natuurlike seleksie het 'n 
diepgaande transformasie in teleologiese denke in biologie teweeg gebring. Die vraag 
aan die orde in hierdie tesis het betrekking op die sin waarin, en die wyse waarop, 
Darwin se teoretiese ontdekkinge metafisiese teleologie oorkom het, en ook 
kontempOrE3re idees oor hoe wetenskaplik legitieme "teleologiese" verklaring in biologie 
daar moet uitsien, ge·inisieer en informeer het. Twee hoofaansprake (wat in werklikheid 
twee kante van dieselfde munt is) word hier verdedig: 
Eerstens, word geargumenteer dat Darwin se pogings om 'n teorie van evolusie te 
ontwikkel wat kon voldoen aan die vereistes van 'n bepaalde empiristiese (vera causa) 
wetenskapsfilosofie, hom daartoe in staat gestel het om metafisiese teleologiese 
verklaring in biologie te ondermyn. Deur natuurlike seleksie aan te bied as die 
empiriese kousale proses verantwoordelik vir al die merkwaardige eienskappe van 
lewende fenomene, kon hy wegdoen met beroepe op openbaringsteologie se argument 
van besondere skepping, sowel as met beroepe op natuurlike teologie se argument van 
ontwerp. Die ondergang van hierdie soort metafisiese verklarings was 'n belangrike 
voorwaarde vir die ontwikkeling van 'n werklik wetenskaplike beskouing van adaptasie-
fenomene, dit is, van 'n wetenskaplik legitieme model van "teleologiese" verklaring. 
Tweedens, word geargumenteer - en weer eens kragtens die empiriese, historiese 
proses wat hy voorgestel het as die oorsaak van adaptasies - dat Darwin inderdaad so 
'n nuwe en wetenskaplik legitieme model van teleologiese verklaring ge·inisieer het. Hy 
was die eerste om teleologiese verklaring van 'n behoorlik kousale basis (natuurlike 
seleksie) te voorsien - 'n belangrike erfiating aan hedendaagse biologie. Nietemin, die 
eksplikasie van die model moes wag tot relatief onlangs in die huidige eeu. Dit gaan 
nou onder die benaming van 'n eti%giese beskouing van funksies en doelwitte, en is 
die model wat na my mening nie net die beste benadering bied van Darwin se eie 
konseptualisering van die verklaring van adaptasie-fenomene nie, maar wat ook die 
mees fundamentele model is - vir beide verklarings- en historiese redes. Ten slotte, 
gegee Darwin se inisiering van laasgenoemde model, is dit nou moontlik om ernstige 
oorweging te gee aan die gewensdheid al dan nie van voortgaande gebruik van die 
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benaming "teleologies" wanneer dit gaan oor hedendaagse biologiese verklaring van 
skynbaar funksionele en doel-gerigte fenomene. 
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1 
Introduction 
"Teleology is alive and well in the natural sciences". - Many a philosopher will sit upright 
on hearing this statement pronounced. After all, did teleological thinking not belong to a 
medieval world-view we have long since rid ourselves of? Did it not form part of those 
metaphysical ways of thought that were once and for all overthrown as the scientific 
world-view gained ascendancy during the past few centuries? Is teleology not the direct 
antithesis of science? Anyone asserting that teleological reasoning - which historically 
has been an obstacle to the development of what we now know as modern 
science - forms part of that very science, can therefore not be in his/her right mind. 
However, provided the person hearing the above statement is a philosopher of science, 
s/he may not be all that surprised, but will use the opportunity to point out that the 
statement as it stands is somewhat misleading and in need of one ortwo qualifications. 
In the first place, instead of applying the claim to the natural sciences generally, we 
should narrow it down to biology alone - in other words, to that natural science dealing 
with living systems. In the second place, rather than employing the term "teleology" with 
all its metaphysical baggage, we may do better by inventing other, less ambiguous 
terms - terms and phrases such as "teleonomy", "goal-directedness", and "explanation 
in terms of apparent goals and functions" - that will be able to capture the specifically 
scientific sense the notion has acquired in recent biological reasoning. 
The aim of the present thesis is to spell out in precisely what sense "teleology" is today 
alive and well in biological science, and to show that it was none other than Charles 
Darwin (1809-1882) in his main work, the Origin of Species (1859), who laid the 
foundations for a new naturalised teleology that was to replace the metaphysical 
teleology whose reign in biology extended from Aristotle onwards and well into the 
nineteenth century. 
The present introductory chapter will do four things: Firstly, a few brief remarks will be 
1 
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made on the history of teleological thinking up to Darwin's day and into the first half of 
the twentieth century - teleology being understood as the explanation or understanding 
of phenomena in terms of their supposed purposes, goals or functions. Secondly, an 
important current model of teleological explanation will be sketched. Thirdly, challenges 
posed for teleological explanation by the requirements of the deductive-nomological 
model, as well as by other charges as to its non-scientific nature, will be recorded. 
Fourthly, a more detailed statement of the thesis will be presented, outlining the 
framework within which Darwin's contribution to a scientifically legitimate model of 
teleological explanation will be investigated. 
Aristotle and since 
Our story commences in the third century B.C. with Aristotle's influential treatment of 
causation. His classification of the latter into four distinct types of causes, namely, the 
material, formal, efficient and final causes, is chiefly of interest to us here for the 
identification of the fourth cause - definable as "the cause responsible for the orderly 
reaching of a preconceived ultimate goal" (Mayr, 1961 [1976:364]). Many centuries 
later, Darwin himself would also employ the expression "final cause" to convey insights 
regarding the goals and functions of phenomena. But by then he had rid the term of all 
the metaphysical associations (such as supernatural purpose, or an active soul inhering 
in things) it had acquired since Aristotle. 
Significantly, Aristotle was a biologist first and foremost. The notion of final causes 
acquired prominence in his thinking precisely because of his concern with living 
phenomena - in which goal-directedness seems evident (Mayr, 1961 [1976:364). From 
the biological domain the idea of final causes was transposed to other phenomena as 
well. A teleological explanation, whether of a biological or physical or social 
phenomenon, was to identify the final cause of the phenomenon; it was to "make an 
event intelligible through ascribing a purpose to it" (Doyal & Harris, 1986:28). But 
purpose was to be understood in a metaphysical sense: things derived their purpose 
from their specific nature and from the place they were thought to occupy within the 
eternal order of the cosmos. 
Generally, then, Aristotelians explained the physical behaviour of objects in terms of the 
2 
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purposes associated with their material constitution. When they moved purposively and 
unhindered, they did so 'naturally' and, therefore, no further explanation of their behaviour 
was required. Similar considerations were said to apply to the celestial world. The apparent 
circular and uniform notion of the stars around the earth was also explained as 'natural' in 
this sense. No further explanation was believed to be needed [ ... ] Why does a boy grow into 
a man? Why does an acorn become an oak? Aristotle and his medieval followers answered 
with reference to future purpose or 'natural potential'. 
(Doyal & Harris, 1986:29). 
The ancient idea of a hierarchical, geocentric cosmos in which each and every species, 
individual and entity had its assigned place and purpose in accordance with their 
respective fixed natures, was passed on more or less intact to the Middle Ages - the 
main modification being the replacement of the pagan conception of the universe as 
having existed from all eternity, with the conception of a time-bound world miraculously 
created and sustained by a benevolent Christian God whose purposeful designs it 
reflected. Given the continuities between the ancient and medieval world-views, it 
proved not too difficult for Thomas Aquinas to merge Aristotelian thought - its non-
Christian nature notwithstanding - with medieval Christian thought after Aristotle's works 
have been rediscovered in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
Christian teleology did less well, however, when the Middle Ages was brought to a 
close by the emergence of modern science during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Geocentrism was replaced by heliocentrism, and profound changes took 
place in the understanding of nature. Nature's workings were increasingly thought of as 
similar to those of a machine. Thinking of nature in mechanistic terms entailed viewing it 
as essentially purposeless matter regulated by universal laws. Corresponding to the 
new conception of nature were, as John Burrow (1968:16) remarks, new models of 
inquiry for studying matter, models "which presupposed regular sequences of cause 
and effect and seemed to leave little or no room for the interpositions of a miracle-
working deity". The practice of rendering things and events intelligible through reference 
to their supposed inherent teleological purposes, was thereby simply pushed to the 
background by the new kinds of reasoning that were intent on revealing physical 
regularities in the interest of control over nature. The overriding concern with how things 
work in terms of the way past events affect or determine present events, and present 
3 
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events affect or determine future ones could not but be alien to the teleological mode of 
explanation in which the occurrence of present events is accounted for by their relation 
to future purposes. (Doyal & Harris, 1986:30-31). 
Following Descartes' mechanistic philosophy many saw living phenomena not as 
qualitatively different from those that made up inanimate nature. The former were 
widely believed to be equally explicable in terms of mechanistic principles. Nonetheless, 
not all thinkers were in accord on this point. Mayr (1974 [1976:384]) notes that the 
history of the biological sciences from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries is 
characterized by a constant battle between extreme mechanists, who explained everything 
purely in terms of movements and forces, and their opponents, who often went to the 
opposite extreme of vitalism. 
The rejection by thinkers like Bacon, Descartes, d'Holbach and La Mettrie of vitalism 
and final causes in biology, was accompanied by the belief that biological terminology 
should be purged of all teleological language. There could be no talk of purpose even 
where growth, behaviour and adaptive structures were concerned. (Mayr, 1961 
[1976:359]; 1974 [1976:383]). In opposition to such mechanistic materialism, there 
sometimes developed certain idealist, vitalist and romanticist tendencies in 
biology - from relatively moderate to extreme - which in different ways hoped to salvage 
something of the uniqueness of living beings by denying that they could be wholly 
reduced to, and explained in terms of physico-:-chemical events. Approaches ranged 
from positing some kind of purposive metaphysical vital force active in organisms or 
even in the universe as a whole, to the more modest claim arising from practical study 
that there is some kind of inexplicable x related to the functioning of organisms that we 
might just as well call a vital force. 1 
On the whole then, one can say that although mechanistic reductionism was not 
entirely absent from the biological sciences, there had emerged - by the time of the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries - something like a consensus regarding the 
1 See the remarks by Mayr (1965 [1976:372-376]) on our having to distinguish between the 
sober, descriptive vitalists of nineteenth century physiology (the later Johannes MOiler and 
Claude Bernard) and the speculative vitalism of Henri Bergson (elan vital) and Driesch 
(entelechy). Note also his distinction between the influence of vitalism and Naturphilosophie 
4 
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continuing need of a notion of purpose or design in the understanding of living beings. It 
was conceded that chemistry and physics could get along without asking what things 
were for. There it was enough to assume that God had created certain impersonal and 
universal laws which made things behave in certain ways. But the same was not 
conceded for biology, as here it seemed evident that God specially created all the 
various organisms, endowing them with the marvellous contrivances they needed for 
their respective places in his creation. It was thus through Rational Christianity and its 
concomitant, Natural Theology, that the crisis of traditional religion and teleology (at 
least in England) were temporarily overcome.2 But this happened at the 
cost of some of the more miraculous and emotional elements in Christianity. Instead of the 
goodness of God being the guarantee of the goodness of the creation, it was the latter which 
became the prime guarantee of the existence and goodness of the God spoken of in 
revelation. Science and religion seemed to cohabit smoothly in the ordered and harmonious 
universe revealed by that devout Christian, Sir Isaac Newton. 
(Burrow, 1968:18). 
However, as the nineteenth century progressed, this smooth cohabitation of science 
and religion became increasingly imperilled. A growing historical awareness occasioned 
by new geological and palaeontological discoveries eroded belief in old (biblical) 
conceptions of the impossibility of species extinction, and of the relative youth of the 
human race and the earth. Evolutionary ideas have been steadily becoming more 
prominent since the previous century, culminating in Darwin's breakthrough in 1859, 
which eventually caused the final rupture in the relation between scientific thinking and 
religious or metaphysical teleology. In natural selection Darwin found something akin to 
a blind mechanistic principle, an impersonal mechanism devoid of purpose which could 
nevertheless account for the apparent design we observe in organic life. With one 
stroke natural theology was shown to be superfluous. If God existed he was the remote 
God of deism who merely put everything into motion by providing certain laws and 
causal processes that then took their due course. None of the well-adapted species 
populating the world was specially and individually created through his personal care. 
Not even humankind. That meant that evidence of the wonders of life no longer forced 
(Schelling, Oken, Carus) respectively. 
2 See Burrow (1968:17-18). 
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one to infer the existence of a benevolent personal creator. Indeed, once one starts 
concentrating on secondary causes (rather than on direct divine intervention), doubting 
the necessity and real existence of a First Cause behind it all is not that far off. 
With biology now manifestly in the same boat as physics and chemistry, a renewed 
effort was made to eradicate the use of teleological explanations from the former. The 
writings of Driesch and Bergson in the early twentieth century represented a last 
extreme attempt to resurrect a metaphysical teleology from the ashes of vitalism. But 
the new philosophies of logical positivism and logical empiricism showed no mercy 
when faced with such speculative endeavours: 
Twentieth-century scientific philosophy arose in a philosophical context dominated by post-
Kantian and post-Hegelian German idealism. It was heavily infused with transcendental 
metaphysics and theology. The early logical positivists and logical empiricists saw it as part 
of their mission to overcome such influences. As philosophers of science they were eager to 
expunge from science any contamination by super-empirical factors arising out of these 
philosophies. One such item was teleology, whether in the form of an appeal to the will of a 
supernatural being who created and continues to direct the course of nature, or in the form 
of such empirically inaccessible agencies as entelechies or vital forces. 
(Salmon, 1990:4). 
Things did not improve much for teleological reasoning during the next few 
decades - from a science-philosophical viewpoint its logical and empirical status 
continued to be regarded as suspect. This was probably partly the case because the 
philosophy of biology never really got off the ground until the 1960s or even the 1970s. 
That meant that the enunciation in 1948 of what later became known as the deductive-
nomological (D-N) model, by Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim in their classic 
article, "Studies in the logic of explanation", provided the impetus for the basic 
consensus on the nature of scientific explanation. Also called the received view, it 
attained its peak in the 1960s (Salmon, 1990:3). The immediate aftermath of this model 
was a further discrediting of teleological explanations because they did not seem to fit 
the D-N structure. Before elaborating upon the criteria in terms of which the deductive-
nomological model measured and rejected teleological explanation, a tentative account 
of an important current model of teleological explanation will be presented. 
6 
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A current model 
After the logical positivist witch-hunt earlier in the century, and in the face of the rise of 
the deductive-nomological model, the status of teleological explanations nevertheless 
began undergoing a slow rehabilitation, so that by 1958 - the year before Hempel's 
treatment of the issue - Pittendrigh could remark that given the demise of vitalism at the 
beginning of the century, biologists could again afford to make statements such as "a 
turtle came ashore to lay her eggs", instead of the non-teleological "she came ashore 
and laid her eggs" (Mayr, 1974 [1976:384]). All the same, this did not mean that an 
adequate explication of the notion had yet been provided. Resolving the difficulties was 
up to the next decade or two. 
In Larry Wright's seminal work, Teleological Explanations, which appeared in 1976, was 
provided an important model of teleological explanation which seemed to overcome at 
least some of the debilitating charges that could be hurled at older forms of teleological 
reasoning. Moreover, it will be my contention below that a modified version of Wright's 
model approximates the closest to Darwin's own ideas on teleological explanation. 
Although it will be the core ideas of Wright's initial etiological analysis of goals and 
functions that will be the theme of the present section, we shall see in the fourth chapter 
how this initial model can be supplemented to eliminate its remaining weak points. 
But first an important terminological point that is long overdue: I follow David Hull 
(1974:103) in using teleological "in a generic, metaphysically neutral sense to refer to 
all statements [or explanations] couched in terms of goals, purposes, and functions". 
The term thus encompasses the metaphysical and the non-metaphysical. It also 
encompasses goal-directed, functional and purposive relations. 3 We shall see that goal-
directed and functional explanations are in important respects similar, but that 
functional explanations have a broader range in that they apply to things other than 
behaviour and processes. Drawing upon Wright, that with which these two kinds of 
teleological explanation are concerned, namely, goal-directedness and functionality, 
can be characterised as follows: 
3 Purposive could be reserved for cases where conscious human behaviour is the 
paradigm - that will however not concern us here. 
7 
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Goal-directedness will be reserved for activities, processes (such as growth), and 
behaviours that are directed to the achievement of certain ends. "The rabbit is running 
in order to escape from the dog", can serve as an example of such behaviour. Wright 
(1976:39) offers the following characterisation of teleological (or what could be called 
goal-directed or "teleonomical")4 behaviour: 
S does B for the sake of G iff: 
(i) B tends to bring about G. 
(ii) B occurs because (Le., is brought about by the fact that) 
it tends to bring about G. 
Functionality in biology, on the other hand, applies to "those situations in which the 
organization of living creatures is paradigmaticii (Hull, 1974: 1 03). Or, put less vaguely 
(but also more generally, in that the definition includes the functions of inanimate 
human artifacts, as well as allowing for goal-directed behaviour to have a function on 
top of its goal-directedness) by Wright (1976:81): 
The function of X is Z iff: 
(i) Z is a consequence (result) of X's being there, 
(ii) X is there because it does (results in) Z. 
Thus, "the heart beats in order to circulate blood" is an example of a statement 
concerning the heart's function. It is also an instance of a "natural function", that is, a 
function relating to the structure or behaviour of organisms - as opposed to what Wright 
calls "conscious functions".5 
To further clarify the relation between goals and functions, we can say that functions 
and goals are both consequences in causal sequences; but more particularly, a 
4 Mayr's (1974 [1976]) adoption of the term (teleonomy) Pittendrigh introduced in 1958 may 
be a good idea, because the use of a separate term denoting goal-directed behaviour that 
is understood in a non-metaphysical sense, may help to prevent a lot of confusion. 
However, I do not necessarily go along with Mayr's additional specification that the goal-
directed ness be due to the operation of a program. 
S Conscious functions are functions we ascribe where human artifacts or intent are involved, 
e.g., "the function of the newspaper shoved under the door is to block a draft". See Wright 
(1976:75-76). 
8 
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function is a consequence of some component (e.g. an organ) of a system (e.g. 
organism), and likewise, a goal is a consequence of some activity (e.g. behaviour) of a 
system. Put differently, when something is said to have a function, it means that that 
something forms an integral and important component in some organismic process or 
system. The "components" of which functions are consequences need therefore not 
always be entities such as organs; even goal-directed activities can be functional when 
regarded from the perspective of another more encompassing process in which the 
activity plays a constituent role. Goals, on the other hand, are never the consequences 
of things, but rather of activities or behaviours. (For instance, the goal of the impala's 
running away is to escape the lion; the function of such escaping is survival. Again, the 
function of the heart is the circulation of blood, but the heart has no goal.)6 
As for the nature of goal-directed and functional explanations, they have in common 
what Wright has termed a consequence-etiology. Both offer an etiology, that is, a 
causal account of the occurrence or presence of certain behaviours/entities, and do so 
in terms of the consequences of these types of behaviours/entities. The consequences 
concern the reaching of certain goals or the fulfilment of certain functions. However, an 
explanation in terms of a goal or a function is not invalidated by the failure in any 
particular instance of the behaviour/entity in question to reach its goal or fulfil its 
function. An "in order to" relation is still present. Failure and malfunction does not take 
away from the fact that the behaviour occurs or the entity is present for the sake of (that 
is, because of) the goal/function. How exactly this claim can be justified in a non-
metaphysical way by reference to the causal history of the phenomena in question, as 
well how one can more accurately distinguish between beneficial consequences that 
are goals/functions and ones that are not, will be the subject of the fourth chapter. As 
Mitchell (1995:42) comments, Wright himself had not yet taken the trouble to "make 
explicit the specific characteristics of the historical, causal 'because' which carries the 
explanatory burden" in his account. It was left to others to show that the key to a 
solution was to be found in the process of natural selection. 
6 I am drawing here in part upon Wright (1976) and Mitchell (1995:39,42), integrating their 
perspective with some of Wilson's (1991 :137-138) insights. 
IJ. 5. 
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The D-N challenge and other difficulties 
We can now return to where we have left off before the treatment of the etiological 
view, namely to the temporary consensus on the nature of scientific explanation that 
was reached due to the rise of the deductive-nomological model. Although Wright's 
analysis appeared only after the received view was already past its peak - various of its 
problematic aspects having been exposed; it was (and is) still fashionable to use 
(revised) D-N requirements as yardstick against which other types of explanation, such 
as teleological explanation, are measured and compared. It is therefore important to 
devote some space to its characteristics so that we shall be able to see, in the course 
of this study, how the etiological model defended here compares with it. But before 
getting to the specific demands of the D-N model, we shall do well to note three general 
charges against the scientific legitimacy of teleological explanation that Wright (1976:7-
22) thought his model was definitely capable of overcoming. They relate to inverse 
causality, anthropomorphism, and obstructionism in scientific research respectively. 
The first charge holds that in teleological and functional explanations the orthodox order 
of cause and effect is reversed, that is, the proper chronological event sequence is not 
respected. That which is really a consequence or result of an event becomes 
designated the cause of the event. However, this is a faulty accusation, and later we 
shall see how Darwin's theory provided the answer to objections of this kind. For now, 
Wright's reply will do: 
The reversal of cause and effect has long been hung like an albatross around the neck of 
teleology, but it is not clear how this view could have survived even modest scrutiny. No 
doubt there is implicit in the teleological appreciation of phenomena an essential forward-
looking element. But there is nothing in any of the ordinary ascriptions of goals or functions 
or motives or purposes or aims or drives or needs or intentions which requires us to reverse 
the normal cause-before-effect sequence. When I explain my going to the store by saying I 
went 'in order to get some bread,' I do not imply that the actual act of purchase caused my 
going which preceded it. The purchase of bread was a goa/ of the action, not a cause. 
Perhaps my having of that particular goal could be viewed as a cause of the action; but that 
of course is something that preceded the action, and hence is not guilty of the egregious 
time-reversal imputed to teleological accounts of behaviour. , 
(Wright, 1976: 1 0-11). 
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Teleological explanations are therefore entirely compatible with ordinary physico-
chemical causality. On the other hand, that does not mean that we can just as well do 
away with talk of goals and functions, exchanging these for purely physico-chemical 
terms. The question is whether such a move will not deny us notions that are of great 
explanatory value. 
The second charge claims that teleological explanations are anthropomorphic, that is, 
they read human mental attributes into the nature of beings that are not human. But 
even though the teleological paradigm case may be conscious and intentional human 
behaviour, and even though teleological explanations of other phenomena may be 
metaphorical extensions of notions that are paradigmatically human, Wright (1976: 12-
22) maintains that this need not pose a problem. He bases his case on the role of 
metaphor in science. The use of metaphors is widespread in science and as long as it 
is employed cautiously, it promotes insight and is a valuable scientific tool. By using a 
well-chosen metaphor in a new context attention can be drawn to an important aspect 
that would otherwise not have been recognised. The same is true of teleology: 
[T]he feature of human teleology which transfers to nonhuman cases is the fact that when 
we say 'A in order that B,' the relationship between A and B plays a role in bringing about A. 
It is this being pointed out, rather than intelligence and conscious purpose. 
(Wright, 1976:21). 
The third charge fears that the acceptance of teleological explanations as legitimate, 
will obstruct further scientific research. According to Wright (1976:22), this charge is 
based on a misunderstanding of teleological conceptualisations and the role they play 
in empirical enquiry. He maintains that they are in fact very similar to the other 
explanatory concepts found in natural science. Whether this claim of his (or the other 
two, for that matter) holds water, we shall only be able to evaluate once we have 
become thoroughly acquainted, in the following chapters, with Darwin's reasoning as 
well as with the amended etiological model. 
That said, we can now return to the D-N model - which for long has claimed to hold the 
key to genuine scientific explanation in the natural sciences (and elsewhere). 
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To qualify as a deductive-nomological explanation,? an explanation has to fulfil the 
logical conditions of being a valid deductive argument, containing in an essential 
fashion at least one general law8 in its explanans, and possessing an explanans that 
has empirical content. To the logical conditions is added the empirical condition that the 
sentences constituting the explanans must be true. (Salmon, 1990: 12). 
In order to avoid confusion, it is important to note here that the D-N model must be 
distinguished from another distinct model of scientific reasoning that serves a very 
different purpose, namely the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) model. Though structurally 
similar, the one (D-N) bears on scientific explanation and the other (H-D) on scientific 
confirmation. In other words, in the case of a deductive-nomological explanation we 
presuppose the truth of the premises (including those asserting scientific laws) as well 
as that of the conclusion (stating the fact calling for explanation). The logical relation 
between premises and conclusion is not one entailing proof of the latter by the former, 
but rather signifies that the former explains the latter by giving sufficient reasons for its 
occurrence. On the other hand, in the case of the hypothetico-deductive method, the 
logical structure contains as one of its premises a hypothesis of which the truth needs 
to be ascertained - the truth of the conclusion once again being assumed. 9 (Salmon, 
1990:7). (It will later become evident to what extent Darwin's theory carries elements of 
both of these models.) 
Among the philosophically controversial aspects of the D-N model, four10 will be of 
specific interest to us, as it will be important to see whether and to what extent the kind 
of teleological explanation employed by evolutionary theory since Darwin can be said to 
7 I shall confine myself to the informal conditions of adequacy for O-N explanations, and the 
mention of certain philosophical assumptions of the model. For a treatment of the more 
complicated, formal explication given by Hempel and Oppenheim, see Salmon (1990:18-
23). 
8 A law-sentence being for Hempel and Oppenheim a true sentence, as well as having the 
properties of universal form, unlimited scope, no designations of particular objects, and 
containing only purely qualitative predicates (Salmon, 1990: 13). 
9 This is however not unproblematic. As Salmon (1990:187, note 4) remarks: "[I]t is an 
elementary logical fallacy to infer the truth of the premises from the truth of the conclusion 
of a valid deductive argument. As a matter of fact, neither Hempel nor I considers the 
traditional hypothetico-deductive schema an adequate characterization of scientific 
confirmation, but it seems to be so regarded by many people". We shall have to decide 
below whether we concur with Salmon in this judgement. 
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deviate from these. Moreover, it will have to be determined whether such deviation will 
invalidate these explanations - Hempel, for instance, did not consider functional 
explanations scientifically legitimate, precisely because he could not see how they 
could be made to conform to the D-N model (or to inductive or statistical models).11 
However, if such deviation is unavoidable, then the question to be asked is whether a 
case cannot be made for the legitimacy of an alternative model to which it does 
conform. 
The first condition of adequacy advanced by Hempel and Oppenheim entails that all 
legitimate scientific explanations are arguments. Also known as the inferential 
conception of scientific explanation, this condition has been problematised and rejected 
by a number of writers. For us the question will be whether teleological explanation 
since Darwin is inferential in this sense. 
The second condition of adequacy raises an additional problem. The covering law 
conception of scientific explanation, that is, the requirement that a scientific explanation 
must include at least one law in an essential way, has been disputed by many involved 
in sciences having an irreducibly historical dimension. Among these, of course, is 
evolutionary biology. 
Thirdly, disagreement has also followed in connection with the Hempel-Oppenheim 
explanation/prediction symmetry thesis. This holds that "any correct O-N explanation 
could serve, in appropriate circumstances, as a scientific prediction; conversely, any 
deductive scientific prediction could, in appropriate circumstances, serve as a D-N 
explanation" (Salmon, 1990:24). Whether this applies to evolutionary biology generally, 
and more specifically to the kind of teleological explanations Darwin inaugurated, is 
questionable. 
Fourthly, the issue concerning the role of causality in scientific explanation has been 
widely debated. Contrary to Hempel's rejection of causality as relevant to scientific 
explanation, many have maintained that causality does have a role to play. Certainly, 
10 These have been selected from Salmon's discussion (1990:23-25). 
11 For an exposition, see Salmon (1990:28-31). 
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Darwin himself was intent on providing us with explanations in terms of truly existing 
causes. 
How the kind of teleological explanation that is the legacy of Darwin, provides its own 
answers to the issues raised by the D-N model and its conditions, will emerge in the 
chapters to follow. What these chapters will entail, can now be addressed. 
Darwin and teleological thinking 
The essential background having been given (that is, a brief history of teleological 
thinking, a tentative description of the model of teleological explanation adopted here, 
and an enumeration of some of the chief challenges faced by it), the argument to be 
developed in this thesis can presently be stated in more detail. 
Darwin's discovery of the theory of evolution by natural selection effected a profound 
transformation of teleological thinking. In what sense, and through which means his 
theoretical discoveries can be said to have overcome metaphysical teleology and to 
have initiated and informed current ideas on what scientifically legitimate teleological 
explanation should consist of, is the question I will investigate here. 
The answer I will propose, is, firstly, that Darwin's efforts to develop a theory of 
evolution that could comply with the requirements of a certain empiricist philosophy of 
science, enabled him to cause the downfall of metaphysical teleology in biology - the 
collapse of which was an important precondition for the emergence of any properly 
scientific account of adaptational phenomena, that is to say, of any scientifically 
legitimate model of teleological explanation. (The former claim is valid regardless of 
whether that empiricist philosophy of science was actually in all of its aspects 
compatible with Darwin's ideas, and regardless of whether the authors of that 
philosophy of science fundamentally disagreed with Darwin's defence of evolution - or 
transmutation, as it was called then.) 
Secondly, and again by virtue of the kind of empirical historical process he envisaged 
as the cause of adaptations, Darwin initiated such a new scientifically legitimate model 
of teleological explanation. However, the explication of that model had to wait until well 
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into the present century. It now goes under the name of an etiological approach to 
goals and functions, and is the model which, in my view, offers the closest 
approximation to Darwin's own conceptualisation. It is moreover my opinion that the 
etiologial approach is also the most important and fundamental model as regards 
teleological explanation. The argument will proceed in the following manner: 
In the first place (chapter two), I shall state some of the science-philosophical 
assumptions that inform the present study. That will be followed by an expositional 
analysis of Darwin's theory of descent with modification by natural selection, in which 
his main premises and conclusions will be listed, as well as the nature of the inferential 
links and evidential support elucidated. In addition, it will be shown how Darwin 
structured his theory of evolution in the Origin of Species so as to make it conform to 
certain science-philosophical ideals that were dominant at the time. Most important in 
this regard was Darwin's adherence to the vera causa doctrine that hailed from Newton, 
and with which he became acquainted through the work of William Herschel and 
Charles Lyel1. 12 
In the second place (chapter three), it will be argued that Darwin's proposal concerning 
the process of species formation, namely natural selection, was in direct opposition to 
the traditional metaphysical teleology (in the form of natural and revealed theology) 
prevalent in natural historical studies at the time. I shall investigate how Darwin - by 
having offered natural selection as empirical causal process responsible for adaptation 
and the origin of species - undermined both the natural theological argument from 
design and the argument from revelation concerning the separate or special creation of 
distinct and immutable species. Two conceptions of divine design will figure 
prominently, namely that of design as practical adaptation, and that of design as divine 
order. 
In the third place (chapter four), it will be shown that Darwin continued to employ 
teleological terminology, his anti-metaphysical stance notwithstanding. Thereupon, the 
etiological approach to goals and functions sketched above will be supplemented, and 
12 A case will be made that Darwin found his inspiration in Herschel's interpretation of the 
vera causa doctrine, and not in the idea of a "consilience of inductions" as advanced by 
William Whewell. 
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the choice made for its adoption motivated. Finally, it will be argued that Darwin, partly 
by virtue of the particular science-philosophical mould in which he had cast his theory, 
and partly by virtue of the kind of historical process he had offered as cause for 
adaptation, succeeded in issuing in a non-metaphysical, scientific form of teleological 
explanation. Teleological explanation was provided, for the first time, with a proper 
causal basis (natural selection) - a crucial legacy to present-day biology. 
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2 
Natural Selection as Vera Causa 
The aim of the present chapter is to show that Darwin convincingly argued - by heeding 
certain science-philosophical ideals - for natural selection as the causal and therefore 
explanatory principle with regard to the origin of species. Before proceeding to a 
reconstruction of Darwin's case for evolution by natural selection, and investigating the 
way in which Darwin drew upon contemporary philosophies of science for the 
presentation and proof of his theory, a brief preparatory synopsis of his theory will be 
furnished, followed by a treatment of the science-philosophical ideals considered 
relevant for the analysis. 
I can however not proceed to a treatment of the mentioned issues without first stating 
some of the philosophical assumptions informing the line of argument developed in the 
present and subsequent chapters. Two issues particularly need to be touched 
upon - that concerning a philosophical account of scientific theory and explanation, and 
that concerning the role of natural selection in evolution. 
Firstly, as regards an account of the nature of scientific theory and explanation, I 
probably feel myself closest to what Wesley Salmon describes as the ontic conception 
(in contradistinction to the modal and epistemic conceptions).1 This entails a realist 
belief in the possibility of knowledge concerning underlying causal (or other) 
mechanisms - which knowledge is empirical and explanatory. It therefore means that 
[M]ere subsumption under a law is not sufficient for explanation. There must be, in addition, 
a suitable causal relation between the explanans and explanandum - at least as long as we 
1 For the distinctions he makes between the three conceptions, see Salmon (1990:118-186). 
He also subdivides these three conceptions further, so that each can be instantiated in a 
number of different versions. For instance, Hempel and the received view falls under the 
inferential version of the epistemic conception of scientific explanation. As for opposition 
between the different conceptions, I tend to agree with Salmon that they need not always or 
necessarily be viewed as incompatible, but that in many cases they may be 
complementary. 
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steer clear of quantum mechanical phenomena. 
(Salmon, 1990: 130). 
This is very much akin to the kind of outlook Darwin had. His adherence to the vera 
causa doctrine which will be discussed below, placed him in an older empiricist tradition 
than the positivist one advanced by Auguste Comte. That means that Darwin's 
preoccupation would have been with issues concerning "existential claims for 
causation", rather than with positivist questions concerning "universal statements of 
law" (Hodge, 1987:266). (That is partly why neither the semantic approach, nor the 
received view, is able to fully do justice to the nature of Darwin's theoryf 
An account of the nature of causation - necessary though it may seem to the realist 
outlook presupposed here - can unfortunately not be presented within the confines of 
this thesis. And in fact, it is in my view quite possible that an adequate account of the 
nature of causation may forever elude us, and that we may be forced to settle for a 
somewhat vague intuitive notion of what it is for one thing to be caused by another 
(others). In any case, Salmon, who sees himself as also working within the ontic 
category of scientific explanation, argues for a theory of causation in terms of the 
transmission of marks which hardly strikes one as convincing or noncircular. 
The lack of both an invincible justification of realism and an explicit account of 
causation, need however not be viewed as a measure of the relative worthlessness of 
these ideas. Not altogether unlike Karl Popper, I have no problem with admitting that a 
commitment to realism (like a commitment to idealism) cannot but be metaphysical and 
irrational,3 and that such a metaphysical realism can only give "some intuitive 
encouragement, some hope, but no assurance of any kind" (1957 [1979:203]). 
However, the latter statement should not be taken to mean that realism is of mere 
emotional and inspirational significance, and have no significant influence on the form a 
2 See Ereshefsky (1991) for a (to my mind) successful refutation of semantic theorists' claim 
that the semantic approach to evolutionary theory is able to overcome the difficulties that 
are inevitably encountered by the received view when the latter is applied to evolutionary 
theory. See Griffiths (1997) for a sympathetic review of Depew and Weber's interpretation 
of the history of the Darwinian research tradition in terms of the semantic view of theories. 
3 Popper (1972 [1979:38-44]) himself nevertheless offer some (admittedly inconclusive) 
arguments for realism. I do not necessarily go along with any of them, or, for that matter, 
with Popper's entire science-philosophical edifice, although I do find some of his ideas 
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realist's theories take. On the contrary, realism will require of a scientific theory to 
identify the real empirical causes of the phenomena to be explained. For instance, I will 
argue below that Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection succeeded in finding 
the empirical causal process responsible for the origin and diversification of species. In 
arguing thus, I shall by implication and to a large extent rule out the applicability of 
certain other approaches to scientific theory, such as the received view or the semantic 
view.4 
Secondly, as regards the role of natural selection in evolution, it must be noted that 
there is a lively debate about the demarcation of the role of natural selection in the 
evolutionary process. The issue is about the relationship between natural selection and 
self-organisation, and which can be said to hold the most weight in evolution. In my 
view, the principles of self-organisation operating in living complex systems cannot be 
denied an important role in evolution, but neither can natural selection. Where exactly 
the balance lies, I leave as yet undecided.5 Darwin himself did not rule out some role for 
factors other than natural selection in evolution. For the purposes of the present thesis, 
one needs only to admit that natural selection do carry with it a rather large part of the 
causal burden. 
Descent with modification by natural selection 
Darwin's theory of evolution, or, expressed more fully, his theory of descent with 
modification by natural selection, consisted of two relatively unoriginal ideas - the tree 
of life and natural selection - combined and applied in an original way.6 
useful. 
4 In contrast to the perspective adopted here, the semantic view defines a scientific theory as 
a "class of abstract models. The theory is true of these models by definition. The theory is 
not true of any real world systems, because it is not directly about any real world system. A 
theory is applicable ro real world systems in virtue of more or less complete isomorphisms 
that obtain between real world systems and the abstract models which the theory 
describes" (Griffiths, 1997:421). 
5 See Depew & Weber (1996) for a treatment of seven different conceptions of the 
relationship between natural selection and self-organisation. See Kauffman (1995) for an 
emphasis on self-organisation. See Cilliers (1998) for a description of the characteristics of 
complex systems, as well as for the development of a model of complexity. 
6 The synoptic account presented here is in part a selective summary of Sober (1993:7-14) 
where more detailed explanations and technical definitions are given, and the difference in 
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Darwin supposed, in the first place, that all forms of terrestrial life are related to each 
other through common ancestors, that is to say, they are all part of a single branching 
tree of Iife. 7 The different branches of the tree may be made to represent distinct 
varieties, species, genera, etc., depending on the amount of detail and the span of time 
we want to depict. The point at which a branching takes place represents the point in 
time where two separate forms last shared common ancestors. The notion of a tree of 
life therefore already entails descent with modification in that we have lineages not only 
descended from one another, but also having undergone change in the 
process - change is implied by the fact that, after all, lineages now exist which had not 
existed at an earlier point in time, and which differs from thei~ ancestral lineages. 
But secondly, Darwin needed to account for the branchings, he needed to find the 
reasons for, or causes of, the modification and divergence of species. He did this by 
claiming that there was chance variation in the fitness· of organisms, and that the 
environment favoured the survival and reproduction of the fitter organisms. (Less fit 
animals will tend either not to survive or not to reproduce as successfully.) Moreover, as 
he believed that variation in fitness was heritable, the fitter organisms would not only 
survive to reproduce, but would also pass on their fitness to their offspring. This sums 
up the principle of natural selection - the principle or causal process which accounts for 
both microevolution - changes within a single species, and macroevolution - the 
extinction and emergence of entire species. 
Darwin thus made a pattern claim (one genealogical tree) and a process claim (natural 
selection as the cause of the diversity among the tree's life forms). The originality of his 
contribution did not lie in the idea of evolution, or in the idea of natural selection, but in 
the idea that evolution or "descent with modification" happens by means of natural 
selection. 
We should not forget though, that Alfred Russel Wallace also succeeded in hitting upon 
this same combination of ideas at almost the same time, and nearly forestalled Darwin 
in its public presentation. Darwin distinguished himself however, by, among others, the 
theories between Darwin and Lamarck is pointed out. 
7 See Darwin's diagram and discussion in The Origin of Species (1859 [1968:159-169, 332-
334]). 
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extensive evidential support he marshalled for his theory. He thereby meant not only to 
persuade readers of his theory's scientific respectability, but also of its scientific 
superiority. But more on that later. 
The short preliminary sketch just offered of Darwin's theory will be filled out in due time. 
For now, however, it provides us with enough background to be able to anticipate as we 
go along the strategic moves Darwin made in arguing for his theory. In the next section 
we will take a look at the thinkers whose ideas influenced the strategy and structure of 
Darwin's argument. 
Herschel, Lyell and Whewell 
. Already from the earliest versions of his theory of descent with modification by natural 
selection, Darwin consciously elaborated his theory in terms of certain contemporary 
ideals for scientific endeavour. In this regard the philosophies of science advocated by 
the two most influential and prominent philosophers of science in the England of the 
1830s - John F. W. Herschel (1792-1871) and William Whewell (1794-1866) -
immediately offer themselves as candidates. Darwin personally knew, and read the 
works of both these figures. Moreover, the great geologist, Charles Lyell (1797-1875), 
whose work embodied much the same science-philosophical views Herschel 
propounded, had a powerful formative influence on Darwin's thinking. 
In what follows it will be my contention that it was upon Herschel's interpretation of the 
vera causa doctrine, rather than upon Whewell's consilience of inductions, that Darwin 
drew when he constructed his theory. However, after the event, when having to defend 
his theory, he sometimes also made use of Whewell's idea of a consilience of 
inductions. In arguing thus, I concur with the views of Jonathan Hodge (e.g. 1989), 
rather than with those of Michael Ruse (e.g. 1975, 1979) - who makes room for both 
Herschel's verae causae and Whewell's consilience in Darwin's construction of his 
theory; or with those of Wilson (1991) - whose philosophical commitments causes him 
to veer entirely towards the side of a consilience of inductions. All the same, despite 
some crucial differences, Herschel and Whewell's philosophies overlapped in many 
respects, and Darwin would have received many of the same ideas from both. 
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Already during his undergraduate years, Darwin became acquainted with Whewell, 
attending some of the same lectures and scientific meetings; and with Herschel he 
would some years later share much the same social circles. In addition, Darwin 
belonged to the Geological Society, as did Herschel and Whewell - Whewell having 
been its president in 1837 and 1838 when Darwin served on its council. Whewell also in 
many ways supported and encouraged Darwin, at least in the years after his return 
from the Beagle voyage when the future estrangement over Darwin's evolutionist 
theories had not yet clouded their shared scientific horizon. (Ruse, 1975:165). 
Darwin first read Herschel's Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy 
in 1831 and then again in 1838.8 He also at some stage read Herschel's Astronomy. 
Among the works of Whewell he definitely did read, was the laUer's address to the 
British Association, his Bridgewater Treatise (in 1838 and 1840), and his History of the 
Inductive Sciences (in 1838). (Ruse, 1975: 164-6). However, there is no indication that 
Darwin had read Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, which appeared in 
1840, by the time he wrote his Sketch in 1842. And it was only in his Philosophy that 
Whewell for the first time explicitly articulated his view on the consilience of inductions. 
Thus, in the crucial years during which Darwin conceptualised his theory and its 
fundamental structure, it was the vera causa ideal as presented in the work of Herschel 
and Lyell that was foremost in his mind. (Hodge, 1989:171, 172). 
It is important to note that philosophy of science in England was dominated by 
invocations of mainly two thinkers - Bacon and Newton.9 As both Herschel and Whewell 
took seriously their adoption of Newtonian astronomy as paradigm for their respective 
8 Herschel, together with Alexander von Humboldt, served as a major source of inspiration to 
the young Darwin's developing scientific mind. This is acknowledged as follows by Darwin 
in his Autobiography (first published in 1887, five years after his death): "During my last 
year at Cambridge I read with care and profound interest Humboldt's Personal Narrative. 
This work and Sir J. Herschel's Introduction to the Study of Natural Philosophy stirred up in 
me a burning zeal to add even the most humble contribution to the noble structure of 
Natural Science. No one or a dozen other books influenced me nearly as much as these 
two" (Darwin, 1958:67-68). 
9 Routine accusations by scientists of each other not adhering to the basic rules of science as 
advocated by Bacon and Newton, frequently entered into scientific disputes. Attempts to 
present one's own work as possessing scientific legitimacy by appealing to the authority of 
these two figures, at times reflected superficial understanding and a desire to be 
fashionable. Ruse (1979:56) mentions a "Granville Penn (1822), who wrote a massive work 
showing that nothing in geology refutes a most literal reading of Genesis, [invoking] three 
authorities in his support - Moses, Bacon, and Newton"! 
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philosophies, they could not but agree on many points. 10 Darwin himself had no 
problem with the conviction of his two mentors that Newtonian astronomy was the 
model science to be emulated by other fields, and was quite enthusiastic about working 
towards the transformation of biology into a Newtonian science (Ruse, 1975:166). 
Herschel's philosophical system can be characterised as a kind of middle position 
between empiricism and apriorism, whereas Whewell, having acquired a greater 
familiarity with Kant than his colleagues, developed a neo-Kantian rationalist stance. 
Their respective notions of what the process of induction should consist of are of 
especial importance, as it would be Herschel's and not Whewell's that would influence 
Darwin when he set about formulating his theories. 
Though explicit mention is not made of Locke, Berkeley and Hume in Herschel's 
Discourse, the work is clearly building on empiricist precepts partly enunciated by them. 
The great Francis Bacon however, is not similarly neglected in the discussion, and 
Herschel develops some of the former's ideas. In the Discourse Herschel championed, 
among other things, induction as the proper and desired method to be employed in the 
practice of science. (Kockelmans, 1968:29). 
For Herschel, there were two main types of laws - empirical laws and fundamental 
(causal) laws. The former describe empirical regularities but do not explain 
them - Kepler's laws, for instance. The latter's task, on the other hand, is to explain why 
the regularities exist by referring to what caused them, and these laws must preferably 
be formulated in quantitative terms - Newton's laws of motion and gravitation being held 
up here as the paradigm example. The combinations of known causes serving to 
explain phenomena, are what Herschel called verae causae, or true causes. He was 
however all but clear and consistent when it came to what he meant by the concept 
cause. At times he inclined towards an understanding of causes in terms of force. 
(Ruse, 1975:161; Ruse, 1979:57; Partridge, 1966:xxix,xxxiii,xxxvii,xxxix). 
Whewell concurred with Herschel on the distinction between empirical and causal. laws, 
which in his own terminology was rendered by "formal" and "physical science", and 
10 They were moreover friends and read and critiqued each other's work. 
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"phenomenal" and "causal" components of theories. But where they did differ was on 
the vera causa doctrine - in this regard making their respective empiricist and rationalist 
colours apparent, as we shall see below. (Ruse, 1979:58). 
According to Whewell's system, the human mind is furnished with a potentiality for 
producing conceptions and laws regarding the natural world. These have a predefined 
form, and are latently present in our minds, ready to become operative upon the first 
stimuli provided by experience (Partridge, 1966:xviii). Whewell believed that science 
could provide us with knowledge that is mind-imposed and has a status akin to logical 
necessity. As a Kantian rationalist ,he would thus find it essential to reason to 
experience when it came to determining the verae causae of phenomena, rather than 
from experience as Herschel insisted. (Ruse, 1979:58). 
For Herschel the criterion something had to meet in order to qualify as the vera causa 
of a phenomenon, was as follows: Where we are confronted with two very similar 
phenomena, and the cause of one of them is known to us in an obvious way, then it 
becomes clear that the other must have been produced by an analogous cause, though 
this latter cause might not have been obvious in itself (Herschel, 1830 [1966: 149]). 
Says Herschel furthermore: 
(141.) Whenever, therefore, any phenomenon presents itself for explanation, we naturally 
seek, in the first instance, to refer it to some one or other of those real causes which 
experience has shown to exist, and to be efficacious in producing similar phenomena. In this 
attempt our probability of success will, of course, mainly depend, 1 st, On the number and 
variety of causes experience has placed at our disposal; 2ndly, On our habit of applying 
them to the explanation of natural phenomena; and, 3rdly, On the number of analogous 
phenomena we can collect, which have either been explained, or which admit of explanation 
by some one or other of those causes, and the closeness of their analogy with that in 
question. 
(Herschel, 1830, [1966:148]). 
The vera causa ideal that served as motivation for both Herschel and Lyell, received its 
canonical explication from the eighteenth century Scottish moral and natural 
philosopher, Thomas Reid, who gave a new interpretation of Newton's first rule of 
philosophising. The latter held that 
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Hyp. I We ought to admit no more causes of natural things, than such as are both true and 
sufficient to explain their appearances. 
(Quoted in Hodge, 1977:239). 
Central to the Reidian interpretation of this rule was the distinction between "true, 
known, real or existing" causes on the one hand, and "hypothetical, imaginary, 
unknown, conjectural or supposed" causes on the other. This contrast was exemplified 
by Newton's gravitational force and Descartes' vortices of subtle matter respectively. 
But it was not in their competence to cause the effects in question (- the planets' 
orbiting the sun) that the superiority of the one over the other resided. Both would have 
been sufficient or adequate to bring about the phenomena we want to account for, and 
therefore had equal status in that respect. (Hodge, 1989: 169). The difference comes in 
whenwe consider the evidence for the existence of each: 
For the gravitational force there is independent evidence (from tides, for instance, and falling 
bodies on earth) for its existence; it is evidenced by facts other than the planetary orbits it is 
to explain; whereas for the existence of the Cartesian vortices there is no evidence except 
those orbits. The gravitational force, unlike the vortices, is therefore both a true, known, real 
or existing cause as well as a sufficient, adequate or competent cause. It meets, then, the 
requirement that one is not allowed to suppose, or infer, that one's explanatory cause exists 
merely because it is adequate to explain what it is to explain. Truth, existence and reality, on 
the one hand, and sufficiency, adequacy or competence, on the other, are independent 
considerations and their evidential demands must both be met for a cause to meet the 
constraints of the vera causa ideal. 
(Hodge, 1989:169). 
In other words, we cannot allow our judgement on the adequacy of a cause to decide 
the issue regarding its existence. That issue can only be decided through our 
possession of direct and independent observational evidence of its activity in nature, 
that is to say, from facts different from those we want it to explain. (Hodge, 1987:236). 
Unlike Lyell, who would find a welcome ally in Herschel when it came to the vera causa 
doctrine, Whewell, though not rejecting the idea of verae causae as such, objected to 
the empiricist content given them by Herschel. Instead of reasoning in an analogical 
manner from known experience to that which is unknown - which would imply ruling 
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out any search for new causes that we may not be familiar with as yet, we should rather 
interpret verae causae in terms of a "consilience of inductions" (Ruse, 1979:58). This 
notion of his basically entails that where a comparison of two or more theories 
developed independently in different fields of science, shows them both pointing 
towards a cause of a very similar nature, that cause can be considered a vera causa. In 
other words, where two or more theories dealing with different kinds of phenomena 
overlap, they can be interpreted as confirming each other, and we are justified in 
accepting the cause they indicate, as a true one. Whewell formulates it as follows in 
one of his aphorisms: 
The Consilience of Inductions takes place when an Induction, obtained from one class of 
facts, coincides with an Induction, obtained from another different class. This Consilience is 
a test of the truth of the Theory in which it occurs. 
(Whewell, 1847:469, Vol. 2). 
Whewell presented his consilience of inductions as a better alternative to the old 
Reidian vera causa ideal for scientific theories. He did not go along with the latter's 
presupposition that the truth or existence of an explanatory cause can be separated 
from its adequacy. The demand that the existence of any cause introduced by a theory 
be demonstrated by direct, independent evidence, was viewed by Whewell as posing 
unnecessary and crippling restrictions for scientific theories. Evidence of such a nature 
is often unattainable, and lack of it should not count against a theory. For we are 
already justified in inferring the probable existence of the explanatory cause in question 
if we can show that it possesses evident explanatory adequacy with regard to 
numerous distinct classes of facts. Nothing more than this is required for establishing 
the inductive credentials of a theory. Whewell believed that the new wave theory of 
light, for one, was an instance of a theory not conforming to the old vera causa ideal,11 
but that it was good science all the same, and that instead of doing away with the 
theory as illegitimate, we should reject the outdated ideal. (Hodge, 1989:171-172). 
As already mentioned, Darwin also, and perhaps more significantly, learned of the vera 
11 The wave theory was not legitimate in the vera causa sense because no direct 
independent evidence could be found for the existence of light waves; the theory was 
nevertheless very successful in that it could account for diverse groups of optical facts 
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causa ideal from Charles Lyell. While on the Beagle (December 1831 to October 1836), 
Darwin read with great interest Lyell's three-volume Principles of Geology (1830, 1832, 
1833), and immediately became enamoured of Lyell's views on the gradual elevation 
and subsidence of land masses. Throughout the voyage Darwin enthusiastically tried to 
observe geological phenomena through Lyell's eyes, and on his return the two forged a 
life-long friendship - Lyell appreciating his young disciple's efforts to prove his 
geological theory. The friendship was strong enough to outlast, in later years, Darwin's 
deep disappointment at Lyell's failure to fully underwrite his (Darwin's) own theory on 
the origin of species. Important though, is that Darwin learned through Lyell's example 
what it would mean to apply the vera causa ideal to natural historical studies, and how 
critical it is to amass as much evidence as possible for your claims, thereby building a 
cumulative case that would be difficult to resist. 
It was Lyell then, who appropriated the vera causa ideal - coming as it does from a 
tradition in the philosophy of physics - for geology. Lyell badly wanted to transform 
geology - which was on the brink of becoming a field known for its philosophical 
promiscuity, being amenable to religious scepticism, materialism, and speculative 
excess - into a respectable science that would rise above conflicts of a metaphysical 
nature. He wanted to show that geology need not rest on shaky foundations or imply 
atheism. Geology could be practised in accordance with the kind of rules of reasoning 
evidenced by Newton's Principia Mathematica (1687). (Secord, 1997:xi,xiv,xvi). 
Labelled uniformitarianism by Whewell (in opposition to Whewell's own catastrophism), 
Lyell held the view that the causes of change at present operating in the earth's 
surface, are the same in degree and kind, or in intensity and efficacy, as those that 
operated in the past long before the human period, and the same as those that will 
operate in the distant future - hence the subtitle of his work: Being an Attempt to 
Explain the Former Changes of the Earth's Surface, by Reference to Causes Now in 
Operation. Just like Newtonian physical astronomy could appeal to the same kind of 
causes accessible to, and knowable by the human mind here on earth when accounting 
for celestial phenomena, so geology can appeal to the same kind of causes accessible 
(at least in principle) to direct observation by the human mind in the present, to account 
(Hodge, 1989:171). 
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for past and future events on the earth's surface. (Ruse, 1979:40; Hodge, 1987:237). 
Given his dissent from the catastrophist viewpoint towards which most British geologists 
in the 1820s inclined, Lyell did not believe that the world's prehistory had been 
characterised by calm periods and great upheavals that no longer operate in the 
present; nor did he believe in the added teleological and metaphysical idea that the 
world manifests direction or progression. Instead, his thought can be said to 
advocate - apart from the uniformitarianism (and actualism) referred to above - a 
steady-state view of the earth. That means that the earth at all times displayed the 
same cycle of gradual eruption and decay, and that both the organic and inorganic 
spheres were devoid of any progressive development. (Ruse, 1979:40). We shall later 
see, especially in the next chapter, in what sense Darwin can be said to have 
appropriated Lyell's ideas on the inorganic sphere, but rejected his ideas concerning 
the organic sphere. 
Having now sketched some of the main ideas advocated by Herschel, Lyell and 
Whewell, the ground is prepared for an analysis of the argument for evolution by natural 
selection as advanced by their pupil, Charles Darwin. 
Darwin's argument 
According to Michael Ruse (1975:166-7), Darwin managed already in his preliminary 
elaborations of his theory - in the Sketch of 1842 and the Essay of 1844 - to incorporate 
the two main characteristics of theory-construction to be drawn from the Herschel-
Whewell philosophy of science, namely, the hypothetico-deductive model and the 
employment of one cardinal cause or principle to account for a broad and diverse range 
of appearances. However, as Ruse (1975: 168) himself admits, "many of the inferences 
in Darwin's theory taken as a whole were far from being rigorously deductive." All the 
same, Ruse (1971) tried his best to force what he regarded as the essential aspects of , 
Darwin's argument, into deductive form - with some awkward consequences - as will 
become clear below. 
I hope to take a more fruitful approach in the following attempt to shed light on the 
nature of Darwin's argument for evolution by natural selection. In this regard extensive 
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use will be made of the insights of Fred Wilson and Jonathan Hodge. (Ruse's important 
work will however not be neglected). Few could probably surpass Fred Wilson's (1991) 
exceedingly clear and detailed reconstruction of Darwin's arguments in terms of its 
individual premises and conclusions. However, Jonathan Hodge's (1989, 1992) 
illuminating analysis of the general construction of the Origin in terms of the vera causa 
doctrine, brings us nearer to the way Darwin conceptualised his own argument. 
Darwin does not, of course, systematically list and number premises, conclusions and 
subarguments, but rather piles up evidence, examples and arguments in a not 
particularly tidy manner. It is therefore not surprising that some confusion and 
miSinterpretation concerning the structure of his "one long argument" - as he himself 
called it - are to be found among friends and foes alike. So there is some truth in 
Michael Ruse's complaint that 
[ ... J the major cause of the trouble is Darwin himself. He omits premises, he repeats 
premises (sometimes in slightly different forms), he has two or three arguments going at the 
same time, and he jumbles the order of premises and conclusions. He fights a not altogether 
successful battle against an illicit anthropomorphism which keeps intruding into what he 
writes. 
(Ruse, 1971 :313). 
Unfortunately though, despite his careful enumeration of all the factors that could lead 
an interpreter astray, Ruse then becomes ensnared in some traps of his own. I fully 
agree with Wilson's verdict that Ruse adopts a "rather odd" position with regard to the 
structure of the Origin (Wilson, 1991:182). The oddness of Ruse's position can be seen 
in the remarks with which he concludes the above (quoted) passage: 
[Darwin] spends a great deal of effort arguing first to something which he calls 'the struggle 
for existence', which he defines in an extremely slap-dash way, and which he claims is 
necessary for the proof of statements of natural selection. Not only does he not need to 
argue for the struggle for existence to get natural selection, but once having supposedly 
proved the existence of the struggle, he does not always use it in his proof of natural 
selection. Finally, Darwin offers us two different varieties of natural selection, and it is quite 
possible that they are logically distinct. All in all, I shall argue that Darwin gives us the, 
perhaps not uncommon, picture of a great inventor who is not very sure of how to present 
and defend the child which he has fathered. 
29 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
(Ruse, 1971:313-314}. 
To claim that Darwin could have done without the idea of a struggle for existence as 
premiss in his argument for the existence of natural selection, is odd indeed. Without 
going into the details of Ruse's analysis and showing up its flaws,12 we can note that its 
failure is due to a lack of attention to the explanatory aspects Darwin intended his 
theory to have. More specifically, instead of realising that natural selection functions as 
an explanatory and causal principle precisely because it entails a struggle for existence, 
Ruse has dropped the struggle for existence right out of the bargain and interpreted 
natural selection as merely referring to the fact it was actually supposed to explain, 
namely, the fact that organisms with favourable variations have a better chance of 
surviving and reproducing than organisms with injurious ones (or alternatively, the fact 
that there is an actual preservation of those with favourable variations and an actual 
rejection of those with injurious ones). Consequently, in order to get his reconstruction 
to make (explanatory) sense, Ruse has to try and bring back surreptitiously the 
explanatory, causal principle he has just discarded. So what he does is to make an 
implicit appeal to the struggle for existence by simply citing an example (industrial 
melanism in moths) in which it operates - without, of course, recognising that he has 
just appealed to the forces of natural selection in the form of the struggle for 
existence.13 
Ruse does not trouble to take seriously Darwin's claim that the existence of natural 
selection follows from the presence of a struggle for existence. But through such 
neglect Darwin's conceptualisation of natural selection as. signifying a causal process 
and causal mechanisms is forfeited, and thereby also its explanatory power. Wilson 
(1991 :210) is correct in asserting that the main reason for Ruse's inadequate analysis 
is his wish to show that Darwin's argument is straightforwardly deductive in form - which 
it is not. 
Wilson, who works within a positivist empiricist philosophy of science that incorporates 
some Kuhnian insights, propounds an alternative view. In his opinion the overall 
structure of Darwin's argument is not deductive - which is not to deny that deductive 
12 That has already been done superbly by Wilson (1991 :209-217). 
30 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
relationships sometimes do play an important role in his argument as far as transmitting 
evidential support is concerned. However, the overall form Darwin's argument takes is 
rather 
to introduce certain imperfect regularities and then to move to less imperfect regularities 
which explain the more imperfect. The evidence supporting the more imperfect generality will 
also tend to support the less imperfect law that is later introduced as entailing and explaining 
the more imperfect. But Darwin also typically introduces other evidence that independently 
supports the less imperfect law. The structure of Darwin's case is not simply deductive, as 
Ruse suggests, but is a marshalling of inductive support to justify asserting ever-more-
embracing unifying abstractive laws. 
(Wilson, 1991 :217). 
Wilson (1991) in fact wants to reconcile Darwin's theory with a positivist account of 
explanation (traditionally entailing an insistence on the D-N model of explanation and 
the requirement that theories be cast as axiomatic14 systems), which latter has often 
mistakenly been thought to reject Darwin's theory on account of its lack of process 
laws. To avoid that dilemma, Wilson insists that the positivist account does make room 
for another type of law, to wit, "abstractive generic" laws that are "gappy" and 
"imperfect" when it comes to the explanation of individual facts and events, but which 
are nevertheless crucial in the guiding of research and the unification of knowledge. 
It should be noted that whereas Ruse bases his analysis on the Origin, Wilson, in 
addition, concentrates on Darwin's first (much briefer, and less cluttered by forms of 
evidential support) public case for natural selection as presented in a paper (together 
with Wallace) in 1858 - the year before the publication of the more lengthy Origin. 
We can now attend to the detail of Wilson's construal of the Darwinian argument. After 
citing passages from the mentioned paper, On the tendency of species to form 
varieties, as textual evidence, Wilson (1991 :173-174) identifies three regularities crucial 
13 See Wilson (1991:213-216). 
14 So far, attempts to produce an axiomatisation of evolutionary theory have not been 
particularly successful. It has only been axiomatised in part, and not as a whole. Ruse 
provided an axiomatic sketch of population genetics, and Williams provided an 
axiomatisation of selection theory. Such partial and incomplete axiomatisation proves 
problematic. Cf. Ereshefsky (1991 :71) and Wilson (1990:117-122). 
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to Darwin's argument. But before presenting these and the other premises, it is 
necessary to keep in mind that any reconstruction of an argument takes some liberty in 
reformulating and rearranging the original ideas, and that Wilson's particular kind of 
positivist agenda does of course force him to search for formulations that satisfy certain 
requirements. The important thing is not to stray too far away from the way in which the 
argument was originally presented. That was Ruse's mistake when he chose to ignore 
Darwin's insistence on the importance of the struggle for existence. That said, let we 
now turn to Wilson's reformulation of what can be considered the first three premises: 
(T1) For any species of organism in its normal environment, offspring are (on the 
whole) more numerous than their parents. 
(T2) For any species of organism in its normal environment, the food supply (on the 
average )is constant. 
Darwin makes the further assumption that 
(T 3) For any species of organism in its normal environment, a constant food supply 
can support (on the average) only a constant number of individuals, and the 
greater the food supply the greater this number is. 
The passages from which Wilson draws for the identification of the above premises, 
concerns an idea Darwin got from his reading of Malthus's Essay on the Principle of 
Population, namely that the increase of population tends to be geometrical whereas 
. food resources, where they can be artificially increased - as in the case of 
humans - can only increase at an arithmetical rate, that is to say, the population would 
tend to rapidly outrun its food supply. Except, of course, if population growth is checked 
by something like moral restraint. But Darwin's point is that neither artificial food 
increase nor moral restraint is available to species other than humankind. 
It follows then, from (T2) and the first half of (T3) that 
(T4) For any species of organism in its normal environment, the number of 
individuals is (on the average) constant. 
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Furthermore, from (T,) and (T4) we can deduce that 
(Ts) For any species of organism in its normal environment, fewer individuals 
survive than are born. 
At this point Wilson (1991: 174) adds a central Darwinian assumption he formulated 
earlier in his book (Wilson, 1991 :158), namely 
(G) Organisms are, on the whole, goal-directed towards the overriding goals of 
survival and reproduction. 
By using (G) and (Ts), we get 
(T6) For any species of organism in its normal environment, there are individuals 
born that, in spite of their strivings, do not attain the goals (viz., survival and 
reproduction) the achieving of which is the function of their behaviour. 
(Wilson, 1991 :174). 
In T6 is entailed the idea of a struggle for existence - which was meant by Darwin to 
include both a struggle for survival and for reproduction. 1s Wilson submits that the term 
"strivings" employed in T6 is a slightly anthropomorphic way of making the pOint that 
goal-directed behaviour is plastic as well as persistent. 16 The obvious question now is 
15 Darwin knew that the phrase "struggle for existence" was somewhat problematiC and he 
insisted that his use of it was intended to be metaphorical. Rather than speaking of a plant 
as struggling against the drought, he said, it would be more correct to speak of its 
dependence on moisture. But the phrase was worth retaining as a general term denoting all 
of organisms' dependencies on and competitions with each other and the elements. By way 
of illustration, one of his examples of the several senses of the struggle can be cited: "The 
missletoe is dependent on the apple and a few other trees, but can only in a far-fetched 
sense be said to struggle with these trees, for if too many of these parasites grow on the 
same tree, it will languish and die. But several seedling missletoes, growing close together 
on the same branch, may more truly be said to struggle with each other. As the missletoe is 
disseminated by birds, its existence depends on birds; and it may metaphorically be said to 
struggle with other fruit-bearing plants, in order to tempt birds to devour and thus 
disseminate its seeds rather than those of other plants. In these several senses, which 
pass into each other, I use for convenience sake the general term of struggle for existence" 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:116]). 
16 A system's behaviour is plastic when the goal of the behaviour can be reached through 
utilising alternative pathways or starting from various initial positions. It is persistent when 
"the system is maintained in its goal-directed behaviour as a result of changes occurring in 
the system that compensate for any disturbances taking place (provided that these are not 
too great) either within or external to the system, disturbances which, were there no 
compensating changes elsewhere, would prevent the realization of the goal." (Wilson, 
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what could the factors frustrating the mentioned strivings consist of? In this regard 
Darwin speaks of checks on the survival and reproduction of organisms. What he has in 
mind are things like rabbits being eaten by foxes if they cannot run fast enough, or dogs 
dying if they catch rabies, or an organism being prevented from surviving or 
reproducing by some environmental factor that prevents one of its needs being 
fulfilled. 17 (Wilson, 1991: 177). All the latter are specific and imperfect laws from which 
one needs to generalise to what Wilson (1991 :179) calls an abstractive law - capturing 
the idea Darwin that tries to convey by means of metaphor and example. So we have: 
(T7) For any species S of organism in its normal environment, there are forces fin 
that environment such that, for any member s of S, that the forces f act on s is 
sufficient for s not to achieve its goals of survival and reproduction, and, 
moreover, for any member s of S, if s does not achieve its goals, then one or 
more of the mentioned forces has acted on s. 
The struggle for existence acquires a more complete expression in (T7) than it did in 
(T6 ), because of the existence of environmental forces against which organisms 
struggle in their strivings being asserted. At this stage another crucial aspect of 
Darwin's theory needs to be brought into play, namely that concerning the heritability of 
characteristics that are variations: 
(H") For any specific organism, there are small variations, and there is a 
physiological-chemical-embryological mechanism such that these variations are 
heritable from parents to offspring to the nth generation, for any n, and also 
such that no variation could be other than slight and almost imperceptible. 
(Ta) For any species S, and for any s in S, there are characteristics f of s such that 
these f are variations in s with respect to S and such that these f are heritable. 
(Wilson, 1991:194,195). 
Unfortunately for Darwin, the heredity problematic remained something of an unsolved 
mystery which would continue to haunt him and which prevented him from judging his 
1991 :142-143). 
17 See Darwin's mention (1859 [1968:119-120]) of his experiments with plants on small plots 
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theory complete. Accepting as he did, Herschel and Whewell's dichotomy between 
empirical/phenomenal and fundamental/causal laws, he sorely felt the need for a theory 
of heredity that would effectively deal with the causes underlying the facts of variation. 
He could not rest content with statements asserting nothing more than that variation in 
fact occurs, in other words, statements of the form we have in (Ts). He wanted to 
identify the physiological-chemical-embryological mechanism referred to in (H") - which 
might require of one to postulate a theory involving invisible entities and unseen 
causes. 1S 
Darwin did subsequently try his hand at such a theory - but without much success. 
Even among his supporters "pangenesis", as he called it, carried little weight, and today 
it stands entirely discredited. That he himself was not too sure about the theory's 
credentials, is shown by the fact that he never reworked the later editions of the Origin 
to include this particular development in his thought.19 Rather than making it easy for 
opponents to detract from the argument in the Origin by offering them an easy target in 
the form of a possibly erroneous theory of heredity, he chose to keep it separate, 
introducing it in 1868 in his Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication. 
(Ruse, 1975:179-180; 1979:212-213). 
Of course, had Darwin but been familiar with the work done by Gregor Mendel on 
particulate inheritance in the 1860s, the missing link would have instantly supplied itself. 
But Darwin had to make do with what was regarded by nearly all of his contemporaries 
as the most plausible theory on the subject - the theory holding that inheritance 
proceeded by means of blending. That meant that if both parents did not happen to 
possess exactly the same characteristic, then the result would be a blend of the two 
characteristics, something in-between. But the idea of blending inheritance did pose 
problems that asked for solutions - phenomena like atavism and what is nowadays 
known as dominant (vs. recessive) genes, were not readily explicable on the idea of 
of turf and his observations as to the checks operating on them. 
18 Cf. Ruse (1975:179). 
19 In the Origin he observed that: "The laws governing inheritance are quite unknown; no one 
can say why the same peculiarity in different individuals of the same species. and in 
individuals of different species, is sometimes inherited and sometimes not so; why the child 
often reverts in certain characters to its grandfather or grandmother or other much more 
remote ancestor; why a peculiarity is often transmitted from one sex to both sexes. or to 
one sex alone. more commonly but not exclusively to the like sex" (Darwin. 1859 
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blending. Moreover, blending inheritance appeared to run counter to Darwin's belief 
that a new characteristic could be passed on almost indefinitely from one generation to 
the next and remain relatively unchanged in the process. For if blending were to obtain 
in each generation, then any new characteristic originally possessed by an organism, 
would quickly be lost during succeeding generations.20 
To overcome the blending theory's inadequacies, Darwin supplemented it with a causal 
hypothesis that incorporated a particulate aspect. To be sure, he accepted that at the 
phenomenal level we usually observe a blending of characteristics, but suggested that 
at the causal level things proceeded in a more particulate way. Pangenesis entailed 
that small "gemmules" were being released by the body cells, which then accumulated 
and combined in the sexual organs to form sex cells. As parents' gemmules normally 
do not fuse (except in hybrids), but merely mingles, they could be passed on intact to 
following generations, and even lie dormant and unexpressed during some generations, 
only to resurface in later ones. Darwin was however unable to explain how the 
gemmules got to the sex organs, and his hypothesis in addition suffered badly from 
attacks on the Lamarckian element (Le. inheritance of acquired characteristics) he 
assimilated into his theory.21 But his failure to present us with the correct mechanism for 
heredity need not invalidate his claims to the effect that there exist variations, that they 
are mostly slight or small ones, and that they are heritable. It also does not undermine 
his next important assumption, to wit, that these slight heritable variations sometimes 
differ in fitness: 
(T9) For any species S, there are individuals s in S, and characteristics f which are 
heritable variations of s with respect to S, and S which are f are more fit than S 
which are not f. 
(Wilson, 1991:196). 
Fitness, it must be noted, is a probabilistic concept, and for one variety to be more fit 
than another means that it is more probable for its members to survive and reproduce 
than for the members of the less fit variety. It therefore does not mean that each and 
[1968:76]). 
20 Ct. Ruse (1979:209-213). 
21 Ibid. 
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every fitter member will survive and reproduce, but rather that certain statistical laws 
apply to the varieties. We can then infer that 
(T10 ) It will on the whole be reasonable to expect, with respect to any species S, that 
if there are individuals s in S and characteristic f of s such that these fare 
heritable variations in s with respect to S and such that S which are f are more 
fit in their normal environment than S which are not f, then, in the long run, all S 
will be f. 
(Wilson, 1991:196-197). 
Of course, without a "long run" there is no point in (T1O), and Darwin therefore has to 
assume that 
(T11 ) The world has existed as an organically habitable place for a very long time. 
We have now been enabled to reasonably expect the occurrence of certain events, 
more specifically we can reasonably expect that given a very great time-span, new 
variations and even new species will emerge. But this says no more than that we 
possess a statistical law, and knowledge of probable outcomes is not the same as 
providing an explanation of these outcomes. To get an explanation we need reference 
to causes, in this case, to the forces of natural selection. These forces have already 
been described in (T7) as having the power to prevent organisms from reaching their 
goals of survival and reproduction, but at that stage we could not connect these forces 
to fitness or to the emergence of new species, as we still lacked the needed theses on 
heritability (H") & (Ta), varying fitness (Tg), and probable outcomes(T1O). Having 
formulated the latter, we are now ready to move on to Darwin's Principle of Natural 
Selection, that is, we can now state that varying fitness is conferred on organisms as a 
result of the existence of forces that act differentially, or have different effects, on 
different characteristics possessed by different organisms (Wilson, 1991 :201): 
(T12) For any species S, if there are individuals s in S and characteristics f which are 
inheritable variations of s with respect to S, and S which are f are more fit in 
their normal environment than S which are not f, then there are g1 and g2 such 
that g1 are the forces of natural selection with respect to S which are f and g2 
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are the forces of natural selection with respect to S which are not f and g1 ;j; g2. 
(Wilson, 1991:197-198}. 
In (T12) then, the existence of laws is stated. These lawful relations said to hold between 
organisms and their environments concern both the different fit-making characteristics 
of organisms and the factors operating in the struggle for existence, that is, the forces 
of natural selection preventing organisms from achieving survival and reproduction. 
(Wilson, 1991 :198). Fitness and natural selection are shown to be inextricably linked. 
There can be no fit-making characteristic without there also being present a relevant 
force of natural selection with regard to which it is fit-making, and there can be no 
acting forces of natural selection without there being differing fit-making 
characteristics - after all, if all organisms in the same environment share the same 
characteristics, then there can be no systematic differentially acting forces of natural 
selection. Who survives and reproduces would be solely a matter of chance. 
By means of (T12), a certain outcome, say the emergence of a specific variety or 
species, as predicted by (T lO), can be causally explained. Naturally, (T12) can only be 
invoked ex post facto, because the processes involved are of such complexity that it is 
simply impracticable to attempt gaining detailed knowledge of the laws at work in a 
given environment. This does of course mean that biology cannot attain to the ideal of 
scientific explanation upheld in physics, namely process knowledge. (Wilson, 1991 :198-
199). 
The principle of natural selection as asserted in (T12) must be supplemented by an 
additional thesis if we are to render the account of Darwin's argument for evolution by 
natural selection complete. The thesis would have to amount to the claim that all 
species, not just some variations or some species, had been descended from earlier 
species, and that this had been the result of natural selection. In short, the Principle of 
the Origin of Species by Natural Selection has to be introduced: 
(T13 ) For any species So, there is an earlier existing species S1 such that all members 
of So are biological descendants of S1' and such that there is a characteristic f 
which is had by members of So and not by all members of S1; and there is a 
time at which f appeared as a variation in S1' and such that organisms which 
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are S1 and fwere more fit than organisms which are S1 and not f, and such that 
there were forces of natural selection g1 and g2 such that g1 acted with respect 
to organisms that were S1 and f, and g2 acted with respect to organisms that 
were S1 and not f, and g1 ;j:. g2' 
(Wilson, 1991:231). 
Natural selection's acting on variants is hereby presented as the sufficient and 
necessary condition for the origin of species. (Wilson, 1991 :231). By way of 
recapitulation, it is worth giving in full Wilson's summary of his reconstruction of 
Darwin's argument: 
Recall some of the crucial inferences by which Darwin arrived at his theory. There are more 
offspring than parents (T1); food supply is constant (T2 ) and can support only a constant 
population (T3); hence, population is constant (T4), and fewer survive than are born (Ts); but 
organisms are goal-directed towards survival and reproduction (G); so in spite of their 
strivings many organisms do not survive and reproduce (T6); acting in this struggle to 
prevent survival and reproduction are forces such as (F); hence, generalizing, there is a 
struggle for existence (T7) between the organisms striving to survive and reproduce and the 
"checks" or forces of "natural selection" tending to prevent the achieving of those goals; 
however, there are heritable variations (T8 ), and some of these make their bearers more fit, 
give them a better chance to survive and reproduce (Tg); moreover, where individuals with a 
certain variation are more fit, we may expect in the long run that this character will spread 
throughout the population (TlO); moreover, what explains the statistical law that one 
character makes for greater fitness than another and explains the actual survival of the fit 
and the spread of the fit-making characteristic are the differential workings of the forces of 
natural selection on the fit and the less fit (T12); there is, of course, plenty of time available 
(T11 ); and it seems reasonable to think that present species have, on the whole, been 
brought about by natural selection operating on minute heritable variations (T13)' 
(Wilson. 1991: 250-251 ). 
In order to better appreciate Darwin's conceptualisation of natural selection as a causal 
process, Wilson's reconstruction can now be supplemented by Hodge's vera causa 
analysis of Darwin's theory. In the process of presenting the latter, reference will be 
made to Wilson's insights and reconstruction insofar as it is deemed relevant and 
applicable. However, this will not necessarily imply respecting Wilson's entire science-
philosophical framework, and he may well disagree with the purposes for which, or the 
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way in which some of his analyses will be appropriated here. 
The schema (see below) Hodge (1989:168) offers of the Origin makes clear how the 
work owes it structure to a systematic treatment of the considerations that would be 
essential to the proving of natural selection as vera causa. A multi-layered structure can 
be discerned, each layer possessing its own set of divisions. 
Part I Chapter I Consideration 1 Division One 
Variation and Existence case Natural selection 
selection under established as 
domestication VCP cause for 
Part II II 
species 
III 
Variation and 
selection under IV Consideration 2 The case 
nature V 
VI 
Competence case 
Difficulties 
VII considered 
VIII 
Part III Consideration 3 Geological difficulty Division Two 
IX 
Trial of theory Responsibility case Natural selection 
of natural X Evidence favouring as probably 
selection as XI responsibility responsible for 
explanatory of species production 
species XII 
production XII 
Recapitulation XIV 
The structure of the Origin of Species (Hodge, 1989: 168). 
Beginning with probably the most noticeable of the book's layers, we find a division into 
three main Parts. The first part (chapter one) treats the principles of variation and 
selection under domestication; the second part (chapters two to eight) treats these 
same principles as they occur in nature; the third part (chapters nine to thirteen) 
demonstrates the explanatory power of the theory of natural selection with regard to 
different groups of facts concerning species. (Hodge, 1989: 167). 
Almost, but not wholly, coinciding with the three part structure, is another layer 
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consisting of three distinct considerations or evidential Cases. 22 These may be more 
difficult to identify in the Origin itself, but as Hodge (1989:167) points out, by turning to 
Darwin's Sketch (1842) and Essay (1844) it becomes clear that this was an articulation 
he found crucial to his argument - the reason being its direct bearing on the vera causa 
ideal, which required of one to argue persuasively not only for a cause's existence, but 
also for its adequacy and responsibility for producing the phenomena in question. 
Darwin's first case thus argues for the existence of natural selection as causal process 
in the world, and comprises the Origin's first part as well as two chapters of the second 
part. It involves questions concerning the occurrence and prevalence of the cause 
(natural selection) - whether it exists at all, and if it does, how widespread is it and what 
are the units (e.g. organisms, colonies, species) among which it occurs? 
In his argument for the existence of natural selection, Darwin reasons by analogy. He 
presents his readers (in the first chapter of the Origin) with something familiar, 
something of which they cannot doubt the existence, namely, the occurrence of distinct 
varieties of domesticated species due to the artificial selection practised by breeders. 
Thus we have before us familiar phenomena accounted for by a familiar causal 
process. Darwin imparts to his readers knowledge gleaned from studying breeding 
practices, in particular, that it was possible to produce a number of widely different 
breeds of, for instance, the domestic pigeon, all of which may have descended from the 
same wild species (e.g. the rock-pigeon), by the simple practice of selecting, and 
breeding from only those individuals possessing some or other quality pleasing to the 
human eye or useful from the point of view of some human purpose. Also, a change in 
human interests or criteria will naturally affect which domestic varieties are perpetuated 
or modified and which not. 
Then (in the second chapter of the Origin) Darwin confronts his readers with the reality 
of variation in nature, and takes the opportunity to point out that naturalists more often 
than not find it difficult to determine which one of a group of closely related varieties is 
supposed to be the true species and which mere varieties of the former. This dilemma 
22 I take as point of departure the treatment of the three cases by Hodge (1977:239-244; 
1987 :234,237-238; 1989: 167 -170; 1992:462-463). 
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provides him with evidence for the claim that all supposedly true species are in fact 
nothing but strongly-marked, well-defined and permanent varieties, and that conversely, 
all varieties are incipient species (Darwin, 1859 [1969: 110,111 D. 
Darwin's next·move is predictable. How does it come, after all, that there are varieties in .. 
nature and that some are more widespread and dominant than others, in the event 
attaining the rank of species? If the prevalence of different domestic varieties can be 
accounted for by the process of artificial selection, does it not then become possible 
that natural variation can be accounted for by an analogous process? Not analogous in 
the sense of another kind of Selector being present, say Nature personified, choosing 
which variations should be perpetuated and which not - Darwin was quite clear about 
that not being his meaning. 23 Rather, in both contexts there is variation - in the form of 
domestic and natural varieties respectively; in both contexts there are conditions 
affecting the survival and reproduction of the varieties - human interests and 
environmental conditions respectively; and in both contexts the varieties possess 
characteristics causally relevant to their survival and reproduction - characteristics 
relevant to human interests and to success in the struggle for existence respectively. All 
of the former taken together, as we know, boil down to artificial selection; but then, by 
analogy, all of the latter taken together must also boil down to a process of 
selection - natural selection that is; in other words, a process of selection, but one from 
which human orchestration is absent. 
Wilson (1991 :236-238) rightly emphasises that an inductive leap is being made here by 
Darwin. He is generalising from specific domestic cases (involving breeding with 
pigeons, cattle and sheep) he is familiar with, not only to all domestic kinds, but to all 
kinds everywhere and always - under domestication and in nature. Also, although citing 
the specific domestic cases do provide direct and persuasive support for an inductive 
generalisation concerning the way domestic kinds are produced and modified through 
selection, it only provides indirect support for a generalisation concerning wild kinds. 
But this partial and inadequate support Darwin furnished by means of analogy for the 
23 Darwin denied the existence of purposeful forces in nature, and remarked in later editions 
of the Origin: "It has been said that I speak of natural selection as an active power or Deity 
'" [and] it is difficult to avoid personifying the word Nature; but I mean by Nature, only the 
aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by laws the sequence of events as 
42 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
existence of natural selection was unavoidable as he did not have direct evidence of 
selection in the wild,24 direct experimental evidence not having been available at the 
time and by its nature hard to come by - not least because speciation events can only 
be identified with hindsight, after they have already taken place, and the fossil record 
being too imperfect (transitional types being absent) to yield unambiguous evidence in 
favour of his claims. But Darwin's inconclusive evidence did not imply that natural 
selection most probably did not exist. Rather, it constituted a challenge or research task 
to find direct evidence for its existence - a challenge that has since been met, though 
not in Darwin's own time. 
There was another important motivation for making much of such an analogy - it 
perfectly fitted the kind of reasoning Herschel's vera causa ideal prescribed. Recall 
what Herschel described as the best way in which to arrive at certainty concerning 
whether something can really qualify as a vera causa: When wanting to determine the 
vera causa of a certain set of phenomena, the search will be greatly facilitated if we 
take our lead from a stock of phenomena the vera causa of which is already known to 
us through direct experience, and which are similar enough to the set of phenomena 
under investigation to be classed together with them. According to Herschel, the similar 
nature of the phenomena, and our knowledge of the vera causa responsible for some 
of them, entitles us to draw the conclusion - and one that is almost undeniably certain at 
that - that the investigated phenomena are produced by an analogous cause. 
This tenet of Herschel was actually instrumental in Darwin's initial realisation that the 
results of artificial selection, far from presenting a case hostile to his evolutionary 
theory - as was the commonly held view at the time25 - could be made to work 
dramatically in its favour. Because here he had two sets of analogous 
phenomena - domestic and natural - and the cause of the former was known to us 
through direct perception, in fact, we ourselves were its author. And, following Herschel, 
ascertained by us" (quoted in Ruse, 1971:330). 
24 See in this regard Wilson (1991 :234-239,282). 
25 Artificial selection was thought to testify against the truth of evolutionary theories, because 
it was believed that artificial selection could achieve only limited variation from the original 
wild type (and not new species), and that moreover, since it was an unnatural process, 
domestic varieties would quickly revert to the wild type once turned loose again - evidence 
of this was available. Needless to say, Darwin's theory would show that none of these 
objections held water, or in any case, that his views could adequately account for these 
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that meant he had definite proof of an analogous causal process, that is, a selection 
process, in nature. If there is domestic selection, well then, given wild variation and the 
struggle for existence, there must also be natural selection. And if the former is a vera 
causa, then so is the latter.26 Darwin felt triumphant. 
Darwin's case for the existence of natural selection thus relied for (indirect inductive) 
support on the analogy with artificial selection, because of the then absence of direct 
experiential'evidence for it, and because of Darwin's acquaintance with Herschel's vera 
causa doctrine. But something more still has to be said about the deductive dimension 
of the case.27 Forgetting for a moment about artificial selection, and reflecting upon the 
reconstruction above, it is clear that Darwin's argument proceeded through deducing 
from certain imperfect regularities (such as superfecundity (T1), and constant food 
supply (T2» other imperfect regularities (such as the struggle for existence (T6)' and 
natural selection (T12»' The imperfect regularities articulated in the premises, constitute 
assumptions in need of inductive support, but once presumed established or verified as 
true, we can also accept the other imperfect regularities that follow deductively from 
them, as true. 
Wherever he was capable of it, Darwin indeed tried to provide independent inductive 
support for his premises,28 and these then, via the argument's consequence relation 
(the movement from premises to conclusion) rendered the conclusions acceptable or 
established in the same degree. Remarks Hodge in this regard: 
Darwin does not claim to establish the existence of natural selection by mere inspection of 
phenomena without compromising the power of natural selection. 
26 In advancing this interpretation I am following Ruse (1975:174-176), rather than Wilson 
(1991 :288-289), who disputes - wrongly in my opinion - that Darwin thought the analogy 
with artificial selection helped him establish natural selection as vera causa. 
27 The following remarks largely draw upon Wilson (1991 :269-280). 
28 For instance, concerning superfecundity (T1), he makes mention of a range of calculations 
and examples, e.g. "There is no exception to the rule that every organic being naturally 
increases at so high a rate, that if not destroyed, the earth would soon be covered by the 
progeny of a single pair. [ ... J Linnaeus has calculated that if an annual plant produced only 
two seeds - and there is no plant so unproductive as this - and their seedlings next year 
produced two, and so on, then in twenty years there would be a million plants"; and "cases 
could be given of introduced plants which have become common throughout whole islands 
in a period of less than ten years. Several plants now most numerous over the wide plains 
of La Plata, clothing square leagues of surface almost to the exclusion of all other plants, 
have been introduced from Europe; and there are plants which now range in India, as I 
hear from Dr Falconer, from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya, which have been imported 
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nature; that this process is going on in the wild is not given from experiential acquaintance 
with its presence there. However, his view is that its existence there is a reasonable 
conclusion from various premises, concerning heredity, geological change and 
superfecundity, that are either already accepted or are evidenced observationally. 
(Hodge, 1989: 170). 
But Darwin also, and this is probably in part the reason for his argumentative structure 
being so confusing, tried to provide independent inductive support for at least some of 
his conclusions (such as (T4) and (T6». That, of course, would have reinforced their 
plausibility as it showed that they could be established in other ways than through 
deductive dependence on premises that may well turn out to have insufficient support 
or be false. Providing independent empirical support for conclusions that have to 
perform as premises in subsequent arguments, also prevents these latter arguments 
from being undermined due to the possible unsoundness of the subarguments that 
deductively established their premises. 
But we now come to an additional and more controversial aspect of Darwin's reasoning, 
'namely, its hypothetico-deductive aspect. The independent inductive support received 
by the (sub-) conclusions is meant to also transfer back to the premises via the 
converse-consequence relation. In other words, should the premises not in themselves 
be strongly enough established by induction, they can still obtain support from their 
deductive consequence being confirmed. The premises thus function as hypotheses 
drawing support from the independent confirmation of the imperfect regularity 
deductively predicted by them. We will return to the hypothetico-deductive element in 
Darwin's reasoning below. 
This concludes our discussion of the ways in which Darwin made his case for the 
existence of natural selection and brings us to his next case. 
The second case comprises the remainder of the second part of the Origin, and argues 
for the competence of natural selection to give rise, through adaptation, to new species, 
genera, orders, etc. The relevant questions here relate to the consequences and 
from America since its discovery" (Darwin, 1859 [1968: 117, 118]). 
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adequacy of natural selection as causal process. In other words, what are the kinds, 
amount and rates of change it is sufficient to produce? And what are the possible and 
actual consequences it brings about? 
The competence case also invokes artificial selection but as a somewhat contrasting 
analogy. Humankind can achieve amazing new varieties and races through selection 
choices not always even consciously made, but nature can do much more. To Darwin 
natural selection appeared a lot more competent than domestic selection when it came 
to the production of new species. Its being a more powerful causal process could be 
ascribed to three factors: Nature had "incomparably longer time at her disposal" 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:132]) - that much was made quite clear by contemporary 
developments in geology; she acted on all characters of an organism, including those 
110t observed and thus neglected by humans in their selection efforts, and she did so far 
more rigorously and consistently: 
Man can act only on external and visible characters: nature cares nothing for appearances, 
except in so far as they may be useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ, on 
every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life. [ ... ] Every selected 
character is fully exercised by her; and the being is placed under well-suited conditions of 
life. Man keeps the natives of many climates in the same country; he seldom exercises each 
selected character in some peculiar and fitting manner; he feeds a long and a short beaked 
pigeon on the same food; he does not exercise a long-backed or long-legged quadruped in 
any peculiar manner; he exposes sheep with long and short wool to the same climate. He 
does not allow the most vigorous males to struggle for the females. He does not rigidly 
destroy all inferior animals, but protects during each varying season, as far as lies in his 
power, all his productions. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:132-133]). 
Darwin's anthropomorphic language when speaking of nature notwithstanding, we can 
see what he is driving at concerning the differences between domestic breeding 
practices and the selection processes in nature. Because natural selection rigorously 
works on all characters over much longer periods of time, it will tend to produce greater 
results, that is, new species, and not just new varieties, as is the case with the more 
short-lived and superficial or appearance-focused practices of domestic selection. 
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It is in the fourth and fifth chapters - "Natural selection" and "Laws of variation" - that 
Darwin tries to establish the competence of natural selection to steadily accumulate 
over many generations the slightest new differences, should these be beneficial to the 
individual organisms possessing them, thereby eventually giving rise to great 
modifications of structure and to new species, genera and orders. Darwin's adherence 
to the vera causa doctrine accounts for his resoluteness about natural selection being a 
slow process operating on small, often imperceptible modifications in structure which 
only in the very long run become visible in the form of new varieties and species. Just 
like Lyell with regard to geological' change, so Darwin with regard to the origins of 
species, refused to appeal to causes that were not operating in the present and not in 
principle accessible to human observation. As catastrophes, great upheavals and 
sudden acts of species creation have not been witnessed by us, they for all intents and 
purposes cannot be invoked to explain geological features or the emergence of 
species. We should rather search for signs of causes that are extremely slow-operating, 
causes that are working and have been working since time immemorial at the same 
intensity to produce all the natural phenomena, including the various species, we are 
familiar with.29 
After noting what natural selection can and cannot do, illustrating its action through 
examples and experiments, describing circumstances favourable to its operation, 
providing an exposition of his notion of an irregularly branched tree of life, reserving 
some role for forces other than natural selection, discussing the variability and 
correlation of heritable characters, etc., Darwin proceeds to the treatment of various 
difficulties encountered by his theory - as regards its competence, that is. Chapters six, 
seven and eight thus seek to foil, in anticipation, attacks on his theory to the effect that 
natural selection would not be able to account for certain phenomena, or, which is the 
same, would not be competent to produce them - this include, for example, very 
sophisticated or peculiar organs, structures, habits and instincts (such as the eye, flying 
squirrels and slave-making ants). These chapters also contest the claims that the 
absence of transitional types in the fossil record, and the well-known fact of the sterility 
of first crosses and hybrids, invalidate his theory. 
29 See, for instance, Darwin (1859 [1968:142]). 
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But now, if one has demonstrated that natural selection exists and that it is competent 
or sufficient for the production of species, and moreover, that it is the only existing 
competent cause, then it follows that it is also the necessary or responsible cause. And 
this was in essence Darwin's view, although he tended to allow a subordinate role for 
Lamarckian use and disuse. (Wilson, 1991 :231,243-244; Hodge, 1987:259). 
The third case of the Origin (coinciding with the third part) constitutes Darwin's 
argument for the responsibility of natural selection for past and present species 
productions. It is concerned with questions about past achievement - we want to know 
what natural selection has actually done, for how much of past evolution was it actually 
responsible and which things can we explain by showing that it resulted from natural 
selection. Thus, for example, where the second case could be seen as merely arguing 
that natural selection is a process capable of producing (at least some) new species, 
the third case would argue that natural selection was in actual fact responsible for the 
production of all the extinct species found in the fossil record as well as all extant 
species - this amounts to the claim Wilson has formulated as (T13). 
Darwin starts off the case for the responsibility of natural selection by taking up again 
the palaeontological difficulty that was treated in a more cursory way (amongst other 
difficulties) in the sixth chapter. He now devotes the entire chapter nine, and in fact, 
chapter ten, to the nature of the geological record - this is of course not surprising, 
seeing that the latter constitutes the chief objection to the responsibility of natural 
selection for the production of all species. For, after all, without there being recorded 
signs of the myriad intermediate varieties his theory asserts to have existed, his claim 
as to the responsibility of natural selection must be declared null and void. Darwin 
therefore assembles al the favourable geological facts he can lay his hands on to 
overcome this grave objection. He then follows this up, in chapters eleven to thirteen, 
with facts from a variety of other fields - biogeographical, morphological and 
embryological - also favouring the responsibility of natural selection, before closing with 
his recapitulation and conclusion (chapter fourteen). We will give more attention to the 
case for the responsibility of natural selection in a moment when dealing with the two 
divisions of the Origin. 
Lastly then, an additional layer of the Origin can be made out in the form of two 
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Divisions. Like the three case structure its presence is due to the vera causa ideal. The 
first division encompasses the existence and competence cases, and concerns the 
establishment of natural selection's vera causa credentials - namely, that natural 
selection is a cause that exists and one that is sufficient for bringing about certain 
results. The second division, encompassing the responsibility case, is concerned with 
the corroboration of the theory as the best current explanation for the origins of species. 
(Hodge, 1989: 168). 
As will have become clear in the above discussion of the first two cases, Hodge 
(1977:242) is quite correct in observing that in the first division of the Origin Darwin 
twice makes an appeal to the fact of variation under domestication: Firstly, in arguing 
for the existence of a natural selection of hereditary variations in the wild, Darwin refers 
us to the familiar tendency of changed conditions to indirectly bring about hereditary 
variation in domestic species by presumably affecting - as he thought at the time - the 
reproductive system itself; and to the familiar fact that these hereditary variations can 
be accumulated through selective breeding. Secondly, in arguing for natural selection's 
competence to cause new species, Darwin refers us to the recognised power of 
domestic selection to cause new varieties, and to the reasons why the selective 
breeding taking place in the wild as a result of the struggle for existence will have more 
notable consequences, namely, the production of new species. Having made all the 
use he could of the known process of artificial selection in his efforts to prove the 
existence and competence of natural selection, in other words, to establish it as a vera 
causa principle, Darwin now moves on to the responsibility case - which is also the 
second division of the Origin. 
It is in the second division of the Origin that we detect a pattern of argument seemingly 
in accord with Whewell's consilience notion. As we hinted at above, Darwin's case for 
the responsibility of natural selection relied on a demonstration of its being able to 
account for diverse classes of facts ranging from geology to embryology. But it should 
be noted that the vera causa ideal, like Whewell's consilience of inductions, equally 
demanded that the cause or mechanism a theory appeals to, be able to account for 
different sets of phenomena.3D However, unlike Whewell, vera causa adherents like 
30 Ruse (1975:161-162,163) also acknowledges this. 
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Herschel, Lyell, and following them, Darwin, did not regard this as sufficient. Rather, in 
addition, the existence of the cause had to be independently evidenced. (Hodge, 
1989:172). 
Darwin therefore heeded all the demands of the vera causa ideal, and inasmuch as he 
did that, he also happened to come close, in part of the Origin, to Whewell's idea of 
theory confirmation. This seeming approximation of part of the Origin to Whewell's ideal 
meant that Darwin could later, when he found it convenient, also use the Whewellian 
position in justifying his theory. Although Darwin in the first place wished his theory to 
be seen as vera causa legitimate, he sometimes did fall back to a position claiming that, 
even if his theory did not achieve full vera causa credentials, it still could not be easily 
dismissed, as other reputable theories such as the wave theory of light did not conform 
to the ideal either. (Hodge, 1989:171-172). 
The responsibility case in the Origin, then, proceeded by an enumeration of many kinds 
of facts regarding extinct and extant species, and contended that we can best explain 
all of these diverse facts (that is, they can be most intelligibly connected under unifying 
laws), if we assume that natural selection was the cause responsible for the production 
and adaptive diversification of these species from remote common ancestors (Hodge, 
1987:238). All the facts in question can be shown to follow from the theory and be 
explained by it, and this can be done in a way superior to attempts based on other 
theories. In demonstrating the explanatory superiority of the theory of evolution by 
natural selection over its rivals, the theory also receive its confirmation. This point, of 
course, brings us back to the hypothetico-deductive method, or the issue concerning 
the transfer of evidential support via the converse-consequence relation. The question 
is whether and when such confirmation can be considered legitimate, because, as has 
been remarked in the introductory chapter, logically it does not seem to constitute a 
valid relation. However, without going into the whole problematic of the logic of 
confirmation. it can be stated that this is not a problem peculiar to Darwin's theory. 
Wilson (1991 :272), following Brody, suggests that as long as the premises are 
explanatory - as they are in Darwin's case - we can allow as legitimate the conveying of 
empirical support via the converse-consequence relation. Says Hodge (1987:263) in 
this regard: 
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Insistence on some such link between explanation and confirmation has been a 
commonplace for centuries, and is not distinctive of biology, much less evolutionary biology. 
These brief remarks do not claim to have solved the problem of confirmation, but only 
to have pointed out that Darwin's claim as to the responsibility of the cause he found in 
natural selection for species production and its accompanying phenomena, could not 
be rejected merely on account of his method of confirmation, as whatever its relative 
merits, this method is common to physics as well. 
In concluding this chapter, one or two things stiJI need to be said about the implications 
of conceptualising natural selection as a causal process. Darwin's modelling his theory 
on the vera causa ideal hailing from Newton, did not mean that natural selection was 
conceptualised as possessing a law intrinsic to its formulation in the way that 
Newtonian gravitation theory had its own force law. That was and is simply not possible 
given the fact that the workings of natural selection consist of complex causal 
interactions between hereditary materials and environmental conditions. As a complex 
causal process, there is subsumed under natural selection too many different cases of 
causal bias to make possible their unification under a law: 
Natural selection has no equivalent law because its very existence requires, causally, 
processes of reproduction, heredity, and variation; and while these processes may be and 
were presumed to be conforming to laws of their own, they cannot exist and conform to 
those laws in an empty universe void of complex interactions between what is changed and 
the conditions determining how it is changed. 
(Hodge, 1987:249). 
We can however, as Wilson puts it, have imperfect regularities that makes "implicit 
existential claims about other relevant factors" (Wilson, 1991: 165), or, which is the 
same, as Hodge puts it, have well-confirmed generalisations concerning the way 
natural selection works "in specified ranges of conditions and with genetic systems of 
specified properties" (Hodge, 1987:262). What we cannot have, is the ideal of process 
knowledge - knowing all the variables and the laws to which they conform in such detail 
that we are able to predict exactly what the future states will look like. But this does not 
take away from the fact that we have in natural selection a causal process to which we 
can appeal when giving explanations, albeit ex post facto, of evolutionary phenomena. 
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Part of the problem is that the classical idea of causation in the physical sciences has 
been closely connected with that of prediction. A theory's capacity for prediction was 
thought to be proportional to its capacity for accurate description and causal 
explanation (recall the D-N model). However, as Mayr points out, a biologist would 
never have made such a claim. The ability to give relatively precise descriptions and 
good causal explanations of biological phenomena does not entail the ability to reliably 
predict their future course. This is mainly due to the complexity of the phenomena.31 In 
this respect biology has thus taught us that explanation and prediction is 
independent - the latter does not necessarily follow upon the former. (Mayr, 1961 
[1976:366-367]). 
The absence, in this chapter, of an explicit treatment of adaptation in terms of Darwin's 
theory, will have been noted. However, that will form the subject of the next two 
chapters, where, among others, Darwin's account of species production through 
adaptive diversification will have to be contrasted with what constituted its main rival, 
namely, the natural theological account advanced by William Paley and others. The 
present chapter merely intended to describe what could be considered the main ideas 
and inferential links of Darwin's theory, as well as elucidate Darwin's construction of his 
theory in terms of the vera causa ideal, that is, point out his arguments for the 
existence, competence and responsibility of natural selection as a causal process in the 
world. 
31 Mayr (1961 [1976:368-369]) actually identifies four (somewhat overlapping) reasons for the 
indeterminacy or difficulty of prediction we encounter in biology: the randomness of an 
event with respect to the significance of the event; the uniqueness of all entities at the 
higher levels of biological integration; the extreme complexity of organiC systems; and the 
emergence of new qualities at higher levels of integration. 
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3 
Natural Selection versus Divine Design 
Science and religion: A harmony lost 
As pointed out in the first chapter, the growing readiness in the nineteenth century to let 
empirical experience have the final say, and to find purely natural, mechanistic 
explanations for all phenomena, including those of life, was the kind of approach that 
spelt the end of the perfect harmony between science and religion as upheld by the 
Newtonian paradigm. This break did not take effect immediately, however, and many 
ingenious attempts at reconciling the two were devised. But the spell of natural 
philosophy and natural theology was thereby broken, and it would henceforth become 
impossible to practise them in anything but a greatly watered-down version which 
lacked the kind of psychological appeal needed as impetus for ultimately carrying on 
with such forms of reasoning. Equally important, the continuation of a literal 
interpretation of Biblical events such as creation and the deluge was now out of the 
question. In no inSignificant sense people's understanding of their world and 
themselves was transformed. Especially as far as relations in the sphere of life were 
concerned, a static world-view in which everything was relatively certain, secure and 
immutable - because reflective of divine purpose and divine plan - was being replaced 
by a dynamic one in which blind change and conflict prevailed. 
In what follows the role played by Darwin in many of these developments must be 
traced. For the purposes of this study, it will take the form of an investigation into how 
Darwin - by having offered natural selection as causal process responsible for 
adaptation and the origin of species - undermined the metaphysical teleology 
underlying both the natural theological argument from design and the argument from 
revelation concerning the separate or special creation of distinct and immutable 
species. 
Of course, natural theology and revealed theology, for all their presumed 
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independence, were actually joined at the root. For the argument from design as it was 
conceptualised at the time, was only able to reinforce revealed theology because it was 
in the first place covertly informed by the same notions and assumptions. Indeed, the 
argument from design would not have made sense without the fundamental assumption 
that whichever signs of design we may happen upon could not but refer to the presence 
of a personal creator that individually created, at some stage in history, each of these 
designed forms, in other words, it could not but refer to the creator of revealed theology. 
Actually, this interdependence had been exposed and invalidated by David Hume in his 
Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779), where he argued that from a given effect 
we can infer, at most, and nothing more than, the existence of a cause capable of 
having such an effect. But this means that 
the appearances of nature do not entitle us to affirm the existence of one God rather than 
many, since the world is full of diversity; nor of a wholly good God, since there is evil as well 
as good in the world; nor, for the same reason, of a perfectly wise God or an unlimitedly 
powerful one. 
(Hick, 1990:26). 
Thus we cannot infer from design in the world the existence of the divine Designer 
preached by the Judaic-Christian tradition. However, few took much notice of Hume's 
argument, and natural theology carried on more or less as before. 
The interdependence of natural theology and revealed theology means that an attempt 
at treating Darwin's undermining of the two under separate headings, can only be partly 
successful: the issues will inevitably intertwine and overlap, especially as Darwin 
himself does not really keep them apart. In effect, the invalidation of the natural 
theological argument from design already goes quite some way towards the invalidation 
of the scriptural account of creation, and vice versa. However, in the discussion below 
we will try to keep the issues separate to the extent the subject matter allows. But first a 
few more comments need to be made on the world-view that informed both these forms 
of argument. 
Before Darwin, argues Daniel Dennett (1995:64-65), the distinction between order and 
design was blurred. We had a hierarchical top-down world-view that could be d~scribed 
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as a "Cosmic Pyramid" and presented thus: 
God 
Min d 
Design 
0 r d e r 
C h a 0 s 
N 0 t h i n g 
God formed order out of chaotic matter, and endowed some of the ordered matter with 
design, and made minds for some of the designed beings - being himself the first Mind 
on which all else depends. But the steps labelled Order and Design respectively, were 
not kept apart from each other in any rigorous or consistent manner. There was no 
need for such a definite separation, as both were gifts from God, results of his creative 
intentions, and thence imbued with divine purpose. Order, that is to say, pattern or 
regularity, as for instance displayed in the solar system, could in principle be 
distinguished from Design, which is Order exploited for a purpose, such as is displayed 
in artifacts. Whereas the solar system has no apparent purpose, a designed entity like 
the eye has a purpose - it is for seeing. But this distinction was of no great 
consequence because the universe in its entirety was an artifact of God, and all its 
entities in their natural states were in any case directed towards the ends God devised 
for each. 
Came Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, however, and the focus 
zoomed in on the divide between Order and Design. Previously, God - a metaphysical 
principle - was the necessary hypothesis for the formation of Design from Order. God 
was the "final final cause", the "for-which to end all for-whiches" (Dennet, 1995:24). But 
Darwin demonstrated how a purely natural, causal process could take the place of God 
in accounting for the progression from the Order step to the Design step. Dramatises 
Dennett (1995:65): 
Give me Order, [Darwin] says, and time, and I will give you Design. Let me start with 
regularity - the mere purposeless, mindless, pointless regularity of physics - and I will show 
you a process that eventually will yield products that exhibit not just regularity but purposive 
design. 
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Darwin thus destabilised the timeless Cosmic Pyramid by striking right at its middle, 
entering there a historical causal process, the consequence of which was a dislocation 
of the God-head right at the top. Indeed, it now became evident how a top-down 
approach to explaining the world, could be replaced by a bottom-up approach. Nothing 
now prevented anybody from extending the kind of causal process Darwin provided for 
the Order-Design transition to the other steps as well. If there was an empirical way for 
accounting for the former transition, then there might equally well be empirical ways for 
accounting for the Chaos-Order transition, and for the Design-Mind transition. And, as 
for God at the top, well there seemed to be no need for that any longer. Moreover, with 
God and the Cosmic Pyramid, went also the metaphysical teleology intrinsic to these 
notions, that is, the belief that everything has supernatural purpose and meaning. 
As implied above, the Cosmic Pyramid view of the world was still common to both 
natural and revealed theology in early nineteenth century England. Discrediting the 
former was thus synonymous with an attack on the latter. Darwin was, for the most part, 
far too careful and fearful of controversy to do this openly and in explicit terms. He did 
not disavow belief in a Creator. However, people would not have been fooled as to the 
far-reaching implications of his theory - controversial precedents (Lamarck and 
Chambers) had already alerted them to these. We will now turn to a more detailed 
discussion of the issues, first with regard to the doctrine of special creation within 
revealed theology, and then with regard to the natural theological argument from 
design . 
. Revelation relativised: The problem of special creation 
It was a work of William Paley that functioned as the standard text for British revealed 
theology in the first half of the nineteenth century. Evidences of Christianity (1794) 
focused on the miracles witnessed by the twelve apostles and presented them as proof 
that Jesus Christ was the Son of God. But German "higher criticism", together with its 
British offshoots, slowly started to erode British belief in revealed religion from 1830 
onwards. The former attempted to interpret the Bible more and more by reference to 
natural terms and less as a testimony to supernatural events. As scientific knowledge 
increased in Britain, it became harder to find an easy reconciliation between science 
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and religion when the two conflicted. Early nineteenth century geology and 
palaeontology had revealed a much older age of the earth and of life than the mere six 
thousand years or so that Bible readers assumed, and already before Darwin's advent 
on the scene, it came to be accepted that the interpretation of Genesis had to take on a 
more flexible form than previous literal renditions would allow. 
This was acknowledged even by religious conservatives such as William Buckland, 
Adam Sedgwick and William Whewell, who were prepared to go quite some way 
towards accommodating science's claims within their religious perspective. For them a 
kind of reconciliation between the Bible and science was achieved by conceding 
authority to science for whatever happened before the advent of humankind, thus 
allowing science to promote the idea of a prehistory consisting of vast geological 
epochs. The Bible took precedence from the creation of humankind onwards. As for the 
six days of the Genesis account of creation, these could have been six long periods, or 
alternatively, the Beginning could have been separated from the succeeding six days of 
special creation by a long time-span. But what was not negotiable, was the fact that 
humankind was created last as the crown of creation, that this happened not too long 
ago, and that some kind of cosmological progression preceded it. (Ruse, 1979:67-69). 
Moreover, evolution had no place within this narrative. If there were signs of organic 
progression in the fossil record, this was to be ascribed to the chronological order of 
God's creative acts, not to an evolutionary process that would have entailed the 
unacceptable idea of a genealogical connectedness of widely distinct life forms. After 
all, one could compromise Revelation only so far, and not any further. 
The defense of the miraculous creation of species was to a large extent inspired by fear 
of jeopardising humanity's status - who was presumed to be created in the image of 
God and destined to lord it over the rest of creation. Apart from contradicting 
Revelation, evolution would have erased the fundamental division between human 
nature and animal nature. To prevent this, the special and separate creation of distinct 
species had to be upheld, and amongst most religious conservatives this doctrine was 
synonymous with God in his providence having designed each species to be uniquely 
adapted to the place it was to fill in the economy of nature. 
In the Origin, Darwin casts this doctrine of special creation in the role of chief rival to his 
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theory of evolution by natural selection - repeatedly extolling the many explanatory 
virtues of his own theory while exposing the lack of any in the case of his rival. 
Naturally, if, as his rival insists, each species was fixed, and expressive of some 
immutable essence bestowed by God, then his theory would be defeated, because 
fundamental changes in structure and habit would be impossible, and that means ruling 
out that one species could give rise to another - whether the proposed causal 
mechanism be natural selection or any other, such as the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics. Darwin's efforts at refuting special creation and disparaging its 
advocates are thus understandable. It drew little attention at the time, however, and for 
two reasons: 
In the first place, there were more controversial precedents, to wit, Lamarck's 
Philosophie Zoologique (1809) in France, and Chambers's Vestiges of the Natural 
History of Creation (1844) in Britain. We will take a closer look at them in the next 
section, but for the moment it will suffice to say that both advanced evolutionary 
theories, and neither of them evaded the issue of human descent as was the case with 
Darwin (at least initially). In England Chambers functioned as a kind of Victorian 
Lamarck who weathered the first and worst storms raging over evolution, thereby 
preparing the way for a quieter reception for Darwin. 
In the second place, religious conservatives had more serious internal threats to deal 
with. The critical winds blowing from Germany had sown seeds which were suddenly 
bearing fruit. The Origin was scarcely published, when, in February 1860, there 
appeared Essays and Reviews, written by seven liberal Anglicans, which swept away 
most of the controversy that would have reached Darwin. Among others, they 
challenged literal belief in miracles, pointed out the historical development of religious 
thought, and empl:1asised the importance of reason in interpreting Scripture. (Ruse, 
1979:239-240). The debates occasioned by these and other similar challenges did 
more than Darwin to undermine belief in the literal truth of the Bible. And by weakening 
dogmatic religion they aided Darwin's case for the rejection of the doctrine of the 
special creation of fixed species. 
The fact that Darwin did not effect such a huge public outcry, and that there were 
evolutionary as well as religious works that seemed to have created more of an uproar, 
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could fool one into thinking that Darwin's contribution was not necessary for the 
downfall of metaphysical teleology. That would however be mistaken. Unorthodox as 
\ 
the two above-mentioned developments may have been, they had no intention of 
extricating themselves from a teleology based on divine direction and god-given 
purpose. It was Darwin who, by virtue of the kind of causal process he proposed, broke 
with metaphysical teleology. But before returning to this point, we should discuss in 
greater detail the way in which Darwin deals with special creation in the Origin. 
In his Origin of Species Darwin carefully steered clear of a number of controversial and 
sensitive issues, one of which was the origin of Iife. 1 Though arguing throughout against 
the doctrine of the separate creation of immutable species, he refrained from 
speculating on the first steps leading to the emergence of life as such. In the course of 
treating other subjects, he now and again makes a passing remark concerning this 
demarcation between what he considers to be the object of his investigations, and what 
he is content to leave out of the discussion. For instance, starting his chapter on 
instinct, he states: 
I must premise, that I have nothing to do with the origin of the primary mental powers, any 
more than I have with that of life itself. We are concerned only with the diversities of instinct 
and of the other mental qualities of animals within the same class. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:234], my italics).2 
But what Darwin was prepared to address in no uncertain terms was the way in which 
new species develop from the varieties of old species. And whatever may have 
happened during the beginning stages of life, he is adamant that it did not include the 
separate or special creation of immutable species (or even genera, families and orders) 
1 Contemporary evolutionary theory does of course not practice a similar abstention. The 
question as to the origin of life itself is indeed the big remaining question, but there is no 
dearth of theories claiming to have found the answer. The debate presently revolves 
around two main alternatives - the one insisting that it was a case of replicators (naked 
genes) first, and the other asserting that the metabolism or cell should receive that honour. 
For a discussion of the rivals, see Fry (1995). Among the adherents of the replicator-first 
thesis, are Dawkins (1976) and Eigen (1972). Among the adherents of the cell-first thesis, 
are Cairns-Smith (1985) and Kauffman (1995). 
2 Another example can be found in the foregoing chapter treating of difficulties encountered 
by his theory, among others that of the existence of very complex and sophisticated organs 
like the eye: "How a nerve comes to be sensitive to light, hardly concerns us more than 
how life itself originated, but I may remark that several facts make me suspect that any 
sensitive nerve may be rendered sensitive to light, and likewise to those coarser vibrations 
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the likes of which have continued existing down to the present day. For if that were to 
be the case, evolution would have been an impossible and nonsensical idea. 
The whole Origin is intent on showing that natural selection, the struggle for existence 
and descent with modification is far superior to the doctrine of special creation when it 
comes to the explanation of present and past facts (about e.g. adaptation). To this end 
the two modes of explanation is compared each time a train of reasoning dealing with 
the one or other aspect of theory is brought to a close, and of course, special creation is 
found wanting without fail. Already early in the Origin, in his Introduction, Darwin puts 
his cards on the table: 
Although much remains obscure, and will long remain obscure, I can entertain no doubt, 
after the most deliberate study of which I am capable, that the view which most naturalists 
entertain, and which I formerly entertained - namely, that each species has been 
independently created - is erroneous. I am fully convinced that species are not immutable; 
but that those belonging to what are called the same genera are lineal descendants of some 
other and generally extinct species, in the same manner as the acknowledged varieties of 
anyone species are the descendants of that species. Furthermore, I am convinced that 
Natural Selection has been the main but not exclusive means of modification. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:69]). 
From this point onwards follows chapter after chapter of careful marshalling of the facts, 
of spelling out implications, providing interpretations and anticipating difficulties and 
objections. But be the subject variation, adaptation, classification, geographical 
distribution, anomalous structures and habits, complex organs or extraordinary 
instincts, sterility in hybrids or the imperfection of the fossil record, invariably a return is 
made to the idea of special creation, and its inadequacy as principle of scientific 
explanation pointed out. Thus, Darwin's objection to special creation, as opposed to his 
own theory, is that it does not provide us with a coherent theoretical framework 
consisting of empirical laws and true causes, which could be applied to the whole 
diverse range of living phenomena in order to explain them, thereby not only rendering 
them intelligible in a systematic and materialist manner, but also rendering them to 
some degree predictable. All the special creation thesis offers us, instead, is the 
of the air which produce sound" (Darwin, 1859 [1968:217, my italics]). 
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repeated assertion that things are the way they are because their Creator wished them 
to be that way. Such a "restatement of the fact" is then further embellished (where 
adaptation is not evident, as in the case of rudimentary organs) by reference to 
additional, rather vague and unscientific principles such as "created for beauty in the 
eyes of man, or for mere variety"; and, "created 'for the sake of symmetry,' or in order 
'to complete the scheme of nature'" (Darwin, 1859 [1968:227,430]), in other words, by 
appealing to the kind of metaphysical notions entirely at odds with the utilitarian 
approach Darwin has adopted. 
From Darwin's point of view, the presence of a certain feature in a species can 
generally be explained by reference to its being useful to the individual members of the 
species in their struggle for existence, or to its having been useful to their ancestors 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:228]). And, of course, in the struggle for existence there is really 
no use fordisplaying symmetry or beauty in the eyes of man. The only consideration is 
whether particular features are aiding survival and reproduction or not. If there are 
symmetry and beauty to be perceived from the human point of view, then these do not 
reflect metaphysical and absolute qualities, but rather the values upon which human 
evaluation is based. Also, the laws of heredity, reversion and the correlation of growth 
may cause the presence of some features that are not now useful to the individuals 
possessing them, but still for Darwin these useless features can hardly be attributed to 
creation in accordance with metaphysical considerations. He is convinced that they are 
the by-products of purely empirical causal processes in principle knowable by science. 
In addition, a feature that is positively injurious to its possessors will not persist or 
become widespread. Rather paradoxically, Darwin here invokes Paley in support of his 
utilitarian thesis: 
Natural selection will never produce in a being anything injurious to itself, for natural 
selection acts solely by and for the good of each. No organ will be formed, as Paley has 
remarked, for the purpose of causing pain or for doing an injury to its possessor. If a fair 
balance be struck between the good and evil caused by each part, each will be found on the 
whole advantageous. After the lapse of time, under changing conditions of life, if any part 
comes to be injurious, it will be modified; or if it be not so, the being will become extinct, as 
myriads have become extinct. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:229]). 
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Darwin is here cleverly implying that the same utilitarian qualities Paley3 sees embodied 
in God's creative acts, can be seen to be operative in the workings of natural selection. 
Natural selection effects the same results Paley thinks God had, namely, the forming of 
useful parts, and the excluding of injurious ones. But that is where all resemblance 
ends. Evolution by natural selection is quite a different kind of causal process from 
divine creative acts. The one is extremely time-consuming, the other sudden; the one is 
empirical and mechanistic, the other miraculous; the one is impersonal, the other has 
recourse to a supernatural agent; the one is probabilistic, the other ensues by divine 
plan and predetermination; the one is devoid of purpose and direction, the other 
directed towards a god-given end; the one entails a struggle for existence, the other 
harmonious balance in nature; the one implies the absence of fixed essences for 
species, the other underwrites its presence. 
As the Origin proceeds, and the body of facts and arguments presented to the reader 
grows larger, Darwin's confidence also increases and his rejection of the opposition 
becomes phrased in stronger terms. By the time he reaches his "Recapitulation and 
Conclusion", he does not refrain from letting of steam against what he regards as the 
stupidity and inconsistency of those naturalists who are quite prepared to make room 
, 
for the fact that a very great number of species had been the products of variation, but 
who nevertheless flinch from following the reasoning through to its logical conclusion 
that al/ species are mutable, preferring instead to hold on to the special creation and 
immutability of at least some species. Moreover, what vexes Darwin greatly, is that the 
particular species fastened upon as the supposedly specially created ones, depend on 
arbitrary choice, because there is nothing whatsoever that distinguishes them from the 
other "non-created" species as better candidates for created status. He thus chides 
these authors for admitting variation as a vera causa in some cases, and rejecting it in 
others without motivating their choices. After having exposed this intellectual 
dishonesty, calling it a "curious illustration of the blindness of preconceived opinion", he 
launches a series of rhetorical questions at them, intended to ridicule their explanatory 
3 In the 1830s there was actually a Cambridge reaction (consisting of, among others, 
Sedgwick and Whewell) against Paley, Tooke and Mill who where regarded as exponents 
of a Lockean sensationalist and materialist epistemology which neglected the metaphysical 
elements of knowledge and the spirituality of the human mind. In particular, as regards 
ethics, Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy was attacked for its utilitarian 
system. (Yeo, 1979:499-500). 
62 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
model to a still greater degree: 
These authors seem no more startled at a miraculous act of creation than at an ordinary 
birth. But do they really believe that at innumerable periods in the earth's history certain 
elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into living tissues? Do they 
believe that at each supposed act of creation one individual or many were produced? Were 
all the infinitely numerous kinds of animals and plants created as eggs or seeds, or as full 
. 
grown? and in the case of mammals, were they created bearing the false marks of 
nourishment from the mother's womb? Although naturalists very properly demand a full 
explanation of every difficulty from those who believe in the mutability of species, on their 
own side they ignore the whole subject of the first appearance of species in what they 
consider reverent silence. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:454]). 
It should be noted that by the time Darwin produced his theory, there had emerged not 
only a more accurate picture of the immense age of the earth, but also the 
disconcerting fact concerning different geological strata with successive and distinct 
fossil fauna. If one wanted to hold on to fixed essences for at least the most diverse 
species, and wanted to maintain the Genesis idea of special creation, well then you had 
to opt for successive acts of creation separated from each other by vast amounts of 
time. And with each dramatic new discovery, another such event had to be postulated. 
Someone like the distinguished zoologist and opponent of evolution, Louis Agassiz, 
was in the end forced to suppose "50 or 80 total extinctions of life and an equal number 
of new creations". This meant the untenable increase of appeal to divine intervention at 
the same time as scientific knowledge was making rapid progress. People could not 
help starting to recognise the ridiculousness of such a state of affairs. (Mayr, 1971 
[1976:281-282]). In the above passage Darwin makes the most of this realisation, and 
hints that what naturalists consider "reverent silence" is nothing but unscientific 
dogmatism. 
To Darwin a deist conception - if any at all - of the Creator's role in the world, seemed 
to accord much better with the facts. And in the light of the above dilemma, among 
others, many other people also felt moved towards some form of deism. Rather than 
having God embody his will in the world through innumerable individual acts of species 
creation, one had to conceive of him as putting into motion a lawful world of which the 
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emergence of species would be only secondary consequences. In order not to alienate 
his opponents unduly, Darwin couches this alternative in language that would hopefully 
make it appear more acceptable to the opposition: 
To my mind it accords better with what we know of the laws impressed on matter by the 
Creator, that the production and extinction of the past and present inhabitants of the world 
should have been due to secondary causes, like those determining the birth and death of the 
individual. When I view all beings not as special creations, but as the lineal descendants of 
some few beings which lived long before the first bed of the Silurian system was deposited, 
they seem to me to become much ennobled. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:458]). 
This brings us to the end of our cursory discussion of the issue of special creation. A lot 
more can be said on this subject, but the main reasons for Darwin's denouncement of 
successive creative acts have been made clear. Some of the issues touched upon 
above will be encountered again in the next section. 
Natural theology undermined: The argument from design 
Natural theology had its formidable enemies before Darwin came along. For one, David 
Hume had in 1779 already subjected the argument from design to a devastating 
critique. But as mentioned above, this did not attract much attention, and natural 
theology was still alive and well in the early nineteenth century. The purposiveness 
thought to be so obviously present everywhere in the universe, continued to vouchsafe 
the existence of a benign God who imbued his creation with divine purpose. 
Nonetheless, Paley's Natural Theology (1802) was deemed outdated by 1830, and the 
Bridgewater Treatises were commissioned to illustrate in a more scientifically up to date 
way how the wisdom and goodness of God were manifested in creation.4 
4 Commissioned by the eighth Earl of Bridgewater, the eight official treatises were the 
following: Thomas Chalmers' On .the power, wisdom, and goodness of God as manifested 
in the adaption of external nature to the moral and intellectual constitution of man (1830); 
John Kidd's On the adaption of external nature to the physical condition of man (1833); 
William Whewell's Astronomy and general physics considered with reference to natural 
theology (1833); Charles Bell's The hand: its mechanism and vital endowments, as 
evincing design (1833); Peter Mark Roget's On animal and vegetable physiology 
considered with reference to natural theology (1836); William Buckland's Geology and 
minerology considered with reference to natural theology (1836); William Kirby's On the 
history, habits and instincts of animals (1835); William Prout's Chemistry, meteorology, and 
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Not surprisingly, two conceptions of design - not necessarily mutually exclusive - were 
at work in nineteenth century natural theology. Reference has already been made to 
the fact that Darwin and others inclined towards deism. But deism tended to entail a 
certain concept of design, one emphasising divine order in the universe, although the 
reverse need not have been true, that is, this particular concept of design need not 
always have been associated with deism. Recall the Cosmic Pyramid described above, 
and the fact that the distinction between Order and Design was blurred before Darwin, 
because everything was in any case thought of as created or designed by God. Now, 
the orthodox teleological notion in the sense of final causes concentrated on the 
demonstration of practical purpose in all features of organisms. Such purposeful 
features can be thought of as design proper - belonging to the Design step of the 
Cosmic Pyramid. But towards 1850 a shift started occurring in teleological thinking so 
that practical adaptation in organisms was less emphasised, and the notion of order in 
the organic world as evidence of design - or more properly said, of Order - brought to 
the foreground. Many began thinking of "law, order, symmetry and harmony as the 
grandest principles of Divine creation", rather than practical adaptation (Yeo, 1979:507). 
Of course, the former conception had long been applied to the physical universe - its 
order having been beautifully articulated by Newton. But the emphasis was now on 
order in the organic world as well - which idea was perfectly compatible with a deism 
conceptualising God as akin to a grand engineer or supreme law-maker who created an 
orderly lawful universe that was then left alone to produce through its own laws and 
forces an orderly organic world. (Of course, note again, this emphasis on organic order 
was also perfectly compatible with miraculous origins.) Order in the organic world was 
evinced by the divine Unity of Plan visible in all organisms, that is to say, by the 
structural homologies found between the most diverse types of organisms. 
We shall see below how Darwin disputed both the idea that divine design could be read 
off practical adaptation, and the idea that it could be proved by organic order. 
William Paley's Natural Theology strongly reflected the conception of divine design as 
the function of digestion considered with reference to natural theology (1834). To these 
Charles 8abbage added his own unofficial and fragmentary Ninth Bridgewater Treatise 
(1837). 
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organismic adaptation. Darwin was thoroughly acquainted with Paley's work - the three 
years spent at Cambridge ensured at least that much.5 But as student he would have 
been the last to anticipate the kind of use to which he would later put the arguments he 
so admired then. It is no coincidence that the Origin repeatedly echoes Paleyan 
arguments and examples - only to draw, time and again, diametrically opposite 
conclusions. Darwin wanted to illustrate that the evidence of purposeful design in 
organisms that Paley and others thought provided irrefutable proof of the Deity's 
miraculous acts, could just as well, and more plausibly, provide proof of adaptation 
through a purely natural process - natural selection. Darwin therefore strenuously 
denied Paley's confident assertion that: 
The marks of design are too strong to be got over. Design must have had a designer. That 
designer must have been a person. That person is God. 
(Paley, 1802:473). 
In nature, the "marks of design" are to be seen wherever means are adapted to ends, 
that is, wherever we find organic structures formed in such a way as to be evidently 
directed to the attainment of certain purposes, for instance, the eye is obviously for 
seeing, the ear obviously for hearing, and so on. For Paley (to use his favourite 
example), the eye was like a telescope, only much superior in intricacy and ingenuity of 
mechanism. But we know that mechanisms like the telescope are a product of human 
intelligence, therefore superior mechanisms like the eye must be the producl of a much 
superior intelligence, which could only be God. In Paley's view, the immense diversity of 
organisms were all perfectly adapted to their respective environments, and only God in 
his great wisdom could have been responsible for this feat. Of course, here and there 
were to be found some deviations and imperfections, but that was inevitable and only 
concerned the features of some individuals, never a species as a whole. The majority of 
the members of any species were perfectly adapted to their environments, which 
5 Says Darwin (1887 [1958:59]) in his Autobiography: "In order to pass the B.A. examination, 
it was, also, necessary to get up Paley's Evidences of Christianity, and his Moral 
Philosophy. This was done in a thorough manner, and I am convinced that I could have 
written out the whole of the Evidences with perfect correctness, but not of course in the 
clear language of Paley. The logic of this book and as I may add of his Natural Theology 
gave me as much delight as did Euclid. The careful study of these works, without 
attempting to learn any part by rote, was the only part of the Academical Course which, as I 
then felt and as I still believe, was of the least use to me in the education of my mind. I did 
not at that time trouble myself about Paley's premises; and taking these on trust I was 
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attested to God's perfect wisdom. 
Darwin not only contested the claim that supernatural design could be read off 
organisms' adaptive features, but also the claim that every species was an instance of 
perfect adaptation. One of Darwin's numerous counterexamples, namely, how to 
account for the fact that we often find organisms with habits, instincts or features that 
are ~t odds with their physical structure, will suffice as illustration. 
Striking at the heart of the argument from design, Darwin enumerates cases of animals 
whose structures do not at all seem to be perfectly adapted to the kind of lives they lead 
or the kind of environments they find themselves in, but who nevertheless manage to 
survive, reproduce and even thrive. Put differently, he is saying that because organisms 
often carry in their structures the marks of other lifestyles suitable to environments 
different from those they actually inhabit, they evidently do not manifest perfect 
adaptation. But on the view that each species has been created once and for all to be 
adapted (in body and life style) to its special place in nature which it was to fill until the 
end of time, it must, according to Darwin, be surprising that one meets with animals 
"having habits and structure not at all in agreement" (1859 [1968:216]). Of course, one 
could opt for an easy way out of the dilemma, claiming that "in these cases it has 
pleased the Creator to cause a being of one type to take the place of one of another 
type", but in Darwin's opinion this is a wholly unsatisfactory argument, and he remarks 
that it seems to be "only restating the fact in dignified language" (1859 [1968:217]). 
Instead, a more scientifically plausible account can be given by appealing to the way in 
which natural selection works, namely, by acting on what is already there, and 
preserving any chance variations in instinct (or structure) should these be favourable to 
the organisms in question in their specific contexts, even when at variance with the 
functions their structures were previously perfectly adapted to fulfil: 
He who believes in the struggle for existence and in the principle of natural selection, will 
acknowledge that every organic being is constantly endeavouring to increase in numbers; 
and that if anyone being vary ever so little, either in habits or structure, and thus gain an 
- advantage over some other inhabitant of the country, it will seize on the place of that 
inhabitant, however different it may be from its own place. Hence it will cause him no 
charmed and convinced by the long line of argumentation." 
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surprise thaf there should be geese and frigate-birds with webbed feet, either living on the 
dry land or most rarely alighting on the water; that there should be long-toed corncrakes 
living in meadows instead of swamps; that there should be woodpeckers where not a tree 
grows; that there should be diving thrushes, and petrels with the habits of auks. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:217]). 
From the theory of evolution by natural selection it follows that the anomalous 
structures of some species and varieties are not unsolvable mysteries or signs of a 
capricious creator, but can be ascribed to previous lifestyles and environments, that is, 
to the lifestyles and environments of ancestors. The substitution, for a personal 
designer, of an impersonal selection process which (regardless of past adaptations) 
preserves new chance variations that are heritable and currently beneficial, thus 
renders normal and likely phenomena that would seem strange upon the design 
account. Also, the selection account constitutes a more scientific, that is, empirical, 
explanation of apparent design than the divine design alternative, which by its very 
nature must appeal to a super-empirical, and thus unscientific principle. 
In a sense, arguments like those of Paley already prepared their own downfall by 
advancing quite some way towards a mechanistic interpretation of nature and its 
workings. Paley commences Natural Theology with his famous watch analogy, thereby 
setting the scene for the arguments in the rest of the work, which invariably goes out 
from the supposition that the existence (and attributes) of God can best be proven by 
demonstrating how much alike the works of nature are to sophisticated human artifacts, 
that is, mechanisms.6 
Thus, by, for instance, likening the eye to a telescope, or more generally, living organs 
to sophisticated mechanical instruments; casting them as mere superior machines that 
6 Paley is aware of the fact that some may find problematic his claims concerning the 
mechanistic nature of organisms. He therefore tries to weaken such objections by remarks 
such as the following: "I have sometimes wondered, why we are not struck with mechanism 
in animal bodies, as readily and as strongly as we are struck with it, at first sight, in a watch 
or a mill. One reason of the difference may be, that animal bodies are, in a great measure, 
made up of soft, flabby, substances, such as muscles and membranes; whereas we have 
been accustomed to trace mechanism in sharp lines, in the configuration of hard materials, 
in the moulding, chiseling, and filing into shapes, such articles as metals or wood. There is 
something therefore of habit in the case: but it is sufficiently evident, that there can be no 
proper reason for any distinction of the sort. Mechanism may be displayed in the one kind 
of substance, as well as in the other" (Paley, 1802:157-158). 
68 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
surpass watches and telescopes only in their degree of intricacy and design, and not in 
them displaying any substantively different qualities, the door towards a wholly 
mechanistic and materialist - and thence godless - conception of the world, was pushed 
ajar. Because if then, as Paley was happy to contend, organs and organisms were 
nothing but mechanisms of which we, as yet, just do not know all the complicated 
workings (due to the superior intelligence of their Designer), but which were in principle 
wholly amenable to an explication in mechanistic terms, then the next step - positing a 
law-like mechanical process put into motion by God as a secondary cause through 
which he chose to produce his mechanisms - suddenly sounded less far-fetched. After 
all, he did keep the planets in their orbits by similar intermediate means. It was such an 
inclination towards deism - inspired by the Industrial Revolution and the notion of God 
as "supreme industrialist" (Ruse, 1979:86) - which prepared the conditions for a purely 
secular evolutionary account of life and its ramifications. For once allowance has been 
made for a productive causal process intermediate between God and his creatures, the 
question might start occurring as to this process's possible autonomy, and as to the 
possible irrelevance or non-existence of the supposed First Cause behind the 
secondary causes. 
Significantly, the French naturalist Georges Buffon (1707-1788) - who is mentioned by 
Darwin (1859 [1969:53-4]) in his historical sketch? as "the first author who in modern 
times has treated [the origin of species] in a scientific spirit" - already expressed the 
view that deism honoured God to a greater degree than a conception which believed 
him to be directly involved in the minute details of his creation: 
Who gives the grandest idea of the supreme Being, he who sees him create the universe, 
arrange every existence, and found Nature upon invariable and perpetual laws; or he who 
inquires after him, and discovers him conducting and superintending a republic of bees, and 
deeply engaged about the manner of folding the wings of a beetle? 
(Buffon, quoted in Greene, 1959:140-41). 
This view continued to gain in credibility and was accepted by many in Darwin's day, 
not least by figures who influenced him greatly, such as Lyell, who were not averse to 
7 The historical sketch was only added by Darwin to later editions of the Origin. 
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the idea of God creating the organic world by natural law. Underwriting the idea of 
secondary causes did nevertheless not entail the abandonment of a metaphysical 
teleology, and in fact, Darwin's two most immediate and important predecessors as 
concerns evolutionist theory, namely, Lamarck in France and Chambers in England, 
saw no contradiction in holding on to divine providence. 
More attention will be given to the issue of secondary causes when we deal below with 
the theories of Lamarck and Chambers. But first the notions of a Natural System and a 
Unity of Type in nature, need to be elucidated. Although in themselves these notions 
did not exclude miraculous origins and immutable species, and indeed were initially 
closely associated with such ideas, they at the same time espoused the notion of 
design as order, and thereby helped prepare the way for a deist interpretation of nature. 
In dealing with the Natural System, or what Darwin also calls "the grand fact in natural 
history", namely that living beings can be arranged in a scheme consisting of groups 
subordinate to groups (species, genera, families, etc.) - expressive of their degrees of 
resemblance, he needs once again to dispel the belief that this signifies the existence 
of a Creator who made every being so as to accord with his fixed and eternal Plan. 
The Natural System was the important legacy to biology of the great Swedish 
systematist and founder of the modern system of classification, Carl Linnaeus (1707-
1778), foremost in whose mind were scientific ambitions largely inspired by the kind of 
metaphysical teleology described above. In his System of Nature (1735) Linnaeus 
provided a classificatory system in which each known plant and animal found its proper 
place. Implicit in this project was the belief that nature possessed a god-given fixed 
underlying pattern that we can come to know through our rational efforts. The 
ostensibly chaotic multitude of beings we observe in nature, actually form part of an 
oeconomia, or a system of means and ends rationally adjusted to each other so that the 
balance in nature is ensured, and no species ever destroyed (Greene, 1959:131-33). 
Just as Adam had been ordained to name all the creatures upon the newly created 
earth, so - for Linnaeus - it was the duty of science to name, classify and describe all of 
nature, and through such knowledge glorify God. But in order to achieve this goal the 
correct method had to be employed - not an artificial method that assign names in an 
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arbitrary manner and according to human convenience, but the natural method of 
classification, which heeds all the natural relationships among organisms, and give 
each a name expressive of its place in this system of relationships. This was a 
momentous undertaking, requiring of the naturalist to take cognisance of every 
characteristic of every species so that accurate classification into genera, orders, etc., 
could be made through the identification of ever more basic resemblances. Every 
resemblance or relationship had to be taken into account, for God would not have 
created things that possessed no meaning. Linnaeus thus dedicated a great part of his 
life to the uncovering of the natural system - which was supposed to mirror the plan of 
creation; but the magnitude of the work forced him to settle, in the mean time, for 
something more practical: he opted for a preliminary classification based on 
resemblances with regard to a single characteristic. This artificial system was to serve 
as a temporary, rough outline subject to modification whenever new evidence 
presented itself. But it proved so successful that people subsequently forgot about 
Linnaeus's wish as to what the real system should consist of. (Bowler, 1989:64-65; 
Greene, 1959:132-33).8 
Linnaeus's belief that the orderly pattern of resemblances we discern in nature bespoke 
the existence of a rational creator in whose mind the original and timeless plan of 
creation was contained, was still prevalent and powerful enough in Darwin's own time 
for him to experience it as a pernicious belief that obscured the real cause (vera causa) 
of the different degrees of similarities between organisms. It was an obstacle to his 
theory, because it denied the possibility of fundamental change, it denied that some 
forms of life could over time give rise to radically different forms. He accordingly felt no 
scruples at declaring it a rather vague and worthless idea: 
[M]any naturalists think that something more [than mere resemblance] is meant by the 
Natural System; they believe that it reveals the plan of the Creator; but unless it be specified 
whether order in time or space, or what else is meant by the plan of the Creator, it seems to 
me that nothing is thus added to our knowledge. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:399]). 
However, Darwin's refusal to admit that the existence of the natural system can without 
8 See also Merz (1965:221). Nordensk'fold (1929:213.217-18). Sloan (1990:306). 
71 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
further ado be ascribed to the Creator's Plan, does not mean that he wants to make a 
case for the opposite extreme: In other words, neither does he want to claim that all the 
similarities and affinities observed among living beings and reflected in the natural 
system, signify nothing but the brute fact of mere resemblance. To make such a claim 
would be to give up the search for a cause of this salient fact of nature. But on the 
contrary, Darwin feels he had found the cause. Thus, instead of "some unknown plan of 
creation" on the one hand, or mere likeness on the other, Darwin accounts for the 
possibility of a classificatory system in terms of common descent: 
I believe that something more [than mere resemblance] is included; and that propinquity of 
descent, - the only known cause of the similarity of organic beings, - is the bond, hidden as it 
is by various degrees of modification, which is partially revealed to us by our classifications. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:399]). 
True natural classification, for Darwin, is always genealogical, and the ranking of forms 
under distinct genera, families and orders thus signifies the varying degrees of 
modification each has undergone since branching from a common progenitor (Darwin, 
1859 [1968:404]). 
Unity of descent also explains another closely related fact, namely, the Unity of Plan. 
The latter refers to more than the fact that life forms can be arranged in a system 
according to the different degrees of resemblances among them. It refers to the fact 
that even those forms (in a group such as the vertebrates), who differ from each other 
in a most extreme manner, still manifest one and the same fundamental archetype. 
In Britain this view was propounded by the comparative anatomist Richard Owen, who 
drew upon the morphological theories of the French palaeontologist Etienne Geoffroy 
Saint-Hilaire - synthesising these with the ideas of Saint-Hilaire's opponent, the French 
comparative anatomist, Georges Cuvier, who underwrote the traditional teleological 
focus on the adaptive nature of organisms and denied Saint-Hilaire's claim regarding 
the unity of plan among organisms. From the transcendentalist Saint-Hilaire (and/or 
from the transcendental elements in the thought of the German embryologist, Karl Ernst 
von Baer), Owen got his Neo-Platonic idea of an ideal archetype existing in the divine 
mind, and realised in all organisms from the same group. But he supplemented this 
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morphological notion with the functionalism of Cuvier, stressing that the amount of 
adaptive modification - which increases from primitive to higher organisms- accounted 
for degree of divergence from the archetype. Owen was however not an evolutionist, 
although he, like others at the time, liked to believe that organic origins arose through 
the workings of natural law. All the same, the unity of plan discernible in organisms was 
to be ascribed to God's sense of order; in any case, adaptational needs could not 
explain it, because some organic structures, although present in diverse organisms, did 
not serve an adaptative purpose in all of them. But yes, in many instances it was clear 
that the general plan had indeed been modified in the interest of the special needs of 
particular organisms. In this way, Owen succeeded in reconciling the orthodox notion of 
design as adaptation with the notion of design as order and symmetry. (Ruse, 1979:12-
14,96,116-125; Yeo, 1979:507-508). 
Darwin knew about these theories and repeatedly referred to the authors in his Origin. 
He also knew that he had found a better way than Owen to account for (and reconcile) 
both the unity of plan and adaptation. To be sure, Owen's ideal archetype need not be 
ascribed to the Creator's Plan. Rather, such structural homologies find their real and 
unmysterious cause in the unity of descent. Furthermore, adaptation has little to do with 
god-given final causes, and everything with evolution by natural selection. Says Darwin 
(1859 [1968:233]):9 
It is generally acknowledged that all organic beings have been formed on two great 
laws - Unity of Type, and the Conditions of Existence. By unity of type is meant that 
fundamental agreement in structure, which we see in organic beings of the same class, and 
which is quite independent of their habits of life. On my theory, unity of type is explained by 
unity of descent. The expression of conditions of existence, so often insisted upon by the 
illustrious Cuvier, is fully embraced by the principle of natural selection. For natural selection 
acts by either now adapting the varying parts of each being to its organic and inorganic 
conditions of life; or by having adapted them during long-past periods of time: the 
adaptations being aided in some cases by use and disuse, being slightly affected by the 
direct action of the external conditions of life, and being in all cases subjected to the several 
laws of growth. Hence, in fact, the law of the Conditions of Existence is the higher law; as it 
o includes, through the inheritance of former adaptations, that of Unity of Type. 
9 See also Darwin (1859 [1968:415-419]). 
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Here Darwin is stripping two important biological notions of their metaphysical garb. He 
reduces them to contingent historical conditions and processes. By proposing evolution 
by natural selection as explanation of resemblance and adaptation, Darwin does away 
with the need to account for these striking phenomena in supernatural terms. Divine 
design, whether understood as adaptation or order, was a superfluous notion, one 
which hindered the search for the true causes shaping the features of organisms. 
There were, of course, evolutionary theories other than Darwin's available - especially 
those of Lamarck and Chambers - which would have been able to claim that they could 
explain resemblance and adaptation in a way not altogether dissimilar from his. 
However, as with Linnaeus, Paley and the others, metaphysical notions of design were 
still part and parcel of their approaches. But they were significant in that they provided 
these notions with a historical dimension. It is important to look at them in a little more 
detail, in order to point out where exactly Darwin's road departed from theirs with regard 
to the nature of teleological explanation. 
In 1809, the year of Darwin's birth, a work appeared that would fifty years hence be 
lumped together with his own Origin, and which would much to his annoyance, subject 
him to the same kind of ridicule the earlier work attracted. This troublesome precursor 
was none other than the Zoological Philosophy (Philosophie Zoologique) of Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829), in which was put forward a version of evolutionary 
theory.10 But even more annoying was his British predecessor, Robert Chambers 
(1802-1871): The title Janet Browne chose for the chapter in her biography of Darwin 
that deals with the role Chambers came to fulfil in relation to Darwin's theory, is 
exceedingly apt: Forestalled but Forewarned. 11 The sudden appearance of Chambers'S 
Vestiges of the natural history of creation in October 1844, published anonymously, 
was a dismal event in Darwin's life. During all the years which he secretly laboured over 
his comprehensive thesis on transmutation, and during which he had come to claim this 
problematic as his sole intellectual property, someone else, also in secret, had been 
doing the same, and indeed, had now forestalled him in the publishing of a work. At the 
10 The following treatment of Lamarck is largely based on Greene (1959:155-6) and Bowler 
(1989:82-88). 
11 See Browne (1996:457-72). 
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time he felt convinced that the speculative and amateurish Vestiges had in advance 
seriously damaged any scientific case for transmutation which might follow. The scene 
had been set in a certain way, and he would have had to do his utmost to avoid being 
seen as another Chambers or Lamarck with all the unscientific airs that surrounded 
them. 
Chambers and Lamarck's theories were similar in many respects, and I will sketch the 
core ideas of both before indicating where Darwin's insights superseded theirs. 
Beginning with Lamarck, we find a concept of nature corresponding closely to that of 
Buffon. Nature was to be studied and understood without recourse to any explanations 
based on divine intervention. God created nature as a self-sufficient system consisting 
of laws and forces that regulate all the motions of matter. As for life - Lamarck found the 
organisation of ordinary matter quite sufficient to account for the phenomenon of life; 
there was no need for inventing a special kind of organic matter, or for appealing to 
some non-material principle that would infuse matter with life. (Greene, 1959: 143, 155). 
Lamarck came to accept the immutability of species less as a result of the fossil record, 
than as of facts gathered from comparative anatomy. But he did recognise continuous 
geological change during the earth's history, and because he was not willing to believe 
that any form of life could become extinct, it seemed only reasonable to believe that 
organisms survived by changing together with their environmental conditions. And they 
change to such an extent that one species can give rise to another, indeed, Lamarck 
did not really think there was such a thing as separate species; as far as he was 
concerned they all imperceptibly shaded into each other, and all the missing 
intermediate forms will be discovered in due time. (Greene, 1959: 158, 162; Bowler, 
1989:86,88). 
Lamarck's theory of the origin of life held that the simplest lower life forms are 
continuously produced in nature by means of spontaneous generation. Humid 
conditions offer an especially favourable environment for these processes. Once these 
primitive life forms have originated, all others successively evolve from them, forming a 
gradual series of increasingly complex organisms who possess an increasing number 
of specialised organs. The formation of these new organs results, according to 
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Lamarck, from needs experienced by organisms in relation to their changing 
environment. The attempt to meet a need takes place through a movement of fluids 
within the body to the parts that must act to bring about the desired end. If the 
necessary organ does not exist at that location in the body, and the need persists, an 
organ is developed gradually through the movement of the fluids, and then grows 
through continued use; it can also wither through disuse. This constitutes his principle 
of use and disuse, which together with his belief in the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, accounted for evolution. (Bowler, 1989:84,86). 
The fact that lower organisms are still in existence all around us, was not perceived by 
Lamarck as a refutation of his belief that a process of complexi~ication has taken, and is 
still taking place. Less developed organisms currently existing can be accounted for 
quite easily - they arose very recently, and find themselves at an early stage in a line of 
development that will eventually also produce humankind - just as previous ones did. In 
other words, several similar lines of development originated at different points in time as 
a result of the continuous spontaneous generation of the lowest organisms, and each of 
these separate lines are presently progressing through the different successive stages -
some having already reached more advanced stages and others still caught up in the 
earlier, less complex ones. (He did however allow for some branching to take place, 
and accordingly, for branches that are dead ends which do not lead to humankind.) 
(Bowler, 1989:85; Greene, 1989:162-163). 
The acceptance of such an evolutionary hypothesis naturally affected Lamarck's 
research interests. And, as is evident in the following statement, it stands - as was the 
case with Buffon - in marked contrast to that of Linnaeus: 
The object of the study of animals is not only to know the different races and to distinguish 
among them by fixing their particular characters,but it is also to discover the origin of the 
faculties which they exercise, the causes which give rise to life and sustain it, and finally the 
causes of the remarkable progression which they exhibit in their organization and in the 
number as well as in the development of their faculties. 
(Lamarck, quoted in Greene, 1959: 159). 
But unlike Buffon, Lamarck was not yet ready to appreciate the influence of 
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randomness and permanent extinction on the process of life. This can be attributed to 
his desire for a certain direction in the evolutionary process: life had to be constantly 
moving towards greater complexity and perfection. It was in this respect that Lamarck 
did not succeed in escaping from teleological thinking. Though he did recognise that 
things could sometimes go wrong and that accidental causes could produce irregular 
varieties that violated the progressive line of development, he did not think that such 
deviations were powerful and lasting enough to undermine the overall progress. His 
tendency to be ambiguous about the causes of evolution stems from this commitment 
to progressive development. He probably sensed to some extent that adaption to new 
and changing conditions does not in itself guarantee a movement to greater complexity. 
Consequently, he sometimes speaks in a vague manner of "the cause which tends 
incessantly to complicate organization", thereby apparently abandoning the project to 
explain evolution solely in terms of material causes. Thus, although Lamarck was 
instrumental in conceptual ising the realisation of nature's plan as a dynamic process 
rather than as the kind of static embodiment Linnaeus had in mind, he still thought of 
nature as possessing some kind of necessary "plan" of development, and regarded 
certain structures as more fundamental than the supposedly irregular varieties. 
Another sign of the persistence of an illegitimate form of teleological explanation in his 
theory, is his emphasis on "felt needs as a positive agency in organic transformation". 
In saying that a certain organ developed because a felt need helped to bring it about, 
entails that a kind of psychological, intentional, or purposeful factor is brought into play, 
thereby denying that organic change can be explained in a completely mechanistic 
manner. In this regard Greene aptly remarks: 
[Ilt was not until Charles Darwin combined Lamarck's emphasis on the effort of living 
creatures to survive amid changing conditions of life with Buffon's idea of random variation 
and the extinction of the least fit that the traditional view of nature felt the full impact of the 
mechanistic concept. 
(Greene, 1959: 166). 
Chambers, on the other hand, felt that there was room for a work that would be a 
synthesis of the latest scientific knowledge - comprehending everything from the nebula 
to man. In contrast to Lamarck, he does zoom in on the fossil record, providing us with 
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a discussion - spanning several chapters - of the different geological strata of the earth, 
and the fossils correlating with each of them. Such a review of the fossil record from the 
lowest strata to the most recent presents us, in Chambers's opinion, with some glaringly 
obvious facts: 
In pursuing the progress of the development of both plants and animals upon the globe, we 
have seen an advance in both cases, along the line leading to the higher forms of 
organization. Amongst plants, we have first sea-weeds, afterwards land-plants; and amongst 
these the simpler (cellular and cryptogamic) before the complex. In the department of 
zoology, we see zoophytes, radiata, mollusca, articulata, existing for ages before there were 
any higher forms. The first step forward gives fishes, the humblest class of the vertebrata; 
and, moreover, the earliest fishes partake of the character of the next lowest sub-kingdom, 
the articulata. Afterwards come land animals, of which the first are reptiles, universally 
allowed to be the next type in advance from fishes, and to be connected with these by the 
links of an insensible gradation. From reptiles we advance to birds, and thence to mammalia, 
which are commenced by marsupalia, acknowledgedly low forms in their class. That there is 
thus a progress of some kind, the most superficial glance at the geological history is 
sufficient to convince us. 
(Chambers, 1844 [1969: 148-9]). 
The view formulated in this passage would not in itself have been problematic for a 
nineteenth century reader. In fact, Chambers's contemporaries would have been happy 
to agree with him that there was progression in the fossil record, that the simplest forms 
emerged first, and that step by step increasingly complex organisms made their 
appearance, each representing a certain, successively greater degree of complexity 
within a graded scale of being. After all, this corresponded with the account given in 
Scripture that God gradually prepared the earth for the Crown of Creation - mankind. 
But Chambers (1844 [1969: 149-50]) pursued the argument one step further, describing 
in some detail how "we see everywhere throughout the geological history, strong traces 
of a parallel advance of the physical conditions and the organic forms." This would in 
itself also not have been perceived as in any way outrageous. It was perfectly clear for 
all to see that beings were adapted to their surroundings - which was to be expected, 
since the Creator designed each of them to live in harmony with the circumstances 
within which he placed them. But Chambers was driving at something more, namely 
that it is changes in physical circumstances that cause changes in the species 
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inhabiting the earth. He actually approached a formulation of the principle of natural 
selection, unfortunately remaining vague when it came to specifying exactly how the 
mechanism operates. What was important, was that he saw the emergence of new 
species and of life generally, not as a miraculous intervention but as a law-like process. 
As for the origin of life on earth, Chambers (1844 [1969:204-5]) thought it nothing but a 
natural "chemico-electric operation, by which germinal vesicles were produced'. 
Moreover, species were genetically related and new ones were naturally produced from 
older ones: 
I suggest, then, as an hypothesis already countenanced by much that is ascertained, and 
likely to be further sanctioned by much that remains to be known, that the first step was an 
advance under favour of peculiar conditions, from the simplest forms of being, to the next 
more complicated, and this through the medium of the ordinary process of generation. 
(Chambers, 1969 [1844:205]). 
By this Chambers basically meant that one species (e.g. a goose) can as a result of 
certain favourable conditions produce another more advanced species (e.g. an 
ornithorynchus) as offspring. Adverse conditions, on the other hand, could cause a 
retrogression - the production of a less advanced species as offspring. As part of the 
evidence for such highly controversial claims Chambers (1969:212-22) appealed to 
embryological phenomena: Physiologists have determined that each animal, when an 
embryo, passes through stages that successively resemble all the lesser species that, 
in the progressive scale of being, precede the species of the animal in question. A 
human embryo, for example, first resembles a fish, then a reptile, a bird and the lower 
mammalia, before attaining its own proper form. Therefore, should certain conditions 
cause the period of gestation to be shorter or longer than would be normal for a certain 
species, and cause the embryo to be born at the wrong stage of development, the 
result would be offspring that belong to a different species from that of the parents. 
In order to give a theoretical justification for his belief in such extraordinary events, 
Chambers (1969:206-11) drew from Charles Babbage's argument regarding the 
workings of natural law. In the Ninth Bridgewater Treatise Babbage argued that 
unexpected and seemingly miraculous events could and do take place, events that 
would appear to violate ordinary natural laws, but which thereby are in actual fact 
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obeying higher laws of which we are. ignorant. He believed that this could be 
demonstrated through the way a certain kind of calculating machine operates. After 
patiently observing the machine for some time, it would appear to provide us with a 
series of numbers, each succeeding the other in a regular and predictable manner, e.g. 
1,2,3,4,5 ..... But induction is never foolproof, and it so happens that the machine, at 
reaching 100 000 001, suddenly switches to the instantiation of a different numerical 
series. After some time another switch occurs. This process can carry on ad infinitum 
without us ever being able to predict when or whether another switch will occur. It does 
however not mean that the process is not law-like; in fact, the entire process is a 
necessary consequence of the mechanical structure of the machine - of which we have 
no knowledge. 
Chambers (1969:210-11,219-20) found that the state of affairs described by Babbage 
must apply to the development of species as well. It would explain why we rarely if ever 
see instances where one species give birth to another - these being extremely rare and 
unpredictable (but nevertheless law-like) events, of which it is quite possible that none 
had occurred during the historical era known to humans, or if they had, it must have 
been in obscure locations under special conditions - where, for all we know, these 
events are still occurring. It is here that Darwin would succeed in articulating a more 
credible alternative involving gradual change. Even Lamarck had more of an 
appreciation for the gradualness of change than Chambers did, though the mechanism 
he had in mind - the inheritance of acquired characteristics - was almost equally 
dubious. 
Chambers of course knew about Lamarck's theory, but was not inclined to give him 
much credit - the one reason being that it was the fashion of the day to ridicule 
Lamarck, and the other being his rejection of Lamarck's idea that all the living forms 
imperceptibly shade into each other. For all his evolutionary ideas Chambers did not 
give up a belief in a plan of being that was of divine origin and entailed definite and 
eternal distinctions among the various species. Although Lamarck did not give up the 
idea of life progressing again and again along certain relatively fixed paths - each time 
realising more or less the same sequence of organic forms, he did dispute the idea of 
radical breaks between species believed to have fixed essences. For Chambers this 
was unacceptable - indeed, for him "the whole plan of being [was] as symmetrical as 
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the plan of a house, or the laying out of an old-fashioned garden", which "must needs 
have been devised and arranged for beforehand" by the Deity (Chambers, 1844 
[1969:232]). 
All the same, the kind of process Chambers suggested was at work in the realisation of 
the divine plan in nature, namely species giving rise to one another through 
reproduction, was hardly orthodox. And he knew he had to address which was probably 
the greatest objection to his theory: that it would mean the ruin of humankind's special 
status in creation. If our ancestral roots hark back to the primates, then the first 
members of the human race could no longer be thought of as called into being by a 
special act of God who have created us in his own image. We were not of heavenly 
origin, but rooted in the animal world. This was sacrilege, but Chambers tried hard to 
make his views appear otherwise: 
But the idea that any of the lower animals have been concerned in any way with the origin of 
man - is not this degrading? Degrading is a term, expressive of a notion of the human mind, 
and the human mind is liable to prejudices which prevent its notions from being invariably 
correct. [ ... ] It has pleased Providence to arrange that one species should give birth to 
another, until the second highest gave birth to man, who is the very highest: be it so, it is our 
part to admire and to submit. [ ... ] For it may be asked, if He, as appears, has chosen to 
employ inferior organisms as a generative medium for the production of higher ones, even 
including ourselves, what right have we, his humble creatures, to find fault? There is, also, in 
this prejudice, an element of unkindliness towards the lower animals, which is utterly out of 
place. These creatures are all of them part products of the Almighty Conception, as well as 
ourselves. All of them display wondrous evidences of his wisdom and benevolence. All of 
them have had assigned to them by their Great Father a part in the drama of the organic 
world, as well as ourselves. Why should they be held in such contempt? Let us regard them 
in a proper spirit, [ ... ] and we shall be altogether at a loss to see how there should be any 
degradation in the idea of our race having been genealogically connected with them. 
(Chambers, 1844 [1969:233-5]). 
Chambers (1969:275-6) also dared to speculate that the present human race with all its 
imperfections might not be the real crown of creation, that for all we know, a superior 
species, a "nobler type of humanity" may still develop which will fulfil the "dreams of the 
purest spirits of the present race". 
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Chambers became the person to make evolution a fashionable topic for discussion in 
Britain,12 though not yet scientifically respectable. Apart from the reviews in journals that 
either praised the Vestiges for making the doctrines of transmutation accessible to 
ordinary workmen and the like, or condemned it as an atheistic subversion of science 
and religion, critical pamphlets and books appeared in due course. The range of critical 
reactions made sure to tackle and thoroughly demolish each and every aspect of 
Chambers's views - the scientific, philosophical and religious. 13 This was not too difficult 
as his book with all its errors and naiveties provided an easy target. 
For Darwin, the reactions to Vestiges served as a due warning that if he wanted to 
advance unorthodox theories he had better do it in the most orthodox way possible, 
making sure that at least his means and methods were above critique. When his turn 
came - and that had to wait until things had entirely calmed down - he would make sure 
that he steered clear of all metaphysical or religious controversies and considerations in 
his Origin. He would confine himself to the scientific matters at hand and not let himself 
out on issues he did not pretend to know anything about. And he would utter almost not 
a word on the status or descent of the species he himself belonged to - that would have 
to wait until much, much later. Moreover, he would apply himself with renewed fervour 
to the meticulous gathering of hard and detailed scientific evidence for his theories. In 
this regard, Herschel's critique of the Vestiges must have made a deep impression on 
him. 
Herschel, in his Presidential address to the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science in 1845, launched his attack at the kind of causal mechanism Chambers 
employed to account for the formation of new species, namely the length of gestation of 
an embryo. Though Herschel himself believed organic origins to be natural, he had no 
intention of letting Chambers get away with the claim that a phenomenon such as 
gestation length was on a par with the Newtonian law of gravitation. As far as he was 
concerned, Chambers had done nothing more than present us with a phenomenal law 
12 See Browne (1996:462-4) for examples of people ranging from politicians to literary figures 
known to have read and discussed the Vestiges, as well as for examples of favourable and 
antagonistic reviews in journals. 
13 See Ruse (1979:106-116). 
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or description of change. Nowhere did he offer anything even approaching a vera causa 
for the origin of species, and thus his theory could not be credited with being good 
Newtonian science. (Ruse, 1979: 109-12). Darwin would now be more determined than 
ever to demonstrate the vera causa credentials of his theory. Exactly how he did this 
have been the subject of the previous chapter. 
It was in the kind of causal process Darwin proposed for evolution, and in the way he 
argued for it, that he surpassed Lamarck and Chambers. Natural selection was a purely 
mechanistic process lacking any built-in direction or purposive force. In this it contrasted 
with Lamarck's causal mechanism (the principle of use and disuse combined with the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics) which was supposed to bring about, through 
organisms' own efforts, increased complexity and perfection. It also contrasted with 
Chambers's higher or divine "law of creation" which ensured that events (species 
productions) occurred which took the life process forward along the developmental 
line - which had to be thought of as progressing from the primitive to the higher forms. 
Thus, although both Lamarck and Chambers tried to give purely natural explanations of 
evolution, doing away with miraculous special creation, they could not get themselves 
to a point where metaphysical teleology was completely left behind. Both were still 
committed to divine design as Order - God created a law-bound universe, which laws 
were moreover progressive by nature, giving rise to ever more perfect and well-adapted 
organisms. A divinely preordained pattern was being realised in creation. Bowler 
(1989:146) describes Chambers's position as follows: 
Surely God could build such a preordained pattern [the kind Babbage proposed] into the 
universe which could change the normal laws of nature from time to time in a way that would 
appear miraculous to the casual observer. Chambers's series of transmutations was ideally 
suited to such an interpretation; the individual acts fitted together to give a rational pattern. 
By adapting Babbage's position, Chambers turned God into the Great Programmer, who has 
built the law of progression into the universe where it can unfold through a series of changes 
to the normal law of like reproduction. The scientist is helpless to investigate the cause of 
such changes; he can see the overall pattern and call it the "law of progression," but he 
cannot understand the programming mechanism itself. 
However, it is hardly science when one, in order to account for certain phenomena, 
postulates a teleological law which can in no way be empirically investigated or verified: 
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Even if someone does observe one of these rare events where one species give birth 
to another, it would be difficult to subject the observation to intersubjective 
testing - given the very elusive nature of these events. Moreover, even if we observe a 
number of these events, we can never come to know the law at work, because it is in 
any case beyond human grasp. Darwin wanted to do better than that. His Lyellian 
beliefs were directly opposed to Chambers's solution. 
Whether Charles Lyell14 liked it or not, Darwin applied nearly all he learned from Lyell's 
uniformitarianism and vera causa commitments concerning the inorganic world, to the 
organic world as well. If one had to confine oneself to the search for past geological 
causes similar in nature and intensity to those causes one knows from observation to 
exist today, then one also had to search for past speciation causes that could in 
principle be observed by us today if only we investigate closely enQugh. Lyell thus did 
not allow for any violent geological cataclysms - whether miraculous (the Flood) or 
not - in order to account for present geological features such as mountains, etc. But 
much as he wanted a natural law-bound explanation not only for geological 
phenomena, but also for species origins, Lyell recoiled from a full-blown application of 
his geological doctrine to the organic sphere or to human history. He did believe, in 
accordance with his steady-statism, in the continuing occurrence, even today, of 
multiple species extinctions and creations. But definitely not in evolution and mutable 
species,15 and he remained vague as to what the natural mechanisms or laws for 
species creation would consist of. Not the normal known laws, in any case; it would 
probably have had to be some peculiar laws - almost in the line of Babbage's 
conception of higher laws; and the appearance of humankind was one case in which 
divine intervention was probably required. Lyell would therefore remain ambivalent and 
torn between his scientific principles and religious feelings. 
It was Darwin who had no scruples at "making the process of life subject to Lyell's ideas 
of uniformity and actuality, thereby in principle ruling out Chambers's almost miraculous 
species productions. Lyell's steady-statism was somewhat problematic, because the 
idea of reversibility entailed by the latter did not sit well with the irreversibility of the 
14 See Secord (1997), Ruse (1979), Greene (1982). 
15 At least not until much later, and only with a great deal of emotional distress. 
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genealogical tree of life (the tree cannot be retraced or repeated, and a particular 
species can never emerge twice). Such irreversibility was the one aspect of Darwin's 
theory that obviously contradicted the traditional mechanistic Newtonian paradigm. 
After all, life was a very complex affair, and there were too many variables, 
interconnections and causal links at play to make it even remotely plausible that exactly 
the same conditions could apply more than once. 
The mechanistic and materialist nature of Darwin's theory can be seen in its two main 
aspects, first, chance variation in organisms' characteristics, and second, natural 
selection as the weeding out of unfit varieties and the preservation of fit ones. This 
claim can be motivated as follows: 
Firstly, as for chance variation, each organism is born with a set of traits not altogether 
the same as that of either of its parents; the difference between parents and offspring 
can be of varying degrees, but there are definite limits to it - for instance, Chambers's 
dramatic changes are out of the question. The production of these variations always 
happens by chance. It is important, though, to understand in precisely what sense 
"chance" is meant here. It means "unplanned, unintended, or undesigned", but not 
"uncaused" (Hodge, 1987:243). The chance variations were still the effects of lawful, 
mechanical causes - but they were hidden, in any case Darwin admitted he did not 
have knowledge of them (recall his statement concerning heredity in the previous 
chapter). (Beatty, 1987:229). In other words, as far as Darwin was concerned, it was 
reasonable to believe that the chance variations were physically (and not divinely) 
caused, and we are justified in searching for these physical causes. The variations 
themselves were thus not the result of a stochastic process. They are only chance 
events from the perspective of their causal relevance to survival and reproduction. I 
shall further elaborate this point below. 
Secondly, we know from what has been said in the previous chapter that natural 
selection cannot take place when there is no variation in fitness, that is, not just any 
variation will do - for there are variations that are neutral with regard to fitness. Rather, 
there must be variations in traits such that these variations confer differential adaptive 
benefits on the organisms possessing them. Such adaptively beneficial traits will 
determine fitness, that is, it will determine the chances on success the organisms in 
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question will respectively have with regard to survival and reproduction. Which 
variations will generally be the most successful in surviving and reproducing, is not a 
matter of chance. Natural selection may be a probabilistic process in that the fittest will 
only on average (and not in each and every case) be the most successful, but that does 
not take away from the fact that it is a deterministic process. It is deterministic in that 
certain traits are causally relevant to success. In Hodge's terms, natural selection is a 
"differential reproduction of hereditary variants" that is "nonfortuitous'~ because "causal 
relevance is present", or again, hereditary variants' "physical property differences are 
sources of causal bias giving them different chances of survival and reproduction". To 
say this, is to assert that natural selection is a causal process, and not a case of the 
mere correlation of phenomena. (Hodge, 1987:251,233).16 
Natural selection may be deterministic, but there is no question of divine preordination 
in its workings, nor any other kind of "prevision" or "provision". (In any case, its 
probabilistic character also seems to preclude that.) It is wholly materialist in its 
determinism: All its results can be explained by the causal interactions between 
empirical environmental conditions and the material organisation of organisms. (Hodge, 
1987:242).17 
To sum up the role of chance in evolution by natural selection, we can say that it is 
a matter of chance as to what variations are arising in the conditions the species is now 
living in, but it is not a matter of chance as to which are most successful in surviving to 
reproduce. 
(Hodge, 1987:244). 
We are now in a better position to clarify the sense in which variants can be said to be 
chance productions. As mentioned above, successful hereditary variants are caused in 
Darwin's view, not by some "vital or divine agency" who calls them forth, but by natural 
causes. These causes "act blindly with regard to their consequences" - consequences 
in terms of survival and reproduction, that is. (Beatty, 1987:229). There is no guarantee 
16 Of course, some detailed account of causation is imperative if one wants to properly 
motivate these claims. but that is a task that is beyond the scope of the present thesis. 
17 See Daniel Dennet's Darwin's dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings of life (1995) 
for a wholly mechanistic account of natural selection as an algorithmic process. 
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that there will arise, in a given environment, any variations of adaptive benefit to the 
organisms inhabiting that environment. There will be variations, to be sure, but the 
degree to which they turn out to be adaptive will not be the cause of their having arisen 
in the first place. Of this much Darwin was convinced, despite his ignorance of what we 
know today as the genetic phenomena of recombination and mutation. This was an 
important conviction, because it ruled out all possibility of divine design - at least in the 
way divine design was understood at the time. The world did manifest order and 
lawfulness, but not the kind of order and lawfulness that would necessarily lead to 
progressive organic development. Darwin (1859 [1968:318-319], my italics) clearly 
stated: 
I believe in no fixed law of development, causing all the inhabitants of a country to change 
abruptly, or simultaneously, or to an equal degree. The process of modification must be 
extremely slow. The variability of each species is quite independent of that of all others. 
Whether such variability be taken advantage of by natural selection, and whether the 
variations be accumulated to a greater or lesser amount, thus causing a greater or lesser 
amount of modification in the varying species, depends on many complex 
contingencies, - on the variability being of a beneficial nature, on the power of intercrossing, 
on the rate of breeding, on the slowly changing physical conditions of the country, and more 
especially on the nature of the other inhabitants with which the varying species comes into 
competition. Hence it is by no means surprising that one species should retain the same 
identical form much longer than others; or, if changing, that it should change less. 18 
Variation is random or fortuitous in the sense that it does not occur because of its 
benefit to the organisms involved. (In fact, we now know that most mutations which 
have any significant effect are harmful.) Rather, a variation arises regardless of whether 
it is beneficial or deleterious to the organism. Once a variant exists, however, natural 
selection will in general 19 and in a nonfortuitous way cause its demise or 
retention/reproduction depending on its fitness-reducing or fitness-enhancing 
properties. To articulate this fact in current terminology: The events at the microscopic 
18 Darwin (1859 [1968:348], my italics) later reiterated: "I believe, as was remarked in the last 
chapter, in no law of necessary development". 
19 "In general", because natural selection is a probabilistic process, and there are "complex 
contingencies" at work as Darwin himself realised. It is therefore quite possible that the 
fittest new variant, as yet consisting of only one or a few individuals, might be killed by 
unexpected rockfalls and the like, without ever having had the opportunity to reproduce. 
That would also be instances of chance events, or "absolute coincidences" in Monod's 
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level at which recombination and mutation take place, are not guided by the 
considerations relevant to the survival and reproduction of organisms in the 
macroscopic world. Jaques Monod, in his Chance and necessity: An essay on the 
natural philosophy of modem biology, formulates the insight as follows: 
"[W]hat may be called 'absolute coincidences', [are] those which result from the intersection 
of two totally independent chains of events. [ ... ] Now, between the occurrences that can 
provoke or permit an error in the replication of the genetic message and its functional 
consequences there is also complete independence. The functional effect depends upon the 
structure, on the actual role of the modified proteien, on the interactions it ensures, on the 
reactions it catalyses - all things which have nothing to do with the mutational event itself 
nor with its immediate or remote causes, regardless of the nature, whether deterministic or 
not, of those 'causes"'. 
(Monod, 1972: 111). 
"[B]etween the determination, however complete, of a mutation in DNA and the 
determination of its functional effects on the plane of proteien interaction, one could [ ... ] see 
nothing but an 'absolute coincidence"'. 
(Monod,1972:112). 
Simply put: Different kinds of laws determine microscopic events 
(mutation/recombination of genes) and macroscopic events (natural selection of 
organisms) respectively. But the products of microscopic events (the resulting mutant 
genes and the new combinations of genes) do have effects on the macroscopic world, 
in this context, on the kinds of organisms formed. However, as the type of causal 
relations at microscopic level differs from the type of causal relations at macroscopic 
level, it is not the same causal process ruling across both levels. The microscopic event 
was not subject to the macroscopic laws and causes, and it can therefore be 
considered a chance event or coincidence from the macroscopic perspective. New 
adaptive traits are exactly the kind of chance events Monod had it about. This is 
because they are the occasional consequences of genetic mutation/recombination. (We 
will give more attention to the defining of the notions of adaptiveness and adaptation in 
the next chapter). 
sense of two independent chains of events coinciding. See below. 
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It is true, however, that despite the wholly mechanistic and materialist way in which 
Darwin conceptualised the process of natural selection, he was himself sometimes 
tempted to discern some progress in evolution - progress in the sense of increasing 
organisation and better adaptedness in organisms. But he did not think of progress as 
reflective of divine direction and design - his final stand on the latter was a confessed 
agnosticism. 20 Rather, for him progress followed purely from the mechanistic way in 
which natural selection worked: 
There has been much discussion whether recent forms are more highly developed than 
ancient. I will not here enter on this subject, for naturalists have not as yet defined to each 
other's satisfaction what is meant by high and low forms. But in one particular sense the 
more recent forms must, on my theory, be higher than the more ancient; for each new 
species is formed by having had some advantage in the struggle for life over other and 
preceding forms. If under a nearly similar climate, the eocene inhabitants of one quarter of 
the world were put into competition with the existing inhabitants of the same or some other 
quarter, the eocene fauna or flora would certainly be beaten and exterminated; as would a 
secondary fauna by an eocene, and a paleozoic fauna by a secondary fauna. I do not doubt 
that this process of improvement has affected in a marked and sensible manner the 
organisation of the more recent and victorious forms of life, in comparison with the ancient 
and beaten forms; but I can see no way of testing this sort of progress. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:336-337]). 
We see here that Darwin does not think of natural selection as possessing some 
inherent teleological force directed towards perfection. And as we saw above, there is 
for him no necessary law of development, compelling life to successively take on 
specific higher forms. Rather, it is a purely mechanical and materialist sifting process by 
which the successful is preserved, that is responsible for the emergence of increasingly 
improved forms. But note that improvement is still a relative concept here - Darwin 
carefully specifies that comparisons can only be made between past and present 
inhabitants of nearly similar climates. The most recent and advanced tropical organism 
would never be able to compete with an ancient inhabitant of an icy climate if both were 
placed in icy conditions. 
20 Cf. Flew (1984:52-54). 
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But Darwin does try to close the Origin with an outlook that sounds more optimistic than 
is warranted by the theory of strife and competition he has just expounded. Notions 
such as "nobility", "progress", "perfection", "exalted object", "grandeur", "forms most 
beautiful and most wonderful",21 are smuggled in here at the end of the Origin to soften 
and mask the harsh materialism and utilitarianism lying at the core of his approach. 
After all that has gone before, however, these phrases do strike one as little more than 
somewhat unconvincing rhetoric aimed at swaying apprehensive readers. 
Interestingly enough though, nineteenth century religious reactions which assimilated 
Darwin's theory into their own frameworks, simply disregarded the fact that the Origin 
opposed necessary development. They did not grasp the fundamental character of the 
process as a materialistic one proceeding through a combination of chance and 
mechanical necessity. Darwin's views were interpreted as being much in the same vein 
as the developmental views of Chambers and Lamarck. At the time there were only a 
few who refused to have anything to do with Darwin's theory, and who continued to 
cling to a literal view of the Bible and design. At the other extreme, a few Calvinists 
adopted Darwin's entire approach, precisely because it did not guarantee progress and 
thus coincided with the Christian belief in the fallenness of humankind. But most 
theologians and biologists sought some kind of compromise in the form of a theistic 
evolutionism according to which the process was supernaturally guided, either in its 
entirety or at least in the final stages leading to humankind. But this solution became 
discredited in science because it precluded a wholly natural explanation of things. From 
a religious point of view, natural selection began to be seen as too selfish and severe a 
process to be an instrument of God. Consequently, from the sides of both science and 
religion the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics started to look like a 
better mechanism. These and other options were explored and although evolution 
continued to be popular, belief in Darwin's selection mechanism dwindled and 
disappeared towards the end of the century. It was only resurrected and its honour 
restored some few decades into the twentieth century when the Modern Synthesis was 
developed. (Bowler, 1989:219-221,246). 
The temporary eclipse of Darwinism was largely due to its unsettling implications for 
21 See Darwin (1859 [1968:459-60]). 
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traditional notions of divine design. It was by accounting in a radically different way for 
the phenomenon of apparent purpose and order in living beings that Darwin pulled the 
rug out from under natural theological interpretations of the world. He showed that 
nowhere was it needed to call in divine intention in order to give a coherent and 
plausible explanation of the phenomenon of life and its wonders. Actually an absolute 
lack of intention was quite compatible with the emergence of well-adapted organisms. 
By proposing a blind, unguided process as the cause of all natural wonders, Darwin 
effected a transformation in our conception of nature and ourselves. God was pushed 
out of creation as an unnecessary hypothesis, and we were left shorn of the last 
vestiges of an animalistic attitude towards nature. The divine direction previously to be 
seen everywhere, evaporated. It was inevitable that it would take some time before 
such an outlook with all its implications would become widely accepted and influential. 
Indeed, we are still in the process of coming to terms with Darwin. 
In the next chapter, we shall see how Darwin did not do away with all forms of 
teleological explanation when he eradicated metaphysical teleology from his thought, 
but how, instead, he presented us with the means to transform teleological explanation 
into a thoroughly scientific undertaking. 
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4 
Natural Selection and Teleological Explanation 
This chapter will start with a brief illustration of Darwin's continuing use of teleological 
language in spite of his having divested biology of the metaphysical notions of divine 
design and supernatural significance. In what follows an etiological approach to goals 
and functions will be adopted as a scientifically legitimate way in which to explain the 
apparently functional and goal-directed character of biological phenomena. Finally, it 
will be argued that Darwin, through having argued for natural selection as the vera 
causa of adaptation, provided us with a historical empirical causal process which for the 
first time, and in a theoretically coherent way, made possible scientific teleological 
explanation in biology. 
Darwin's language 
Darwin may have left behind metaphysical teleology, but he did not leave behind talk of 
functions, ends, purposes and contrivances. He felt no scruples at using teleological 
language to describe the workings of biological phenomena, for instance telling his 
readers how an organ "originally constructed for one purpose", may later become 
converted into an organ serving a "wholly different purpose"; pointing out how an organ 
"has been modified but not perfected for its present purpose"; and how, in very distinct 
species, the same "function" can be fulfilled by similar organs as a result of natural 
selection having hit upon the same invention for both species (Darwin, 1859 
[1968:220,230,223], my italics]). 
In fact, Darwin still employed the Aristotelian expression, "final cause", in the Origin 1 
and elsewhere. Lennox marks that Darwin's Species Notebooks, for example, are 
consistent with regard to the meaning they attribute to this expression, that is, 'final 
cause' refers throughout to that which things (organs/instincts/behaviours) are for. 
i 
1 Cf. Darwin (1859 [1968:242,416,426]). 
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In contexts where the central question being considered is 'What is S for?', Darwin refers to 
the answer to the question as stating the 'Final Cause' of S. By contrast, when he thinks it is 
reasonable to suppose that the fact in question is not for anything, he denies that it has a 
'Final Cause'. 
(Lennox, 1993:410-411). 
Statements as to the goal-directedness of organisms' behaviour also abound in 
Darwin's text: Males struggling with each other "for possession of the females"; plants 
excreting a sweet juice "apparently for the sake of eliminating something injurious from 
their sap"; larger ground-feeding birds only taking flight "to escape danger"; and pollen-
devouring insects "visiting flowers for the sake of collecting pollen" (Darwin, 1859 
[1968:136,139,176,140], my italics). 
The question arising here regards the legitimacy of Darwin's continuing use of 
terminology that seemingly contradicts the very nature of his enterprise - after all, what 
place do goals and functions have in a process where all intention is absent, where 
chance and mechanistic cause-effect sequences combine to give a purely materialist 
account of biological phenomena? Does talk of goals and functions not smack of 
metaphysics and fallacious reasoning allover again? In the next section I will propose 
the adoption of an etiological approach to teleological explanation which will justify the 
continuing use in biology of such terminology. However, rendering these terms science-
friendly will entail understanding them in a way somewhat different from what we are 
wont to. In fact, we may start wondering whether "teleological", "goals" and "functions" 
are still appropriate terms to use, but in the current absence of anything more neutral, 
we seem to be stuck with these terms, at least for the present. 
An etiological approach to goals and functions 
Generally, the ascription of goals and functions to phenomena are meant to be 
explanatory, that is to say, when we succeed in ascribing a goal or a function to a 
phenomenon or event, we feel that it has been explained - depending, of course, on 
how accurate or sufficient we judge the ascription to be. For example, by saying that 
the function of the piece of paper in the book is to mark the place where I last stopped 
93 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
reading, I explain not only why the piece of paper is in the book, but also why it is 
located between those two pages specifically. In this example, however, we have to do 
with an agent (me), who intentionally placed the piece of paper in the book so that it 
would fulfil the function of place-marker I intended it to. (Whether it did so successfully 
or not does not affect the point being made here.) In such cases where conscious 
agents are the source of functions and goals, it may be appropriate to speak of the 
function or goal being represented as an idea in the mind of the agent, which 
representation can then be regarded as the proximate cause of the events or acts in 
question.2 But the identification of such a proximate cause in the form of an intention, 
does of course not rule out a more detailed physico-chemical explanation of what is 
going on both in the "mind" of the actor and as regards the ensuing actions or states of 
affairs. However, given the impractical (and mostly unnecessary) nature of such 
detailed investigations, we are usually' content to leave it at the simple ascription of a 
goal or function - finding that a quite satisfactory form of explanation. 
In the case of by far the majority of biological phenomena, there are no mind-
possessing actors whose intentions can account for the existence of functional and 
goal-directed phenomena. And besides, in the previous chapter the divine mind has 
been relieved of that all-encompassing burden. But we nonetheless still have trouble 
banishing the impression of design from our thoughts when we scrutinise living complex 
systems - where functionality and goal-directedness seem to be the rule rather than the 
exception. Darwin himself never ceased to wonder at the ostensible design so 
abundantly manifested in living phenomena. How then, are we to account for such a 
state of affairs, given that intentional design - whether divine or otherwise - can no 
longer be accepted as a scientifically acceptable solution? To answer this question, a 
slight detour is in order for the elucidation of certain distinctions within the discipline of 
biology, distinctions such as that between proximate and ultimate causes, which will 
prove to be relevant to the answer developed below. 
Biology can be seen as a science encompassing two fields that differ considerably in 
"method, Fragestellung, and basic concepts" (Mayr, 1961 [1976:360]). It does not direct 
its attention exclusively to the answering of so-called what-questions - questions aimed 
2 Cf. Mitchell (1995:41). 
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at establishing and describing states of affairs (as will be the case in a purely 
descriptive structural biology). Two other types of questions, namely how-questions and 
why-questions, are each found to correspond to a separate domain of biological 
enquiry. What could be termed functional biology concentrates on problems relating to 
how things operate or function - the main technique being the experiment, and the ideal 
being an approximation to the simplicity and elimination or control of all variables that 
characterise physical and chemical experiments (Mayr, 1961 [1976:360]; 1974 
[1976:398]). 
Why-questions, in contrast, are absent from the physical sciences, but essential to the 
science Darwin put on firm foundations, namely evolutionary biology. But "why?" should 
here be understood in the sense of a historical "how come?", not in the sense of a 
finalistic "what for?". It refers to the fact that all biological phenomena are historical, that 
is, spatially and temporally determined, constituted as links in an "evolutionary chain of 
changing forms, none of which has any permanent validity" (DelbrOck quoted in Mayr, 
1961 [1976:360-361]). Evolutionary biology wants to determine the causes or pathway 
by which organisms' characteristics have been effected. Put differently, it occupies itself 
with the selective significance of different phenotypical aspects. (Mayr, 1961 [1976:360-
361]; 1974 [1976:398-399]). 
However, the difference between functional and evolutionary biology extends further 
than their distinct Fragestellungs. The kinds of causation searched for in answer to the 
respective questions, are of a fundamentally different nature. When we are looking for 
the set of immediate causes of a phenomenon, say migration, our investigation falls in 
the domain of functional biology and we can speak of proximate causes (in this case 
certain physiological changes in response to external stimuli). But when we want to 
know the ultimate historical causes (in this case certain genetic and ecological 
conditions) of the phenomenon, our investigation veers toward evolutionary biology. 
(Mayr, 1961 [1976:362-363]). As Mayr also formulates it: 
[P]roximate causes govern the responses of the individual (and its organs) to immediate 
factors of the environment, while ultimate causes are responsible for the evolution of the 
particular DNA program of information with which every individual of every species is 
endowed. 
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(Mayr, 1961 [1976:363]). 
It is this notion of the ultimate causes of biological phenomena that concerns the 
present study. Darwin supplied the theoretical means with which, for the first time, the 
origination of the structures and features of distinct species could be explained in a 
scientifically satisfactory manner. In the workings of natural selection he has provided 
the chief ultimate causes determining the form organisms' features take in their normal 
environments. God was no longer needed as the ultimate cause of these; instead, a 
historical empirical process took his place. However, Darwin did not pretend to have 
found in natural selection the ultimate cause of life itself. How the first living system 
arose, was a mystery to him and he did not claim to have found the answer to that, 
although he did believe it was also due to some or other law-bound process. But once 
the first, or possibly even a few primitive and extremely simple living systems made 
their appearance, Darwin is confident that natural selection was then capable of taking 
over and through driving an evolutionary process, could account for just about 
everything that subsequently ensued, that is, for all subsequent variation, modification, 
complexification, speciation, and so on. But now, how does this notion of the workings 
of natural selection being the ultimate causes of organismic features, relate to the 
explanation of these same features in terms of goals and functions? How does natural 
selection pertain to the issue of the legitimacy of teleological explanation? To show the 
connection between natural selection and goals and functions, I will now outline an 
etiological approach to teleological explanation. 
Upon an etiological approach to explanation, "to explain why something occurs is to 
describe the causal history which led to the event - i.e. to give its etiology" (Mitchell, 
1995:41). For our purposes that means that the occurrence of certain organs and 
behaviours will have to be explained by reference to their causal histories. Describing 
these causal histories will involve showing how the organs/behaviours in question had 
brought about, in the past, certain consequences which were responsible for the 
perpetuation, through many generations, of these same organs/behaviours. That is 
what a consequence-etiology is all about. Comments Salmon (1990:111-112): 
The basic idea of a consequence-etiology is as ingenious as it is simple. A particular bit of 
behavior B occurs because B has been causally efficacious in the past in achieving a goal G. 
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A cat, hunting for prey, is clearly engaged in goal-directed behavior. It stalks in a typically 
catlike way because such stalking has resulted in the procurement of food. It is not caused 
by the future catching of this particular mouse, for (among other problems) in this instance 
he may not succeed in catching his prey. But such behavior has worked often enough to 
have conferred an evolutionary advantage on the members of the species. [ ... ] Roughly 
speaking, the causal efficacy of B in bringing about G in the past is, itself, an indispensable 
part of the cause of the occurrence of B on this occasion. It is a consequence-etiology 
because the consequences of doing B are a crucial part of the etiology of the doing of B. 
In other words, at some time in the past and quite fortuitously, a certain behaviour/entity 
occurred which happened to have had advantageous consequences. And it is because 
it happened to have had these advantageous consequences that it recurred and 
acquired a relative degree of fixity, enabling us to make statements involving goals and 
functions. Indeed, through having had certain advantageous consequences in the past, 
the organs/behaviours came to be functional or goal-directed, that is, they now appear 
to us to serve specific functions and goals. The mechanisms at work in selecting and 
preserving behaviours/entities with advantageous consequences are articulated by 
evolutionary theory - we will return to this below. 
Not all causal sequences render consequences functions. The same goes for goals. It 
is obvious that not just any consequence qualifies as a function or goal: An organ or 
behaviour can have, at anyone time, many detrimental and beneficial consequences 
without all or even most of these being functions/goals of the organ/behaviour. One 
should beware, in this respect, of the "fallacy of functionalism", which entails "taking the 
fact that a consequence is beneficial as sufficient to accounting for why the practice [or 
feature or activity] exists" (Mitchell, 1995:43). In order to distinguish between the 
relevant and irrelevant consequences, some criterion should therefore be formulated. 
But before making clear how natural selection can be utilised to help solve the problem 
of a relevant criterion, the teleological character of goals and functions demands more 
attention. 
It is precisely the fact that they are identified as consequences of the items whose 
presence they must explain, that makes for the teleological character of goals and 
functions. It is also the reason some regard explanation in terms of goals and functions 
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as problematic. Observes Mitchell (1995:50): 
The classic puzzle regarding functions [and goals, we might add] is how the consequence of 
a trait [behavioural or otherwise] could explain why the trait is, in fact, present. 
In the introductory chapter it has been remarked that one of the objections to 
teleological explanation is that it seems to present consequences as causes - it 
reverses the standard cause-effect sequence. Present actions and states of affairs are 
being explained by future ones. Such a mode of explanation would of course not only 
mean violating the linear conception of time, but also signify a return to an illegitimate or 
unscientific form of thinking, one that matches the defeated metaphysical teleology in 
regarding biological phenomena as possessing some kind of surplus-value 
transcending their empirical aspect: That is to say, biological phenomena would be 
viewed as infused with a purposiveness that is not compatible with ordinary mechanistic 
explanations. It would require positing an additional direction-giving force or principle for 
which no independent empirical evidence can be produced. As suggested earlier on, 
this particular critique should not be accepted as a definite refutation of the validity of 
teleological explanation. But apart from a few brief comments at the beginning of this 
study, I have not yet elaborated an adequate alternative interpretation of teleological 
explanation. 
To begin with, we should take care to remember that when we speak of the teleological 
character of biological phenomena it in fact denotes nothing more than ostensible 
functionality and goal-directed ness - at least in all cases where conscious intention is 
not the source of the functions/goals. The heart is not really directed towards the 
realisation of a certain future consequence (blood circulation); but it does happen to 
have that vital consequence in organisms presently, just as it happened to have had it 
for many ages. And even where some degree of conscious intention may be present 
(e.g. in some behavioural activities), it still is never the case that the future determines 
present states of affairs or activities. Recall the passage from Wright (1976:10-11) I 
quoted in the introductory chapter, in which he presents the example of one's going to 
the store in order to buy bread - the actual (future) purchase of the bread was not the 
cause of one's going there, but rather the goal: 
Perhaps my having of that particular goal could be viewed as a cause of the action; but that 
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of course is something that preceded the action, and hence is not guilty of the egregious 
time-reversal imputed to teleological accounts of behaviour. 
At this point we may seriously pose the question as to whether the term teleological is 
really appropriate, and not a possible misnomer. Should we at all speak of teleological 
explanation, given all the problematic and metaphysical baggage this term is saddled 
with? Because it does appear to inevitably carry in its very core the assumption of the 
future determining the present. And even if that were not the case, there is evidence 
that the use of one and the same term for both a form of metaphysical or invalid 
explanation, and for a form of properly scientific explanation, has all the potential for 
creating confusion. In this respect Ghiselin (1994) was enraged by Lennox's (1993) 
rather misplaced criticism of himself. In his article titled "Darwin was a teleologist", 
Lennox claims that Ghiselin is departing from faulty assumptions when the latter 
asserts that in any "non-trivial sense" of the word teleology, Darwin got "rid of teleology 
and [replaced] it with a new way of thinking about adaptation ... " (Ghiselin quoted in 
Lennox, 1993:409). In Lennox's view, Ghiselin is wrong in equating teleological 
explanation exclusively with explanations making an "appeal to divine design or an 
internal vital force". Instead, Ghiselin should see that the notion teleology encompasses 
both that old metaphysical form of explanation and Darwin's new non-metaphysical 
"selection-based teleology". Both are teleological, only, the metaphysical version is 
scientifically inegitimate, and Darwin's version is scientifically legitimate. But it remains a 
case of one form of teleology having been replaced by another form of teleology, and 
not of an eradication of all teleology. Concludes Lennox (1993:418): 
By carefully examining Darwin's actual use of teleological explanation, one finds an 
explanatory structure which is at once irreducibly teleological, and at the same time unlike 
any of the standard forms of teleology in the nineteenth century. Indeed, it is only rather 
recently that there is a model of teleological explanation to which Darwin's reasoning 
conforms. 
Ghiselin (1994) reacts to Lennox with an indignation that is in my mind justified. He 
regards Lennox's criticisms as being in essence a quibbling about words as well as 
being manifestly oblivious to the epistemological issue at hand. Whereas Lennox wants 
to continue using the word "teleology", namely, as an overarching term denoting not 
only the old metaphysical explanations in terms of design, but also Darwinian scientific 
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explanations of biological phenomena, Ghiselin rather prefers to reserve "teleology" for 
al/ illegitimate or invalid forms of explanation in terms of goals and functions - which 
include not only the old metaphysical forms but also non-metaphysical but fallacious 
forms. What Lennox did, was little more than to denounce Ghiselin for not employing 
teleology as an overarching term like he himself does, moreover pretending that he is 
thereby arguing some significant point. But Ghiselin (1994:490) points out that an 
important epistemological point is being missed when terms such as teleology and 
teleological continue to be used as descriptive of present-day biological explanation: 
When Lennox [ ... ] asserts that "most biologists and philosophers of science acknowledge the 
apparent value of identifying various features of living things in terms of goals, ends, 
functions, design and so on" I am appalled. We acknowledge the value of identifying the real 
significance of features that have apparent goals, apparent ends, apparent design and the 
like. In ordinary discourse, design without a designer is a contradiction in terms. No 
competent teacher of biology would want to blur such an important distinction by calling two 
such fundamentally different things by the same name, given the immense amount of effort 
that has to be invested in teaching students not to think teleologically. [ ... ] 
Lennox's suggestion that once we have got rid of Design or internal vital forces we have 
an innocuous form of "teleology" is not the sort of thesis that a properly educated biologist 
would accept. He completely misses the epistemological problem that working scientists 
must face when actually doing research on matters of adaptive significance. Contrary to 
what he claims, one does not have to believe that the world actually was created by some 
Intelligent Being, if one is to behave as if the world had the properties that He would have 
endowed it with. Neither does one have to use the word "final cause" to behave as if such 
things actually existed. One can merely behave as uneducated persons generally do, and 
not even question the assumption that life has purpose. Teleology may be treated as an 
ineffable mystery, or perhaps as something that has to be invoked upon epistemological 
grounds. Or, as so often happens, one can attribute powers to selection that God might 
have, but natural selection does not. 
Biological explanations in terms of goals, functions and the like, need thus not be 
traditionally metaphysical in order to be illegitimate. In fact, the moment one starts 
assuming that biological features or processes really, in an objective sense, possess 
goals and functions, you are making yourself guilty of an illegitimate form of 
explanation, and are liable to commit gross errors in reasoning, that is, to see 
functionality and goal-directedness (or to use less loaded terms: features that are 
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causally relevant to survival and reproduction) where there are none. Ghiselin 
(1994:490) offers us a notorious example of such illegitimate reasoning in "the notion 
that organisms have certain properties 'for the good of the species"'. According to this 
notion, the individual species member is thought of as serving the perpetuation of the 
species as a whole through possessing certain features that does not necessarily 
benefit itself as individual organism, but instead aid fellow species members and 
thereby the species itself in its struggle with other species. In other words, it is not the 
individual organism, but the species that is the unit of selection.3 This kind of reasoning 
is also teleological and fallacious in much the same way as older teleological thinking. It 
likewise assumes that things evolve to serve some greater whole, only in this case no 
divine plan is invoked but rather the notion of the species to which individual members 
are subordinate or dependent upon. This then, is teleology, and to my mind Ghiselin is 
correct in insisting that current biological explanation should rather not be lumped 
together under the same term. It would be better to invent other terminology so as to 
prevent confusion. 
In some sense Lennox cannot be blamed for his wayward remarks, because 
unfortunately it is true that many biologists and philosophers of science are not always 
as careful as they should be when writing about explanation in terms of apparent goals 
and apparent functions. For reasons to do with the economy of expression, they more 
often than not neglect to insert the all-important apparent, and moreover, like Lennox, 
many continue to employ teleological as a term descriptive of the kind of explanation 
they occupy themselves with. But unlike Lennox, they will probably all stick to the 
adjectival form (teleological), and refrain from going as far as employing the related but 
3 The issue concerning the unites) of selection is a whole problematic of its own to which 
evolutionists have adopted different viewpoints. The question turns on whether the gene, 
the individual organism, or the group is the unit being selected. Put differently: does 
adaptation take place to benefit genes, organisms or groups? (The species is not 
considered an option.) Darwin argued for the individual organism. Genic selectionism is 
exemplified by e.g. the work of Richard Dawkins. See his The selfish gene (1976). Elliott 
Sober (1993:88-118) presents a discussion of the problematic that succeeds in showing 
how genic selectionists sometimes fail to appreciate the complexity of the forces at play. He 
argues that we are dealing with a complex process in which selection takes place at all 
these levels. Genic selection may account for some traits, but not for others. The same is 
true of organismic selection and group selection. This viewpoint also entails that the 
interests of the different objects need not be identical: An organism's interests can conflict 
with those of its genes, and a group's interests can conflict with those of its individual 
members. It does seem to me however, that organismic selection will always be the 
primary selection process, with genic selection second, and group selection only occurring 
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more loaded noun forms (teleology and teleologist) when speaking of biological 
explanation since Darwin. Such has also been the practice in this study, not so much 
because I think it advisable to continue use of the adjective, but because the authors 
upon which I draw still employ the term, and for reasons of continuity and intelligibility I 
followed suit. Also, an adequate new term has yet to be introduced - one which will 
encompass both scientific explanations in terms of apparent functions and scientific 
explanations in terms of apparent goals. 
Ghiselin (1994:489-490) suggests that instead of "teleology" and "teleological" we use 
the terms Pittendrigh coined, namely, teleonomy and teleonomic, but unfortunately it 
seems not to have caught on, and where it did, as in the case of Mayr, it does not 
necessarily assume the kind of general or comprehensive meaning we need it to. That 
is to say, it is not necessarily employed to denote both goal-directed and functional 
explanation. Mayr, for one, in the end seems to restrict "teleonomic" to goal-directed 
processes and behaviours alone, in other words, the term ceases to apply to functions 
as well. He observes that one can hardly say that the eye of a sleeping person is goal-
directed at anything, even though it is a well-adapted system. According to him, we 
probably ought to make 
a terminological distinction between functional properties of systems and strict goal 
directedness, that is, teleonomy of behavioral or other processes. However, since one will be 
using so-called teleological language in both cases, one might subsume both categories 
under teleology. 
(Mayr, 1974 [1976:396]). 
Mayr thus falls back on teleology as the comprehensive term. Therefore, anybody who 
wants to follow Mayr in his use of "teleonomy" for goal-directedness, but not in his 
continuing use of the problematic "teleology" (or "teleological" explanation) as 
comprehensive category, will still be left without an appropriate general term to replace 
the former. I will not attempt the formulation of a proposal concerning new terminology, 
but I do concern it an issue in need of some serious thought and a new consensus. 
For now we will have to make do with much of the old terminology in the form of "as-if' 
under special conditions. 
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statements that are carefully qualified, because there does seem to be an 
indispensable role for what Wilson (1991 :136) calls a "working hypothesis of ostensible 
design", in attempts to explain biological phenomena. Drawing upon others (e.g. Broad 
and Goudge), Wilson describes organisms as complex systems with parts arranged, 
acting and interacting in particular ways, and which display ostensible design or 
purpose when the following conditions apply, namely 
if (a) the parts and their actions are such as might have been expected if the system had 
been constructed by an intelligent being to fulfil a certain purpose that he or she had in mind, 
and if (b) when systems of this sort are further investigated under guidance of this 
hypothesis, hitherto-unnoticed parts, arrangements among parts, and processes of 
interaction are discovered, and these are found to accord with the hypothesis. 
(Wilson, 1991: 132). 
We seem to be moving into dangerous territory with formulations such as the above. 
That is why it is imperative to always keep their "as-if' character and possible points of 
disanalogy foremost in our minds. Where the hypothesis of ostensible design - or what 
Stephen J. Gould would call the "engineer's criterion of good design" - comes in handy, 
is in its enabling us to devise "optimality models" that generate possible explanations 
for particular biological phenomena. With optimality models we proceed upon the 
supposition that "certain specified morphological features or behavioural patterns 
causally explain why certain characteristics or traits serve the [ostensible] goal of 
survival and reproduction". We then try to determine what specific combination of 
morphological and behavioural variables will maximise the fitness of the type of 
organism in question, that is, what combination (keeping in mind, of course, the 
anatomical, phYSiological and other limits of the specific species) will give it the greatest 
chance of surviving and reproducing given the conditions in its normal environment. 
The combination fastened upon - which is taken to constitute "optimal design" - is then 
compared with the state of affairs in nature to see to which extent there is 
correspondence. Where it does obtain to a considerable extent, we are justified in 
inferring that we have achieved a reasonably good understanding of the biological 
phenomena under investigation.4 
4 I am drawing here upon Wilson (1991: 134-136). 
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However, is the idea of optimal design not reminiscent of the metaphysical belief in 
perfect adaptation by divine design? Do optimality methods of analysis not come 
dangerously close to the unjustified assumption that there is a/ways a function or goal 
to be found for each and every feature or activity? Even Darwin denied that such a pan-
adaptationist approach could apply. The risks accompanying optimality models cannot 
be disowned, but these are outweighed by the advantages of gaining fruitful 
hypotheses for guiding further research. Also, although the point made by the previous 
chapter, was that Darwin had rid us of the notion of a metaphysical designer or force, 
the point was not that he thereby also undermined all ideas of order, regularity or 
apparent "design" in nature. Recall Dennett's (1995:65) remark that Darwin, having 
been given Order, proceeded to show how Design could emerge through a purely 
mechanical process. But this does entail the supposition that there is, in fact, at least 
some order, regularity and "design" in nature which our scientific theories can attempt 
to capture. That then, is indeed a core metaphysical assumption from which science, at 
least in its more realist mode, cannot escape. 
As we have seen above, the hypothesis of ostensible design relies heavily on the 
analogy with the human ability to make things that could meet certain ends we have in 
mind. What we should do is to carefully note all possible limitations of the analogy 
between, on the one hand, human intelligence and the technological artefacts it 
produces, and on the other hand, natural selection and the adaptations it brings about. 
In agreement with a number of other authors, Wilson (1991: 136-137) identifies 
"problem-solving capacities" as the crucial characteristic human intelligence and natural 
selection have in common. Where the solutions humans devise to their problems take 
the form of various artefacts and practices, the solutions natural selection hit upon or 
preserve concern the survival and reproduction of organisms and take the form of 
adaptational features and behaviours. But because the disanalogies between the two 
types of processes should be kept out of the hypotheses concerning the products of 
natural selection, we need a "running commentary" that alerts us to "those features of 
the form of [human problem-solving] processes that are to be ignored in the generation 
of hypotheses".5 
5 Human problem-solving processes form, of course, part and parcel of human culture -
which is itself subject to change. Whether, to what extent, and in exactly what sense 
cultural change can be said to fit the Darwinian evolutionary paradigm, is the subject of a 
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To recap, the foregoing paragraphs have been concerned with the illumination of a 
vitally important point, namely, that talk of goals, functions or design in biology are not 
to be taken literally, that is, we are not to take biological features, processes or activities 
as in actual fact directed towards the achievement of certain effects or consequences. 
But this realisation does not force us to do away with all such terminology, for the latter 
has proved to be of indispensable heuristic and explanatory value. Moreover, there is a 
definite sense in which specific function and goal ascriptions can be said to be accurate 
or inaccurate, and this is determined by empirical evidence - as we shall shortly see. 
However, the nature of the whole enterprise does demand of us to be careful in our 
inferences and language use. In this regard I am for instance not convinced that we 
need to carry on using the term "design", as in optimal design and ostensible design. In 
most caces the latter can be replaced by less loaded, and more accurate terms, such 
as "adaptation. 
The next step in the development of an etiological approach to goals and functions, is 
whole different debate with which the present thesis is not concerned. An interesting move 
was made by Richard Dawkins (1976), when he concluded his The selfish gene with the 
COining of a new term: meme. "Meme" was intended as an analogous term to "gene", and 
signifies the idea of a cultural unit of transmission. Like the gene, it is a replicator, though a 
more recent arrival on the evolutionary scene, and its survival value likewise depends on 
the qualities of longevity, fecundity and copying-fidelity. See Delius's (1989) article, "Of 
mind memes and brain bugs, a natural history of culture", as an example of an author who 
takes his lead from Dawkins. However, there are many problems with the meme or 
replicator interpretation of culture, and a better alternative may be the suggestion by Harms 
(1996) in his "Cultural evolution and the variable phenotype", that culture be subsumed 
under phenotypic variability rather than it being interpreted as a separate and autonomous 
form of evolution. 
Related to the question of cultural evolution is the question concerning the evolution 
of scientific knowledge, which question has become the focus of what is now called 
evolutionary epistemology. Karl Popper, for instance, contended that the growth of scientific 
knowledge proceeds through much the same kind of process of selection (or error-
elimination) as that to which the evolution of the tree of life is subject. He characterised 
scientific growth as a problem-solving process that proceeds "from old problems to new 
problems, by means of conjectures and refutations" (Popper, 1961 [1979:258]). According 
to him, humans have advanced beyond other organisms in their ability to devise solutions 
in the form of theories, which latter then have to bear the brunt of selection forces, thereby 
sparing the inventors that fate. Says Popper (1961 [1979:261]): "[W]hile animal knowledge 
and pre-scientific knowledge grow mainly through the elimination of those holding the unfit 
hypotheses, scientific criticism often make our theories perish in our stead, eliminating our 
mistaken beliefs before such beliefs lead to our own elimination". Although there is some 
merit in Popper's ideas, he does not always get his biology right, and apart from that, I do 
find his idea of an evolving "largely autonomous third world of objective knowledge" 
(Popper, 1968 [1979:111]) a bit odd. He might nevertheless be able to find some support 
among meme theorists. 
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to bring in clearer relief the criterion for distinguishing between consequences that 
qualify as goals or functions, and consequences that do not. As will become evident, 
the criterion relates to their causal mechanisms - that of which they are the 
consequences or effects. 
Sandra Mitchell (1995:42) advances two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for 
the qualification of a consequence as a goal or a function: Firstly, the feature or 
behaviour of which it is a consequence must have been selected over alternative 
features or behaviours due to this particular consequence it has, and secondly, the 
production or reproduction of the feature or behaviour must be a direct result of that 
selection process to which it was subject. (Mitchell, 1995:42). It means that in order to 
identify goals or functions we have to appeal to a causal history in the form of a 
selection process. The causal history at issue with regard to natural items, is the history 
of natural selection: 
For an etiological functional relationship to occur, a selection background like natural 
selection must operate. The selected consequence of an item must furthermore be causally 
responsible for its replication and, hence, its current presence. Evidence only of a selection 
background or selection of an item will be insufficient to justify ascription of a function. The 
feature explained, like larger size in male primates, must have been selected for the 
functional consequence, say success in male/male competition, and, secondly, it must have 
been produced or reproduced as a direct result of that selection process, in this case by 
genetic transmission. 
(Mitchell, 1995:42). 
Mitchell makes her point with regard to functions, but the passage could be easily 
rephrased to apply to goal-directed relationships as well. The important insight to be 
gained here is that in natural selection we have been provided with a causal process 
and history that provides the means for making sense of, and legitimising teleological 
explanations in a non-metaphysical way. Natural selection is a causal process that is 
amenable to empirical investigation, that is, evidence can be gathered concerning the 
conditions and consequences of natural selection. The conditions and consequences 
(goals/functions) being, of course, those that are relevant to survival and reproduction. 
Important to note concerning Mitchell's two conditions, is that the first condition alone 
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will not do as criterion, because that would for instance allow a one-time accidentally 
beneficial consequence to qualify as goal or function - which clearly is not what we 
have in mind with these terms, for all general explanatory value is then lost. To prevent 
such inappropriate ascriptions one also needs to be presented with evidence that the 
feature or behaviour in question generally gives rise to this consequence in such a way 
that the feature or behaviour is reproduced in following generations because of its 
possessing this superior consequence which confers a fitness advantage on the 
possessors (organisms), thereby causing them to be favoured by natural selection. 
But what does fitness mean, and what does it mean to say that natural selection 
favours the fitter organisms? The important point to grasp, is that fitness is a relative 
concept. We can give a general theoretical definition of fitness, but the moment we wish 
to give a more detailed description of what a fit organism would look like, we are forced 
to give a number of descriptions, each of which can only have validity relative to a 
specific kind of environment. But in its most general sense, fitness can be defined as 
high viability (the probability of reaching adulthood) and/or high fertility (degree of 
reproductive success). The greater an organism's probability of survival and/or the 
greater its expected number of offspring, the greater the fitness of the organism. 
Important is, that biologists are not so much interested in the fitness of single organisms 
as in the fitnesses of their traits. That means that organisms who share a specific trait 
may still differ in their respective (overall) fitnesses. Naturally, if natural selection is to 
take place, organisms will have to differ in traits determining their viability and fertility. In 
the absence of differences in traits determining fitness, the process of natural selection 
can per definition not take place. (Sober, 1993:81 ).6 
Whether a specific trait enhances an organism's viability and fertility depends very 
much on its environment. Not only the physical properties of an organism, but also the 
environment with which it interacts, determines its fitness. An organism (e.g. a dolphin) 
may be fit when it finds itself in a certain kind of environment (e.g. an ocean), but given 
6 Where there is variation in fitness within a population, natural selection acts to increase the 
frequency of fitter traits and to decrease the frequency of less fit traits. When one and the 
same trait influences both viability and fertility, and influences them in different ways, a 
conflict will develop between the two types of selection. Some sort of trade-off between the 
importance of high viability and the importance of high fertility in the environment in 
question will result, and this will determine how strongly the specific trait will be selected for 
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a very different environment (e.g. a desert), it may suddenly become radically unfit. 
That is why we always speak of organisms' normal environments - the environments in 
which they have evolved and to which they have become adapted, the ones with 
respect to which they are fit. However, fitness is not necessarily the same as having a 
lot of adaptations. In the present study we are very much concerned with adaptations, 
because features or behaviours that are functional or goal-directed in the sense 
explicated above, are adaptations, but that is not the same as currently being a fit trait. 
To clarify this point the next few lines will be devoted to some brief comments on the 
concept of adaptation and its derivatives. 
When we talk about a trait as an adaptation,7 we refer to its history - we are making a 
claim about why it originally evolved. A trait is an adaptation for performing a certain 
task when ancestrally there was selection for it to perform this task, because in doing 
so it conferred a fitness advantage at that time. This is not to say anything about 
whether a trait is presently adaptive: Adaptation must not be confused with current 
utility. An adaptation may have no present use, indeed, it may even be maladaptive. On 
the other hand, an adaptation may be useful/adaptive (confer a fitness advantage) now, 
but not necessarily because of the initial reasons for its evolution, that is, a trait which 
evolved for one reason, can subsequently be co-opted to perform a very different task. 
Of interest here is that features and behaviours with functions or goals need not 
presently confer fitness; however, for a feature or behaviour to have a function or goal, 
that is, for it to be an adaptation, it must have conferred fitness at some time in the past, 
for otherwise it would not have been perpetuated. 
With regard to the process of adaptation a further distinction has to be made - that 
between ontogenetic- and phylogenetic adaptation. The former has it about changes 
made within an individual organism's lifetime,. such as when an organism learns 
something and thereupon changes its behaviour in a way beneficial to itself. 
Phylogenetic adaptation, on the other hand, entails the modification of the composition 
of a population through natural selection. In this case changes do no not take place 
within the life of an individual, because it is not the individual who is adapting. 
or against (Sober. 1993:57-9). 
7 I base my discussion of adaptation in the following two paragraphs on Sober (1993:82-6). 
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Nevertheless, individual organisms benefit from phylogenetic adaptation by having the 
evolving trait genetically transmitted to them across generations. Evolutionary theory is 
concerned with the latter kind of adaptation. 
Ontogenetic adaptations, or any characteristics acquired through an organism's own 
efforts during its lifetime, are not heritable, that is, it cannot be passed on genetically to 
its offspring.B The present study's interest thus lies with functional or goal-directed traits 
or behaviours that are phylogenetic adaptations, and not ontogenetic adaptations. 
Given that the selection process applying is that of natural selection, and that the 
relevant production and reproduction processes can therefore only refer to those 
involving mal/adaptations that are heritable traits of organisms, ontogenetic 
adaptations - not being heritable - cannot qualify. 
Upon the etiological approach, explaining phylogenetic adaptations, that is, explaining 
the presence of particular phenotypical (i.e. morphological, physiological and 
behavioural) traits by reference to their goals or functions, requires the specification of a 
causal background, that is to say, a selection background, as well as a narrative 
account of the relevant role the consequences in question played in the causal history 
of which the traits are the result. Put differently, in answering the question as to why a 
specific trait is there, attention is drawn to a consequence it had in the past, a 
consequence which causally contributed to the perpetuation of the trait. This is the 
same as offering a narrative account of how the trait evolved by natural selection.9 
The point is to demonstrate that the trait had a beneficial consequence which conferred 
a fitness advantage upon organisms in the past who possessed the trait. Being fitter 
than those who did not possess it, they produced more offspring to whom the trait 
naturally got passed on, and who in turn was aided by the trait's beneficial 
8 Lamarckism (the idea that it is possible to inherit acquired characteristics) would have to 
presume that information about the acquired characteristic could in some way travel from 
the revised body part (somatic-line cells) to the eggs or sperm (germ-line cells). No 
evidence has been found for the existence of such communication. Moreover, even if the 
information could reach the DNA, it is not all that likely that the DNA would be able to code 
for the new characteristic. See Dennett (1995:117,321-2). Note however, that although 
inheritance of acquired characteristics should be ruled out, this does not prevent the 
capacity to acquire certain characteristics from being heritable. See Dennett 
(1995:77-80,323). 
9 Cf. Mitchell (1995:44,51). 
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consequence. 
Functions and goals then, refer to past consequences, rather than to future 
consequences towards which the present is drawn. This focus on past consequences 
rather than future ones when we explain the presence of a particular trait in a species, 
does of course not contradict the fact that the trait's presence in an organism now, is 
indispensable for its survival or reproduction at this moment and in the future. An organ 
like the heart is having consequences all the time, and without these consequences the 
organism would die. That is the way things have evolved. And it is because we have 
knowledge of the consequences traits have had in past organisms, that we are able to 
predict with relative certainty what consequences they will have in present organisms, 
as well as what will be the consequences if the trait is absent or abnormal. 
It has been made clear now that ascriptions of goals and functions are a shorthand for 
statements regarding the causal histories of traits. A succinct way in which to convey 
the fact that a trait's past consequences were instrumental in the preservation and 
perpetuation of the trait, is to say that the consequence of the trait's consequence is the 
reproduction of the trait. At this point the time has come to spell out how Darwin 
prepared the foundations for a scientifically legitimate etiological view of goals and 
functions. 
Darwin and the etiological view 
From all the foregoing one should have been able to realise that there would have been 
no properly scientific account of functions and goals in biology without natural selection: 
In this study I have opted for the etiological view as an example of a scientifically 
legitimate account of goals and functions. There are also other views available, such as 
the dispositional account propounded by Bigelow and Pargetter. But the different views 
need not be thought of as conflicting, and can be viewed as supplements to each other, 
each playing a role in a distinct explanatory project. 10 And notwithstanding differences 
10 See Mitchell's (1995:47-51) assessment of the dispositional account argued for by Bigelow 
and Pargetter. In their view biological function should be "forward-looking", rather than 
"backward-looking" as in the etiological view; a dispositional analysis of functions is 
therefore required. They draw on the analogy with biological fitness - which notion was 
rescued from its explanatory failures through being given a dispositional interpretation. 
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in the details of various analyses of functionality and goal-directedness, contemporary 
biology operates within the Darwinian paradigm, which means that natural selection 
and its related concepts, such as fitness and adaptation, will inform whatever accounts 
of teleological explanation people may come up with in biology.11 My choice of the 
etiological view for the purposes of the present study is not wholly arbitrary or 
opportunistic, though. Apart from it having become more or less consensus among 
philosophers of evolutionary biology, there is, in my view, a sense in which it can be 
regarded as the most essential account, both for explanatory and for historical reasons. 
In the first place, the etiological account is more fundamental as regards explanatory 
status, because it is concerned with the ultimate evolutionary causes of traits. By 
referring to a trait's causal history, the trait's presence is explained, that is, we get to 
know the answer to the original question as to why the trait exists. The dispositional 
account, in contrast, is concerned with how an existing trait confers a fitness advantage 
on its possessor, thereby helping to explain why the organism is faring as it does in the 
struggle for existence that constitutes natural selection. On the etiological account, a 
function or a goal is a "consequence which has played a certain role in [a trait's] causal 
history", while on the dispositional account, a function or goal is a trait's "disposition to 
have a certain consequence" (Mitchell, 1995:51 ).12 In my opinion, although I do not 
deny an explanatory role for the dispositional account in biology, I find it to be little more 
than a derivation of, or an extrapolation from the etiological view. The dispositional view 
is too narrowly focused on the present performance of traits to be of use in explaining 
how traits evolve over the long term and come to have functions and goals in the first 
place. The etiological account, on the other hand, already in a sense incorporates the 
dispositional account in its causal histories by illustrating how a trait's having had a 
However, in my opinion Mitchell convincingly shows that their criticism of the etiological 
view is suspect, and that the analogy with fitness applies only to a limited extent. See also 
Salmon (1990:114).' 
11 The causal role analysis of function, which focuses on capacities, has in the mean time 
come to my attention. Amundson & Lauder (1994) argue that this analYSiS, developed in 
psychology by Cummins, may even be more appropriate to evolutionary biology than the 
etiological (selected effect) view. Anatomy especially, according to them, may gain from 
causal role analysis as it is mostly difficult and irrelevant to demonstrate selective histories 
for functional traits. The causal role account is thus not historically defined. In my view, it is 
related to Bigelow and Pargetter's account and thus suffers from much the same problems 
as the dispositional account. See below. 
12 I am drawing in this paragraph, in part, on Mitchell's (1995) formulations and insights, but 
unlike her, I do argue that the etiological view is more fundamental. 
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certain consequence - or, if you like, a trait's having had a disposition to have a certain 
consequence - was instrumental in the reproduction of the trait itself. That the trait 
through its consequence must have conferred a fitness advantage at some stage goes 
without saying, and on the etiological view arguments to that effect will make up the 
causal history of the trait. Citing Mitchell's (1995:51) example will help further clarifying 
the difference between the two views: 
What function explains on the dispositional view is why a large male primate reproduces 
more successfully than a small one. What function explains on the etiological view is why 
male primates are large. 
Now, in my opinion, the dispositional view would not be possible, or at least convincing, 
if not ~acked up by the etiological view. Without any regard for causal histories we are 
liable to make mistaken claims about present goals and functions. 13 Unlike Bigelow and 
Pargetter I do think that a causal history of adaptation is imperative if we are to ascribe 
goals or functions to a trait. The dispositional account will allow the sudden chance 
production of a trait with beneficial consequences to be called functional or goal-
directed, without there having been time to observe whether there is any selection for 
the trait. Such an ahistorical focus on a trait's current utility in a system strips the 
terminology of a lot of its explanatory force. 
Moreover, from the historical point of view of Darwin's breakthrough in the nineteenth 
century, the dispositional account seems almost to amount to a denial of the 
significance of his efforts to found biological explanation on a new scientific basis. A 
dispositional account of goals and functions would have been of little use in an effort to 
defeat a metaphysical teleology. It is not only the fact that talk of "dispositions to have 
certain consequences" sounds strangely familiar - jargon which would not have caused 
a pre-Darwinian biologist restless nights, for it comes so comfortably close to talk of 
inherent purpose, and even reminds of Lamarck's ideas concerning use and disuse and 
the role of organisms' own exertions. It is also the fact that a dispositional account of 
goals and functions does not account for the presence of traits with goals and 
functions; it does not account for the existence of adaptations, which means that no 
scientific explanation is being offered of these phenomena, and there is nothing to rival 
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metaphysical accounts that appeal to special creation and divine design as explanatory 
principles. 
Darwin expressly wanted and needed to make an etiological point. He needed to do 
more than show that organisms are in actual fact adapted to their environments - which 
is really what the dispositional view boils down to, and which is also what Paley and the 
authors of the Bridgewater Treatises knew so well and built their arguments on. To 
defeat the latter Darwin needed to show why organisms are adapted to their 
environments; he needed to produce an alternative and materialist account, one 
appealing to empirical causes and mechanistic processes, but also one which brought 
history into the bargain. 
Darwin had to find a kind of causal process that would render superfluous and 
inappropriate all claims about miraculous origins, god-given adaptations, divine 
interventions and divine guidance in the biological sphere. It was in Lyell's 
uniformitarian geology that he found an important lead: If you wanted to build your 
science on solid foundations, then you had to depart from respectable science-
philosophical principles - principles that would in advance rule out the possibility of 
appeal to strange events (such as miraculous cataclysms) not amenable to sound 
scientific investigation. For Lyell the injunction to search for past geological causes of 
the same kind and intensity as present causes, was not so much informed by beliefs 
concerning the nature of empirical reality, as by science-philosophical and 
methodological considerations: 
Practitioners, Lyell argued, should carry out their investigations under the assumption that 
causes now visible around us (volcanoes, rivers, tidal currents, earthquakes, storms) are of 
the same kind that have acted in the past, and have done so with the same degree of 
intensity as in the present. In the Principles, uniformity was not a theory about the actual 
history of nature, but a policy for securing the philosophical foundations of geology: Lyell 
aimed to define, as he said in a letter, the "principles of reasoning in the science". 
(Secord, 1997:ix). 
Darwin made sure that his theory of evolution by natural selection also adhered to 
13 See Mitchell's (1995:46-47) example of mimicry in butterflies. 
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these principles. After all, biology was in need of the same solid foundations. It had to 
be wrested away from speculation and shown to be subject to ordinary physical causes 
and laws. But if one wanted to account for the impressive array of adaptations found 
among living organisms, and you wanted to account for them in terms of the action of 
modest everyday causes, well then you had better have time on your hands. Doing 
away with the notion of an extraordinary cause capable of single-handedly effecting 
superb new adaptations, meant opting for the slow cumulative approach - adaptations 
had to come into being through small incremental steps. Time thus appeared on the 
stage as a significant new actor. In this respect Darwin made sure to exploit the 
analogy between natural selection and Lyell's geology: 
I am well aware that this doctrine of natural selection, exemplified in the above imaginary 
instances, is open to the same objections which were at first urged against Sir Charles 
Lyell's noble views on 'the modern changes of the earth, as illustrative of geology;' but we 
now very seldom hear the action, for instance, of the coast-waves, called a trifling and 
insignificant cause, when applied to the excavation of gigantic valleys or to the formation of 
the longest lines of inland cliffs. Natural selection can act only by the preservation and 
accumulation of infinitesimally small inherited modifications, each profitable to the preserved 
being; and as modern geology has almost banished such views as the excavation of a great 
valley by a single diluvial wave, so will natural selection, if it be a true principle, banish the 
belief of the continued creation of new organic beings, or of any great and sudden 
modification in their structure. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968: 142]). 
Both geological and biological changes were the products of modest causes operating 
over great periods of time. A geological feature and a biological adaptation both have 
their histories accounting for their presence. There is a difference though: Things like 
gigantic valleys do not evolve in the sense with which we are concerned here; there is 
no question of reproduction and descent with modification. Geological features are not 
products and embodiments of history in the same significant sense that biological ones 
are. Lyell held that the features of the earth's surface were fully reversible: Where there 
is a valley today, there may some ages hence stand a mountain, and more ages into 
the future, a valley again. Of course, the two valleys will not look exactly the same - in 
that sense they are unique historical entities, but far more so are two individual 
organisms; in addition, there will be no connection between the two valleys: the first one 
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will hardly have had an influence on how the second one looks. It is very different with 
biological features - they belong to organisms that form part of a single branching tree 
of life. What happened ages ago as well as what happened recently in the tree's history 
still affect how organisms look today. Furthermore, none of it is reversible: The same 
species cannot emerge twice (although somewhat similar adaptations might). With 
changing circumstances natural selection modifies what is already there, but it never 
retraces its steps. 
Darwin thus proclaimed the thoroughly historical nature of biological organisms and 
their adaptations. There were no eternal essences to be realised. In order to explain 
why a particular adaptation existed, one had to produce its causal history (the Origin is 
full of examples), which combined the contingent nature of chance variation with the 
necessity (albeit probabilistic) of the mechanistic sifting process we have in natural 
selection. 
Important to realise, is that the historicity of organisms and the irreversibility of their 
adaptational complexes cannot in itself be attributed to natural selection: Rather, new 
organismic variations occur quite independently of the workings of natural selection 
(recall the remarks made in the previous chapter). In fact, evolution would have 
proceeded much faster if there were no natural selection - the mutation rate then being 
the only limit. But as it is, natural selection weeds out most mutations, checking the 
number and the kind of courses evolution can take. After all, Darwin's contribution to 
biology was the notion of evolution by natural selection. Natural selection may not be 
able to account for variation, but it does account for adaptation. In other words, it 
determines which variations are preserved, depending upon their beneficial 
consequences with regard to survival and reproduction. But the irreversibility of 
organismic changes are again not so much due to the workings of natural selection as 
to the fact that organisms are complex systems not likely to undergo the same variation 
in reverse. In this regard, Darwin's repeated emphasis on the influence of the "laws of 
correlation of growth" can be interpreted as a recognition of the complexity of 
organismic systems. It is this original complexity of living systems, governed by laws 
(such as those of self-organisation) other than those of natural selection, that accounts 
for the fact that although natural selection may be a mechanistic process, its products 
are not mechanistic or ahistorical. 
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But the workings of natural selection do shape the history of organisms, determining 
which of the chance variations are perpetuated and which discarded. It determines 
which features are useful and which useless in the struggle for existence taking place in 
a given environment. It thus accounts for the emergence of adaptations, of traits with 
apparent goals and apparent functions. It renders the history of traits causal in a very 
particular sense - a sense more specific than the recognition of general physico-
chemical causality, one which concerns the (macroscopic) conditions of survival and 
reproduction. 
Although it gives rise to functional and goal-directed traits, Darwin conceptualised 
natural selection's shaping of organismic history as a wholly mechanistic process, itself 
without purpose or meaning. Daniel Dennett's casting of natural selection as an 
algorithmic process captures this point well. An algorithm is lOa certain sort of formal 
process that can be counted on - logically - to yield a certain sort of result whenever it is 
'run' or instantiated" (Dennett, 1995:50). Its three chief characteristics are: substrate 
neutrality (it is the logical structure of the procedure that guarantees the results, not the 
causal powers of the materials in which it is instantiated), underlying mindlessness (the 
process can be broken down into a series of small simple steps requiring no 
intelligence), and guaranteed results (if executed correctly, it will always yield the 
results it is supposed to). Provided that the requisite empirical conditions for the 
execution of the kind of process are met in nature, it will test out mechanically whatever 
random candidate it is presented with and yield a certain logical outcome. (Dennett, 
1995:48-60). Dennett's notion of natural selection as an algorithmic process reminds of 
Popper's (1965 [1979:243]) characterisation of the evolutionary process in terms of the 
following schema: 
TS1 
71 ~ 
P1 -7 TS2 -7 EE -7 P2 
~ 71 
• 
• 
• 
116 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
where P1 is a problem faced by a type of organism in its environment; TS is the 
tentative solutions to the problem in the form of new phenotypical traits; EE is the 
process of error-elimination (selection) to which the tentative solutions are subject; and 
P2 is the new problem situation emerging through the former one's being solved. Each 
different problem situation can then be said to instantiate a new algorithm. 
In natural selection, we thus have not just one algorithm, but a whole class of them 
yielding different results (Dennett, 1995:51 ).14 What they have in common, is that they 
are all concerned with results that entail the preservation of traits that are useful to 
organisms in their struggle for existence in their particular environments. However, 
natural selection is probabilistic in the sense that the algorithms will generally, but not in 
each and every instance be instantiated in such a way that they actually do preserve 
the fittest trait. This is because the required conditions are not always met, and 
contingencies to enter into the process. Nevertheless, on the whole the expected 
results are produced, results apparently exhibiting design, but produced in an utterly 
mindless and purposeless manner, driven by nothing except the blind action of ordinary 
physical causes. 
In following Herschel and Lyell in their adherence to the vera causa doctrine, Darwin 
bought into a concept of nature holding that natural events do not proceed by leaps and 
bounds but by modest changes brought about by equally modest causes acting over 
great periods of time to produce the more significant changes. This doctrine of Natura 
non facit sa/tum, to which Darwin repeatedly refers by name in the Origin, was duly 
applied by him to the biological sphere. His conceptualisation of natural selection as a 
14 The abstract and formal aspects of Darwin's argument can be aknowledged through such 
an algorithmic interpretation of natural selection. Says Dennett (1995:48): ''The idea [ ... ] 
that Darwin should be seen, rather, as postulating that evolution is an algoritmic process, 
permits us to do justice to the undeniable a priori flavor of Darwin's thinking without forcing 
it into the Procrustean (and obsolete) bed of the nomological-deductive modeL" However, 
this point should not be taken as yielding to those, like Popper (1970 [1979:69-70]; 1965 
[1979:241-242]), who accuse natural selection of being a "tautological" principle or a 
"logical truism", that is of employing the notion of the "survival of the fittest" which really 
means nothing but "those that survive are those that survive". These claims do not hold any 
water, because, in fact, actual survival and reproduction are not the criterion of fitness. By 
interpreting natural selection as a probabilistic process and fitness as a certain propensity 
or chance to survive and reproduce, the tautology objection falls away, as it is no longer the 
case that the fittest individuals will always survive. Cf. Mitchell (1995:48) and Wilson 
(1991 :222). See also Wilson's (1991 :217ff) countering of Popper's claims that "Darwinism 
is not a testable scientific theory" and that it does not really predict or explain. 
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process operating by small steps to preserve slight successive modifications, thus 
accords well with Dennett's characterisation of it as an algorithmic process. Darwin may 
have interpreted biological phenomena as historical phenomena, as phenomena 
carrying with them the unique marks of history, but he made sure that the history of life 
was not a wholly random and capricious affair. It was subject to a relatively systematic 
process of selection and elimination through ordinary every-day causes. 
Throughout this thesis I have argued that an interpretation of natural selection as a 
mechanistic process accords well with Darwin's conceptualisation of the former. 
However, there are developments in evolutionary theory that challenge mechanistic 
interpretations of natural selection such as that proposed by Dennett (1995). Certain 
kinds of emphasis on the role of organisms' self-organisation and complexity in 
evolution could affect the way in which natural selection is conceptualised as well. For 
instance, Eigen (1992:123,125) does not see as selection as a "blind sieve", but rather 
as active and driven by an internal feedback mechanism that searches for the best 
route to optimal performance by virtue of an inherent non-linear mechanism. Eigen 
bases his interpretation on the ideas of "sequence space" and "quasi-species" - ideas 
which fit into the new physics of non-equilibrium states. This notion of evolution as 
steering very effectively in the direction of the "optimum value peak", is entirely at odds 
with the classical interpretation derived from Darwin. I have chosen to stick to the 
classical path, as a consensus on these issues has not yet emerged, and as there are 
important historical reasons for attending to Darwin's own conceptualisation and the 
tradition thereby initiated. For one, Darwin's proposing of natural selection in the form of 
a kind of mechanical sifting process as cause of adaptation was indeed very effective in 
rooting out metaphysical ideas of purpose in living phenomena. The mentioned new 
developments do sometimes seem to me to return to notions of "direction" and the like 
that should be handled with extreme care. 
As for Darwin's own belief in the lack of inherent purposiveness and direction in the 
process of natural selection - one of the ways in which he expressed the insight, was by 
drawing attention to the fact that natural selection will rarely if ever produce petiection 
in the sense of perfect adaptation. That is not its goal. It has no goal. It yields whatever 
emerges from the struggle for existence, and that is not absolute perfection: 
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Natural selection in each well-stocked country, must act chiefly through the competition of 
the inhabitants one with another, and consequently will produce perfection, or strength in the 
battle for life, only according to the standard of that country. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:232]). 
Natural selection tends only to make each organic being as perfect as, or slightly more 
perfect than, the other inhabitants of the same country with which it has to struggle for 
existence. [ ... J Natural selection will not produce absolute perfection, nor do we always meet, 
as far as we can judge, with this high standard under nature. The correction for the 
aberration of light is said, on high authority, not to be perfect even in that most perfect organ, 
the eye. 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:229]). 
Although Darwin was not averse to the idea of present-day inhabitants of certain 
climates being better adapted than ancient inhabitants of the same kinds of climate,15 
he saw this as the logical outcome of a linear and mechanical process, one operating 
through many trails and errors, a wasteful process, not a process that somehow quickly 
steers towards the best results. 
This then, was Darwin's contribution to biological explanation: He demonstrated how a 
materialist mechanistic history could be provided of those biological traits which seem 
to be directed, as if by intent, to the achievement of goals and the fulfilment of 
functions. He extensively argued for natural selection as the vera causa of adaptive 
modification, demonstrating not only the plausibility of its existence, but also of its 
competence to account for the diversity of biological phenomena, as well as its actual 
15 Stephen J. Gould (1996) will probably deny even this limited claim by Darwin. In his work, 
Life's Grandeur: The spread of excellence from Plato to Darwin, he argues against the idea 
of any general trend towards greater complexity; the absence of such a trend being due to 
the randomness with which the different environments to which organisms must adapt 
themselves, succeed each other. Although the more complex organisms emerged later in 
the history of life than the first simple organisms, that only means that there is a passive 
trend towards greater variety, that is, through time there arose, inCidentally, by chance, a 
variety of organisms differing in their degrees of complexity. But the pattern of overall 
results emerging is not due to a driven trend, that is, it is not a case of each element 
evolving with a bias for change in a certain direction. Greater (morphological, 
developmental, functional) complexity per se, does not guarantee success in the struggle 
for existence. See Gould 1996:204ff for McShea's distinction between driven and passive 
trends and how they could be recognised. However, a more careful analysis and 
comparison with Darwin's views are needed. The question is whether Darwin himself 
makes the mistake Gould exposes in others, the mistake of confusing greater adaptedness 
with greater complexity. 
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responsibility for their production. His causal histories of biological adaptations drew on 
ordinary empirical causes, doing away with the need for metaphysical considerations 
and divine intention, thereby transforming biological explanation into a thoroughly 
scientific enterprise. He therein presented (in essence and by example, but not yet in 
name and explicated model) biological explanation of adaptation with an etiological 
model. He succeeded in giving adaptation a scientific causal basis in the form of a 
historical selection background. 
Although the kind of explanation we gan give, upon Darwin's theory, of any particular 
adaptation, may not fit the deductive-nomological model, it is still crucial to biology, and 
can be characterised, following Wilson (1991:105-106) as narrative explanation. The 
latter tries to answer the question Why? in the "context of an assertion about some 
event E to the effect that E happened because s". It "provides a sketch of a fuller 
explanation of how it could be that E happened because of s". For example, it would 
provide a fuller explanation of the paradoxical claim that amphibians developed limbs 
enabling them to live on land, so that they could in fact be better adapted to remain in 
(get back to) the water (during droughts). But there is no simple generality connecting E 
(developing limbs) with s (having to remain in the water). That is why narrative 
explanations do not seem to fit the deductive-nomological model. However, the 
important thing is to gain scientific intelligibility, and that is exactly what narrative 
explanation gives us in its own way. Explains Wilson (1991 :111): 
A narrative explanation, one which renders "E because s" plausible by suggesting certain 
intermediate steps which could possibly account for that change, has the merit of embodying 
a set of detailed suggestions about how the gappy explanation "E because s" could be 
improved. A narrative explanation contains a set of detailed hypotheses which, if subsequent 
research verifies them, will provide a less imperfect explanation of E. For the practising 
scientist, then, a narrative explanation is both an explanation, but one which is gappy and 
imperfect, and also a sketch of a research programme for eliminating acknowledged gaps. 
Wilson's account of narrative explanation can be viewed as fully compatible with the 
etiological or selected effect model of functional and goal-directed explanation 
developed above. Both fully recognise the role of history in the explanation of 
adaptation. 
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I conclude with the following quotation from Darwin (which draws in part on the Beagle 
experience, and betrays his European imperialist roots), where he takes recourse to 
metaphor in order to describe how the acknowledgement of the historical nature of 
living beings makes their characteristics intelligible to us: 
When we no longer look at an organic being as a savage looks at a ship, as at something 
wholly beyond his comprehension; when we regard every production of nature as one which 
has had a history; when we contemplate every complex structure and instinct as the 
summing up of many contrivances, each useful to the possessor, nearly in the same way as 
when we look at any great mechanical invention as the summing up of the labour, the 
experience, the reason, and even the blunders of numerous workmen; when we thus view 
each organic being, how far more interesting, I speak from experience, will the study of 
natural history become! 
(Darwin, 1859 [1968:456]). 
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5 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, and to pinpoint again Darwin's important contribution to the issue of what 
a legitimate form of explanation in biology should consist of, we can retrace some of the 
ground covered in the course of this study. 
To begin with, in the first chapter, it emerged that teleological explanation was subject 
to changing fortunes during the centuries since Aristotle, and indeed, the spiral went 
inexorably downward. From being an all-embracing metaphysicai world-view bestowing 
meaning and purpose everywhere and upon everything, dictating the place of each 
object and organism in a fixed universal hierarchy; to being exorcised from the physical 
sciences as incompatible with a materialistic and mechanistic account of phenomena, 
and being uneasily confined to the life sciences; it eventually reached a point where we 
ask whether what we ar~ busy with now in biology is any longer to be designated as 
teleological explanation, and whether teleology, in any sense of the word, is not now 
definitely a thing of the past. 
In the second chapter, an exposition of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection 
was presented. It took the form of an analysis of his argument in terms of its main 
premises and conclusions, elucidating its logical structure and evidential support. It was 
demonstrated how Darwin strove to conform to the older empiricist vera causa tradition 
which required arguing for the existence, competence and responsibility of natural 
selection in order to establish it as the true cause of the origin and diversification of 
species. 
In the third chapter, the dire implications of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural 
selection for the conceptions of design underwritten by revealed and natural theology at 
the time, came to light. It appeared as if the positing of an empirical, probabilistic and 
mechanistic process as the cause which yielded all the marvellous adaptations we used 
to think were individually fashioned by the hand of God (or at the very least engineered 
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by him through secondary causes), had overthrown teleological explanation and 
eliminated all possibility of its return. 
However, in the fourth chapter, it has been noted that far from banishing teleological 
terminology from his writing, Darwin went right ahead with its use in describing the 
adaptations natural selection has brought about: Adaptations were adaptations for 
certain tasks; they had ends, purposes, functions or final causes. Somehow it still made 
sense to speak in this manner when observing the workings of organisms - there did 
after all seem to be an undeniable functionality and goal-directed ness to organisms and 
their constitutive parts. But the question was how use of terminology with such a 
problematic history, could be justified in biological science. The answer presented was 
that an etiological approach to explanations in terms of goals and functions, enable us 
to found these terms on an empirical causal basis - that of the process of natural 
selection, which, of course, was Darwin's great contribution. No longer things that lie 
beckoning in an unrealised future, goals and functions are now made to designate past 
consequences, their content being determined by the empirical causal histories of traits. 
In what has gone before, the links between two distinct debates have in actual fact 
been traced, two debates removed from each other by a period of more or less a 
hundred years. The first took place within a nineteenth century milieu that was still 
struggling to liberate all forms of scientific explanation from religious dogma and 
unfounded speculation; the second took place in the aftermath of the triumph of the 
deductive-nomological model. What has been attempted in this study, was an 
elucidation of the fact that the kind of theory Darwin developed at the time, was capable 
not only of discrediting reigning metaphysical explanations in biology, but also of 
transforming the whole concept of teleological explanation in such a fundamental way 
that it was enabled to attain scientific legitimacy in the present. It did take more than a 
century for an adequate model of his reasoning to be threshed out, probably partly 
because, as Mayr says, Darwin continued use of teleological language in what we 
should now rather call (according to Mayr) a strictly teleonomic context. But, thanks to 
Darwin, and to leave aside all ambiguity, it is actually no longer "teleology" that is "alive 
and well" in biology, nor explanation in terms of goals and functions. It is explanation in 
terms of apparent goals and apparent functions. 
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